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Introduction: development, 
contingency and entanglement: 
decolonization in the conditional
Andrew W. M. Smith and Chris Jeppesen
The imperfect tense describes an indefinite ending:  in the past, it is 
irresolute; in the future, it is conditional. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the vast African empires of Britain and France started to break 
apart in ways that seemed to defy the political will of the colonizers. By 
1966 most of the African continent had gained independence and new 
nation states raised the standards of liberation.1 Looking back on the 
political reconfigurations of this period, it can appear that an unstoppable 
storm swept across the African continent during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Indeed, leading figures on both sides of the colonial divide 
regularly chose to remind diverse audiences at this time that events 
were being propelled by uncontainable, natural forces. Be it through 
Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’, Nkrumah’s ‘raging hurricane’ or the tides 
of history washing France out of Algeria, European colonialism appeared 
destined to be overwhelmed by forces beyond its control.2
Yet, as Frederick Cooper astutely reminds us, when explaining the 
end of European empires in the middle of the twentieth century, histori-
ans all too often fall into traps set by knowing how the story ends.3 The 
surety of the destination, however, should not make an arduous jour-
ney any simpler in reflection. Whether through violent confrontation or 
negotiated transition, possibilities for political change grew and shrank 
in the decades after 1945. There was no straight, single path that led to 
the end of empire, just as there was never one united voice raised in defi-
ance of colonial rule.4 Across many territories the departing pageantry 
of colonial authority, typified in its last moment in the folding up and 
unfurling of flags, invoked a sense of order and control that was seldom 
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in evidence as those ceremonies were conceived.5 New ‘developmental’ 
initiatives after 1945 profoundly changed the relationship between local 
people and the colonial powers. They generated new opportunities for 
negotiation, opened spaces in which claims could be made upon the state 
and provoked bitter challenges that pushed against the limits of colonial 
authority. The outcomes of these encounters were not preordained; 
unforeseen consequences created contingent moments in which the pro-
cess of political change became redirected.6
The chapters in this volume coalesce around three central themes 
of development, contingency and entanglement to explore when and 
why such possibilities emerged, and also chart their disappearance dur-
ing the period of ‘late colonial shift’ from around 1945 to 1970.7 Sifting 
through the complicated processes that shaped decolonization permits 
us to account for, to measure and to analyse the messiness and fluidity so 
often flagged up as beyond the terms of study. Cutting across traditional 
chronological frames allows us to look askance at the process of decoloni-
zation, and to consolidate different historiographies. Visions of the future 
were conceived in the conditional tense, and give us the sense of a future 
imperfect. These drew upon connections, movements and ideologies that 
had started to form during the interwar period but that were intensified 
and transformed during six years of global conflict.8 Profound political, 
economic and cultural developments in Europe and Africa inflected the 
imperfect visions of the future that arose, and make this period especially 
significant in understanding the end of European empires in Africa.
Decolonization resists easy definition or periodization. Like the 
process itself, writing the history of decolonization in Africa remains 
fraught and contested. In its shallowest and narrowest form, decoloni-
zation refers to the transfer of sovereignty from colonizer to colonized. 
Even though political and economic entanglements endured, the transfer 
of power represented a moment of profound realignment. This seemed to 
invite the view on both sides that the process had always been inevitable. 
For European powers, self- congratulatory Whiggish proclamations cel-
ebrated a job well done.9 In contrast, within newly independent African 
nation states, narratives of national liberation celebrated hard- won 
independence as the foundation myth for new national histories, born 
of struggle and achieved through the victory of nationalism over coloni-
alism. These dichotomies quickly crept into initial retellings of the end 
of European empire, drowning out alternative narratives. Politicians and 
commentators emphasized points of fracture over enduring continuities, 
while scholars, often with one eye on the present, settled into arguments 
about whether independence was given, taken or inevitable.
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Over the previous two decades the field of decolonization studies has 
been transformed.10 Rather than focusing on shallow flag independence, 
explorations of deep decolonization range far beyond questions of territorial 
sovereignty,11 instead exploring what Senegalese poet and politician Léopold 
Senghor has called ‘the decolonization of minds’.12 Entrenched binaries and 
teleological assumptions have been broken down, and smooth narratives 
running towards an inevitable end point disrupted. This is what Michael 
Collins explores in Chapter 1, which traces a number of important trends in 
the historiography of decolonization. Collins’ in- depth historiographical sur-
vey is intended to stress the importance of perspective and highlight the ways 
in which discussions of decolonization have been shaped by their contempo-
rary contexts. Issues of agency, discussions of legacies, and the compact of the 
imperial nation state all offer rich seams for interrogating the ways in which 
the end of European empires has been framed by historians. What emerges 
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is a messy, contingent and contested constellation of intersecting and 
often competing processes, which cut across local, national, imperial and 
global contexts. Such distinctions were familiar to African opponents of 
colonial rule in the late 1950s. For Senghor, decolonization had to involve 
more than the transfer of political power. Writing in Le Monde in 1957, he 
explained: ‘By decolonization, I mean the abolition of all prejudice, of any 
superiority complex in the minds of the colonizer, and also of any inferiority 
complex in the mind of the colonized.’13 Colonial authority never rested on 
juridical control alone. Its perpetuation depended upon complex systems 
of knowledge and power that facilitated the physical, racial, economic and 
linguistic subordination of colonial peoples.14
One of the great challenges of explaining late twentieth- century 
decolonization in Africa is how to capture the diversity of local particu-
larity while threading this into a coherent overarching narrative that 
situates the broadly contemporaneous breakdown of European empires 
amidst the turbulent currents of post- 1945 global politics. To achieve 
this, Martin Shipway has elsewhere stressed the need to triangulate 
‘between “top down” and “grass roots” perspectives, and by comparing 
the various colonial empires [to] arrive at that curious entity known in 
the literature as the “colonial state” ’.15 For Shipway, the colonial state 
was the prize for which colonial governments and nationalist oppo-
nents fought. Likewise, for John Darwin, the very idea of its ‘lateness’ 
changed the nature of the compromises struck between the colonized 
and colonizers, as broader global pressures met an ever denser mesh 
of local conflicts.16 By focusing on the colonial state not as a manifes-
tation of European control but as a composite of competing systems of 
power, structures of sovereignty and channels of interaction, we can 
understand it as an unruly space in which divergent ambitions could be 
pursued.17 This encourages an analytical approach that is more openly 
comparative, allowing us to break down the conceptual borders of for-
mal empires and recognize the resonance of British and French attempts 
to impose authority over a wealth of local communities and nations 
anew, while trying to resist the wider processes that eroded the basis 
of colonial legitimacy during the twentieth century. While these acted 
upon different empires in uneven ways, and provoked often drastically 
divergent responses, they offer, in Martin Thomas’ formulation, new 
insight into how colonial powers decided between ‘fight or flight’.18
By the late 1950s most observers recognized that significant change 
loomed on the horizon. Following Britain and France’s humiliation during 
the Suez Crisis, a new confluence of pressures emanating in the metro-
pole, colonies and wider international arena ensured that maintenance of 
the status quo could satisfy very few. For metropolitan planners, colonial 
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resources and markets had not generated the desired boost to stuttering 
European economies, and, with anti- colonial agitation mounting, the 
costs of maintaining an empire rapidly appeared to be outstripping the 
benefits.19 A series of brutal confrontations between colonial authorities 
and local opponents across Africa and Asia highlighted the fragile founda-
tions of European authority, whilst the rise of mass nationalist movements 
in many territories generated new expressions of a popular will for racial 
and political equality.20 These calls were amplified within global insti-
tutions and Cold War configurations, which provided new forums and 
vocabularies to strip colonialism of any lingering ideological legitimacy.21 
And yet, even at this stage, few could confidently predict how long or what 
shape this transformation would take.22
This volume draws out the interplay between cultural, political and 
economic forces within and between European decolonization in Africa 
during the period of late colonial shift. Frederick Cooper has led this trend, 
focusing on ‘the pushing and tugging at colonial relationships’ and stress-
ing the importance of the febrile period of decolonization over the assumed 
narrative of colonial decline.23 At both the level of the state and below, this 
was a process as defined by its lingering entanglements as it was by funda-
mental changes to formal structures. For metropolitan audiences, decolo-
nization did not simply unfold elsewhere. As Elizabeth Buettner lays bare, 
it helped reconfigure European societies in fundamental ways.24 In captur-
ing the fluid relationship between ‘metropole and colony’, Gary Wilder has 
reframed France as an ‘imperial nation state’, expanding the frame of ref-
erence to look beyond a hexagonal view of its colonial relationships, and 
privileging the nuanced and often messy transfers between politics, activ-
ism and the arts.25 In service of this understanding, the chapters in this vol-
ume consider micro- histories, memories and transnational debates, all of 
which are situated within the years around the end of empires. They chart 
a multiplicity of transformative forces within and beyond colonial borders, 
recognizing where processes were bound by geographic limits and where 
they spilled over.26 In considering these messy moments of late colonial 
tension and transformation, this volume develops three main themes: 
development, contingency and entanglement.
Development
Far from initiating a retreat from empire, the experience of the Second 
World War made European powers more determined to reinvigor-
ate their African colonies in new ways. Post- war reconstruction at 
home would be matched by a restructuring of empire overseas. War 
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had sapped European powers’ economic and physical strength, but, 
more decisively, also undercut the moral basis of empire itself.27 In 
the aftermath of the war, and amidst the crystallizing polarities of the 
Cold War and the first wave of decolonization in Asia, the cacophony 
of voices raised in criticism of European empire grew in volume 
and number.28
A generation earlier, the Wilsonian moment’s apparent prom-
ise for colonial peoples had dissipated amidst repressive coercion 
and brutal reprisal.29 In contrast, as Emma Hunter has explained, the 
period between the pronouncement of the Atlantic Charter (1941) and 
the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
‘marked a rupture in traditions of international political thinking’.30 
New international institutions enshrined self- determination as a uni-
versal goal, while a discourse of universal human rights threw the 
essential contradictions of imperial power into stark relief on a global 
stage – processes explored by Robert Skinner in Chapter 5. In conse-
quence, European powers accepted that a return to the orthodoxies of 
the interwar years was no longer sufficient. In place of the old axioms 
of indirect rule, trusteeship and the mission civilisatrice, colonial devel-
opment was placed at the heart of a reconceptualized colonial project. 
While ideas of colonial development had long roots reaching back 
to the nineteenth century, the post-1945 iteration seemed to mark a 
decisive shift that was both practical and discursive.31 Development 
became a lens through which diverse groups sought to spy very differ-
ent futures; it was never monolithic in meaning, intent or outcome. 
As such, development initiatives created a web that spanned metro-
politan and colonial contexts, and incorporated state and non- state 
actors. In revealing the gap between ideology and practice, devel-
opment exposes the interplay of high politics, structural change and 
popular response.32 It offers an insight into the underlying dynamics 
of the late colonial shift and the contingent processes that shaped the 
final breakdown of European empires in Africa, as well as situating 
these within a wider Cold War context.33
Although reforming voices had been calling for greater intervention 
by the colonial state to tackle the problems of hunger, poverty, exploita-
tion and disease since the 1930s, it was not until after the war that the 
resources required to realize these ambitions became available. Swept 
up in post- war optimism, metropolitan planners fervently proclaimed 
the potential for science and technology to deliver material improve-
ment to both European and colonial societies. Few saw any contradiction 
in deploying technocratic expertise to improve standards of living and 
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productivity through ‘welfare’ at home or ‘development’ in the colonies, 
while simultaneously boosting metropolitan economies. Although it was 
never confined to those on the left of European politics, this redemp-
tive vision for empire, as Charlotte Riley documents in Chapter 2, found 
enthusiastic advocates in the British Labour Party. Riley stresses that for 
some members of Attlee and Wilson’s Labour governments developmen-
talism came to define the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, even 
if that definition was not always meaningful for recipients of aid or decol-
onizing peoples. Colonial development schemes facilitated a reimagin-
ing of the relationship between colonial powers and colonized territories 
in the years after 1945, which created new forms of influence to protect 
key interests after the end of formal rule. The Labour Party emerges as 
a means of tracking changes in an evolving discourse of humanitarian 
aid, which had its roots in post- 1945 colonial development. This analysis 
stresses that the humanitarian work of the 1960s and onwards reflects 
the ways in which Labour ministers attempted to imagine an alternative 
colonial future in the aftermath of the war.
Far from constituting an expression of colonial hegemony, post- 
1945 development remained a contested and contingent process of 
negotiation between European governments, colonial officials, com-
mercial interests and local people.34 In Chapter 3, Marta Musso analyses 
the complexities of decolonization in relation to resource competition. 
By focusing on the discovery of oil in the Sahara, another aspect of the 
complex entanglement of empire is revealed. The interaction of states 
and non- state actors complicated negotiations considerably, drawing 
together conflicting partners and forcing political solutions to follow the 
impulses of business. Musso’s chapter reconstructs a series of negotia-
tions in which sovereignty and capital were crucial but uncertain. This 
offers a compelling illustration of how visions of the future could shape 
negotiations, and how development was contested and multidirectional. 
While the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) bartered off rights 
to those whom it could support, the French state sought to undermine 
North African solidarity by dealing with the Tunisians. A turbulent global 
political situation acted as a backdrop for these negotiations, in which 
the Suez Crisis and the ‘battle of Algiers’ served as vital considerations 
for the money men looking to invest in a viable future and French officials 
hoping to secure access to valuable resources. These multiple contingent 
judgements shaped the experience of development, and spanned the net-
work of entanglements that criss- crossed the late colonial state.
In formulating their vision of a technocratic revolution, metropoli-
tan bureaucrats took little account of how individuals and groups across 
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Africa were also reimagining the possibilities for change now open to 
them. But indigenous populations never sat passively by while colonial 
officials remade the world around them.35 Local responses displayed 
understandable mistrust at attempts to interfere in established agricul-
tural practices and the intimacies of domestic life.36 Lamenting such an 
attitude, Senghor said of late colonial development policy: ‘The people of 
the overseas territories are more sensitive to the means of giving than the 
gift itself. More precisely, the problem is not the giving, but to discuss the 
gift between partners in the communauté on an equal footing.’37 Colonial 
officials were left with little option but to pursue a pragmatic approach 
based upon negotiation and conversation, rather than compulsion, in 
order to achieve any impact at all. Even so, the reliance on violent coer-
cion as a means of imposing order did not diminish.38 Events in Kenya 
and Algeria may provide the starkest reminder that the ending of empire 
could depend upon a brutal bloodletting, but this should not detract from 
the everyday forms of popular and political violence seen across almost 
all decolonizing territories.39
Development initiatives not only impacted on the physical land-
scape of colonial territories, they also asked (and often demanded) that 
Africans thought about themselves in new ways.40 After 1945 develop-
ment sat alongside human rights as an emancipatory discourse.41 In rec-
ognizing colonial subjects’ right to make demands upon the state, colonial 
powers opened a dialogue that, as Skinner explores in Chapter 5, African 
leaders would take in unforeseen directions, and in so doing create new 
possibilities for political transformation. In appropriating the language 
of development to make their own claims upon the state, African trade 
unionists, farmers, mine workers, ex- soldiers and politicians, as well as 
many ordinary men and women, demanded that colonial governments 
make good on abstract promises by delivering equality of pay, education, 
rights, welfare services and political reform.42
Unsurprisingly, developmental colonialism never realized the benef-
icent promises many European officials liked to proclaim; neither did it 
equate to unbridled exploitation, however.43 Britain and France both con-
tinued to actively extract economic, strategic and diplomatic benefits from 
the grossly unequal relationships of empire, but they also embarked on a 
far- reaching series of interventions that created new opportunities for fur-
ther change. Development initiatives infringed on the lives of indigenous 
people in new and increasingly intrusive ways. They opened alternative 
possibilities for political collaboration, participation and contestation 
that unfolded in unpredictable ways in the decades after 1945. It was this 
uncertainty that meant that, even in the mid- 1950s, the shape and the 
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extent of self- government remained ambiguous in many  territories, and 
predictions of the future remained imperfect.44
Contingency
Contingency, as a tonic for inevitability, has become an increasingly 
important consideration when writing about the end of empire. It is a 
concept that is both vital in the possibilities it creates and ephemeral in 
the uncertainty it engenders. It invokes the conditional tense, and the 
sense of an ending, but avoids the surety of known outcomes. In prior-
itizing an anti- teleological reading of decolonization, this sense of the 
‘future imperfect’ is a revealing lens through which to view the present of 
the past. By sifting through the conditional sense of what would, could 
and should have happened, we can find a new insight into how those 
projections of colonial futures were formed.
In Freedom Time, Gary Wilder unpacks how the perception of his-
torical time and the projection of colonial futures energized anti- imperial 
activists just as it panicked national governments.45 The shifting scales of 
this ‘freedom time’, perceived during this moment of accelerated change, 
were both scalable and palpable. Administrators, activists and ordinary 
people not only conceived of different futures but held different under-
standings of time.46 When colonial administrators articulated the idea 
of – ever- diminishing – ‘timetables for self- government’, they were try-
ing to impose order on the competing and clashing pressures that were 
reshaping the colonial relationship.47 The contestation over shaping these 
was more than a battle over specific points of change and the minutiae 
of detail; it was also a contest over the control of time. The perspective 
gained from looking back after the end of empire ‘glosses over the con-
tingency and sheer complexity of major historical crises, and the extent 
to which the impact of crisis led the actors involved to recast their actions 
retrospectively in terms of the “wider” historical picture’.48 Historians are 
often trapped by the timetables preserved in archival records, in which 
taxonomy seemingly leaves little room for chance.49
The 1950s, in particular, were a period of profound social, cultural 
and political crisis. There is both a historical and a historicized meaning to 
this idea of late colonial crisis. When writing about the history of decolo-
nization, the 1950s signify, as Reinhart Koselleck terms it, ‘a historically 
immanent transitional phase’.50 The experience of profound change aug-
mented the expectation of further change in the present. By looking at the 
1950s as a moment of crisis, we can begin to unravel the mindsets that 
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met the oncoming change. Yet there was also a contemporary  reading 
in which events were pushing towards a moment that meant action, or 
some other reckoning. This destination was neither defined nor delim-
ited by those responding, though it became clear that European empires 
could no longer exist as they had done for the previous half- century. 
Opportunities and threats were assessed in the context they arose, and in 
the late colonial state they seemed to many to augur some grand realign-
ment. Untangling the historical constellations of those in the midst of this 
crisis (both real and imagined) allows us to better understand the crisis 
itself. Michael Collins has observed how the ‘compression of the histori-
cal space between empire and nation- state’ transformed alternatives and 
recast narratives while they were still being written.51 The broad ‘horizon 
of expectation’, as it was imagined by anti- colonial nationalists, adminis-
trators or the innumerable individuals of the British and French imperial 
nation states, stretched out far beyond what they had seen in the late colo-
nial ‘space of experience’.52 An anti- teleological reading allows the recon-
struction of the ideational contexts in which people found it meaningful 
to explore alternatives, question their relationships to power and parse 
everyday impressions, whatever the outcome.
This sits uncomfortably with a narrative of inevitable decoloniza-
tion, largely defined by the loud voices that echoed after the transfer of 
power. Looking at alternatives in their contingent context prioritizes dif-
ferent voices, and changes the tenor of their speech. Conditional readings 
conjure up nuance and uncertainty often lost to the seemingly definitive 
past. The poetry of Guinean artist and politician Keïta Fodéba provides 
a useful example.53 His poem ‘African Dawn’ was originally released in 
1950, in a collection called Poèmes africains. From this point, Fodéba fol-
lowed an impressive artistic trajectory that took his troupe, the Ballets 
Africains, all across the globe. In 1958 he became the interior minister 
of the newly independent Guinea, helping to define its culture and its 
systems of government, as well as its climate of brutal internal repression 
and the infamous prison at Camp Boiro. At this stage his work remained 
popular, as the 1965 reissue of his poetry attested. This revised edition 
contained important changes, however. Five words were added to the 
poem ‘African Dawn’: the line ‘Yes, it was the dawn’ became ‘Yes, it was 
the dawn… the dawn of African freedom’. The act of alteration changes 
the character of the book itself, and imbues it with a certainty absent 
from the original. Fodéba was an artist long before he was Sekou Touré’s 
red right hand. By recognizing and reconstructing these changes, we can 
salvage a contingent moment from oblivion, and better understand its 
context.54 Without privileging a dominant narrative, such as the coherent 
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demands of strident anti- colonial activists or the defence of imperial loy-
alists, it becomes more possible to look at the contemporary history of 
the past, and to offer some analysis of the ‘quixotic space of premonition, 
probability, and speculation’.55 In this volume, a focus on the conditional 
offers a better means to triangulate competing perspectives in the late 
colonial state, and better understand the messy and many- layered pro-
cess of decolonization.
In Chapter 4, Andrew W. M. Smith offers a vision of how the idea of 
contingency can be read into moments of indecision. By highlighting the 
simple, but crucial, element of uncertainty, we can read a different nar-
rative in the viewpoints of contemporary actors. This chapter analyses 
three documents in historical context, while reflecting on the research 
stories that support them: a book by an academic bound to empire, 
extracts from African students’ homework gathered by the colonial state, 
and a report by a colonial administrator at the end of his service. In each 
case, an anti- teleological reading of decolonization is combined with 
a material history of the source, and a reflection on the background of 
the authors. Recreating these ideational contexts allows us to recast the 
issues of the day on the day. Refocusing the narrative, in this social his-
tory of ideas, is not intended to supplant grander narratives but, rather, 
to illustrate the personal and intangible connections that supported the 
imperial nation state.
Beyond moments of indecision lay longer debates, which addressed 
the futures of African states and their people in a similarly contingent 
fashion. In Chapter 5, Robert Skinner analyses how the terms of human 
rights talk emerged out of a responsive relationship with their context, 
dependent on the many contingent turns of the decolonization period. 
This chapter looks at international anti- apartheid activism in the 1950s 
and 1960s, to examine in particular the vague and diffuse sense in which 
ideas of ‘human rights’ were deployed by activists. The definitions of 
‘human rights’ that became dominant in the 1970s did not emerge from 
a static vision espoused by utopian radicals, nor was it a post facto impo-
sition by colonial states but, rather, an illustration of how ‘pushing and 
tugging’ shaped the processes and discourses of politics in colony and 
metropole. Ideational contexts were not always static, nor easy to trace, 
and this chapter cuts across horizontal and vertical bonds to analyse a 
transnational discourse shaped by the ‘freedom time’ context of the late 
colonial state.56 Through this framework, individuals and groups sought 
new ways of mobilizing political protest, modes of action and participa-
tion in the light of decolonization. ‘Solidarity’ against apartheid, while 
resonant with older forms of liberal and socialist internationalism, 
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developed in parallel with attempts to promote new forms of  political 
engagement that transcended national borders  – just as these bor-
ders increasingly came to mark, define and demarcate newly sovereign 
territories.
Entanglement
The transfer of sovereignty to successor governments may have marked 
the end of formal control, but widespread entanglements remained at 
both the level of the state and below.57 European non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs), businesses, charities, mercenaries and many 
others stepped into the spaces left by the retreating colonial state, often 
replicating previous inequalities of power in new forms. In recognizing 
the particular importance of post- war developmental impulses, and the 
contingent influence of perceived and anticipated change, the entangle-
ments of the late colonial state are given fresh importance in this volume. 
This was not simply the product of neo- colonial exploitation but a more 
fundamental recasting of connections. The end of formal rule did not rend 
the relationship between Europe and Africa but simply unpicked some of 
the threads in a densely woven cloth. Many European officials in the late 
1950s would have appreciated this view. Although they were increas-
ingly prepared to accept that the end of formal control was becoming ever 
more likely, few believed this should necessitate a profound realignment 
in the relationship between Europe and Africa.58 As in Lynn Hunt’s 
understanding of globalization, decolonization can be understood as a 
‘series of transnational processes in which the histories of diverse places 
become connected and interdependent’. In this iteration, decolonization 
is not a single coherent process but a multifaceted combination of forces 
working towards the dissolution of all vestiges of colonial domination, 
whether they were material, ideational, psychological or structural. Far 
from having ended with the passing of sovereignty, it remains ongoing.59
Decolonization’s effects rippled far beyond the borders of newly 
independent states, to reconfigure European societies and global politi-
cal thinking just as profoundly.60 For Todd Shepard, this took shape in 
French culture as a means of dealing with the trauma of imperial dis-
location.61 Shepard’s reading brought the importance of personal con-
nections and interpretations to the fore, and discussed how opinions and 
narratives were constructed in public discourse. This is especially useful 
when considering those bonds that stretched beyond France itself and fol-
lowed families, companies and relationships across the routes of empire. 
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In Chapter 6, Chris Jeppesen offers another vision of entanglements 
that adapted to the end of formal rule, and sought to reforge themselves 
outside state control, yet still within the compact of the imperial nation 
state. Jeppesen’s chapter addresses the reformulation of duty and ser-
vice, reconfiguring imperial loyalties around individual aspirations and 
trajectories. In a parallel of the personal bonds and connections sketched 
out by Wilder in the French imperial nation state, the British Colonial 
Service and its recruits experienced a complex mixture of continuities, 
dislocations and reconfigurations. Many connections survived the formal 
transfer of power, proving adaptable and taking on the language of devel-
opment to foster engagement in newly independent African states.
A drive to understand better how decolonization reveals fresh per-
spectives on the dynamics of power, agency and political reconfigura-
tion across time and space has led transnational and global historians to 
move beyond a focus on the breakdown of twentieth- century empires. 
Rather than seeing this as a phase of late modernity unfolding within 
national history paradigms, they have instead used it to ask new ques-
tions about processes of global change and exchange from the late eight-
eenth century until the present.62 Central to this has been an approach 
that not only compares national empires but charts the flows between 
them.63 Joanna Warson’s focus on entanglement in Chapter 7 teases out 
a meaningful discussion of how shared experience could shape visions 
of the future. British and French colonial officials struggled to contain 
West African populations that moved freely across colonial borders, even 
as they attempted to legislate around them. French officials feared that 
migrating workers would weaken their claims to developmental legiti-
macy, sensing a loss of manpower and prestige as people moved in search 
of work. Such negative assessments seemed to increase the likelihood 
that nationalist ideals would spread, and French officials worked to these 
predictions. These worries about what could and should happen encour-
aged the French to reach over porous borders, engaging directly in anglo-
phone Africa and fostering increasing entanglements as a result of the 
shifting sands in the late colonial state.
Envisaging European empires as overlapping webs of exchange, 
across which travelled people, resources, capital and knowledge, has 
transformed understandings of how colonialism operated from the 
eighteenth century onwards.64 Decolonization, in this reading, is far 
more than an account of the ending of European empires. It is a globaliz-
ing force in its own right, which compresses gulfs of time and space to 
make possible new political configurations and imagined communities.65 
Indeed, this volume recognizes Potter and Saha’s call for a reconciliation 
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of global and imperial history, and sets out with the intention of affording 
‘more agency to individuals, and recognis[ing] the crucial importance of 
choice, contingency and chance’.66 Imperfect visions of the future could 
draw on connections that cut across the colonial state just as they could 
reinforce some of the structures designed to manage it.
Concluding comments
The developmental turn of post- war empires was an important marker 
of change. By reconfiguring the relationships that spoke through the 
compact of the late colonial state, it relied on the triangulation of 
perspectives that this volume will explore. This change took place in 
contexts that were marked by a pervading sense of crisis and opportunity, 
however. This moment of possibility magnified the potential for change, 
and the relationship between space of experience and horizon of 
expectation was notably uncoupled. In this context, the entanglements 
of empire gained a new importance in configuring structures of power 
and motivating action in a postcolonial world. Sovereign borders could 
not contain the discourses that recast them, nor hope to stymie the 
developing appetite for their revision. Actors beyond the confines of the 
state acquired more prominent roles in defining the direction of newly 
independent nation states.
The processes described are not intended to be comprehensive 
but, rather, to serve as an exploration of emergent historiographi-
cal themes in a febrile setting for historical enquiry. By uniting dif-
ferent historiographical fields (both geographically and in terms of 
approach), this volume stresses the importance of the particular 
period of late colonial shift in understanding the complex relationship 
between Europe and Africa as the process of decolonization unfolded. 
It seeks to shed light on a moment of adaptation, in which confident 
projections of future developments were conceived even while the 
structures they relied on were reconfigured around them. In tackling 
the notion of human rights or development, anti- colonial activists and 
colonial officials alike drew on an ideational context that they were 
struggling to control. The forces of history, so evident in the vocabu-
lary of the colonial leaders and European governments in the 1950s, 
were never as unitary, nor as simple as they were depicted. Rather, 
they converged on an imperfect future, conceived conditionally on bar-
gains yet to be struck, and debates yet to be won.
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Nation, state and agency: evolving 
historiographies of African 
decolonization
Michael Collins
As the title of this volume suggests, scholars of decolonization are 
 increasingly looking at the connected or ‘entangled’ histories of empire 
and its aftermaths. From this perspective, decolonization was not a 
discrete process that marked a shift from empire to national independ-
ence but a multi- layered, multifaceted phenomenon. While decoloni-
zation had particular, specific causes and effects in different African 
settings, it was also shaped by wider, structural dimensions of empire that 
may be seen as systemic: the political and economic relationship between 
imperial ‘core’ and colonial ‘periphery’; the colonial state in terms of its 
bureaucratic structure; ideologies of governance, ‘development’ and race; 
and emancipatory narratives of anti- colonial freedom and nationhood. 
Many of these aspects of empire and decolonization cut across particular 
imperial or national contexts and point us towards complex chronologies 
of change.
Looking back at the historiography of decolonization, we are 
reminded that it has been studied from quite different perspectives, and 
that this in turn has a strong bearing on the forms of agency that histori-
ans of decolonization have placed at the forefront of their analyses. For 
example, there is a somewhat paradoxical affinity between older accounts 
of decolonization, which see primary decision- making as taking place in 
the realm of high politics at the centres of empires, and the newer ‘postco-
lonial approaches’. In the latter case, whether discussing economic theo-
ries of dependence and neocolonialism or cultural histories of European 
imperialism as an intellectual/ cultural matrix, Europeans remain central 
to the exercise of power, control, change and continuity. When historians 
 
 
britAin,  FrAnCE And thE dEColonizAtion oF AFriCA18
18
have emphasized African agency this has often (though not always) been 
within the framework of anti- colonial nationalism.
This is perhaps indicative of the fact that we are revisiting a 
problem that has concerned historians of empire for a long time: how 
to write the history of empire  – or of decolonizing empires and new 
states  – as a more or less integrated field of study. The focus on the 
‘entangled’ nature of imperial aftermaths in this volume suggests that 
our understanding of when empire ended needs to be questioned and 
re- examined. The idea that empire continued in alternative forms after 
formal independence was gained is hardly new, but there is an awful 
lot more to this idea than was originally intended by protagonists of 
‘neocolonialism’. From a contemporary, ‘presentist’ perspective, the 
arguable failures of the postcolonial state in the formerly colonized 
world require us to look again at independence and its shortcomings. 
Recent studies have sought to question the empire/ nation binary and 
re- examine the alternative decolonization paths that were not fol-
lowed.1 In addition, historians have begun to pay far greater attention 
to ongoing postcolonial ‘traumas’  – specifically, cultural, intellectual 
and political – in former colonial metropoles. In all these respects, the 
relationship between the formerly colonized world and the European 
ex- colonial powers remains deeply interwoven.
Imperial designs, metropolitan manoeuvres  
and moral legacies
The older historiography of British and French decolonization has 
concerned itself with the question of how and why metropolitan political 
actors deemed it necessary to wind down their empires, and what this 
signified. In this sense, it has tended to take a metropolitan, or what 
is often more critically labelled a ‘Eurocentric’ perspective. The source 
of explanation for imperial contraction – as with its prior expansion – 
was to be found in the political and economic sphere of decision- making 
at the centre of the empire. Even where the focus of study extended 
to colonized territories, the causal relationship moved from core to 
periphery. African agency eventually manifests itself in the form of a 
‘nationalist consciousness’, whereby colonial elites at the metropolitan 
centre are able to negotiate a ‘transfer of power’ to newly independent 
nation states, ordinarily falling within a post- imperial power structure 
such as the British Commonwealth or the French Communauté of 
African states. Along the way, empire and decolonization are both 
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bound up with a moral mission and continue to provoke questions about 
the legacies of empire.
From its earliest incarnation, imperial history was concerned 
with the expansion of European empires overseas, and as such the his-
tory of the colonized world became coterminous with the expansion 
of European territories and the incorporation of new lands and peo-
ples into imperial structures of control.2 European colonization was the 
integrating force that brought the non- historical peoples of the world 
into the orbit of history itself. Although decolonization was not yet part 
of the lexicon of imperial historians, the question of nationalism was 
not entirely absent from the purview of interwar historians of empire.3 
The end of the First World War had seen the British empire acquire new 
mandate territories, but also be challenged by a series of shocks arising 
from the emergence of nationalism in Ireland, Egypt, Iraq and – most 
importantly – India, as well as a new assertiveness from the dominions, 
notably Canada. They were writing at a time when imperial control 
appeared to be increasingly challenged, yet largely retained a confi-
dence in Britain’s ability to direct events and the trajectory of empire 
regardless of local challenges.4
From this broadly liberal perspective, not only was there no exis-
tential crisis of British imperialism, there was also a widespread belief 
in its moral purpose, its ongoing ‘civilizing mission’. Challenges to 
British rule were natural developments along the road towards a British 
Commonwealth, which provided the ongoing justification for the British 
empire itself. Independence, when it came, would mean the steady 
achievement of ‘free association’, but this freedom was not something 
that colonized peoples would wrench prematurely from the grasp of 
an oppressive imperial power; it would be negotiated and given when 
they proved themselves ready.5 The focus for these historians of empire 
was predominantly constitutional. The 1917 Montagu– Chelmsford 
Declaration on India, and the subsequent 1919 Government of India Act, 
placed great faith in the possibilities of constitutional reform and gradual 
democratization. While this spirit of gradualism was to animate much 
of the interwar historiography on empire, the Second World War forced 
Britain into a more defensive, self- justificatory position with regard to 
its empire, and to more explicitly imagine its end. In his 1943 Argument 
of empire, aimed at US audiences sceptical of Britain’s imperial status 
and intentions, Keith Hancock claimed that the British empire was the 
most extensive system of freedom that had ever existed in human his-
tory. Within the British empire, he wrote, ‘monarchy grows into democ-
racy, empire grows into Commonwealth, the tradition of a splendid past 
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is carried forward into an adventurous future’. This was contrasted with 
what he evocatively labelled a ‘sundered world of snarling nationalisms’.6
Similar interwar positions were also clearly discernible across 
Britain’s political spectrum, albeit with a much clearer accent on ‘devel-
opment’ and the socio- economic dimensions of future independence. 
Following Lord Lugard’s Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922), 
the idea of ‘indirect rule’ – whereby local authorities would be preserved 
and colonial administrations govern through them, envisaging no signifi-
cant social change along the way – was the paradigm for imperial govern-
ance not just for the British but more widely across Africa and beyond. In 
the interwar research of crucial figures such as Lord Hailey, as well as the 
large output in both the academic and popular press by Margery Perham 
on colonial development, we start to see the Lugardian orthodoxy ques-
tioned, and the significance of socio- economic change as a prerequisite 
for future decolonization come to the fore. It has been suggested that 
this intellectual emphasis on the social and economic underpinnings of 
‘detribalization’ as a preparatory move towards independence pre- dates 
the Second World War in the form of the colonial development secretary 
in 1938, Malcolm MacDonald. In that year MacDonald asked the sum-
mer school on colonial administration at Oxford University:  ‘[W] hat is 
the main purpose of the British Empire?’ He answered that it was
[t] he gradual spread of freedom amongst all His Majesty’s subjects, 
in whatever part of the earth they live… The spread of freedom in 
British countries overseas is a slow  – sometimes a painful  – evo-
lutionary process [which had already resulted in the dominions 
evolving as ‘completely free’ and ‘fully sovereign nations’]… The 
same spirit guides our administration of the colonial empire. Even 
amongst the most backward races of Africa, our main effort is to 
teach those peoples to stand always a little more securely on their 
own feet.7
Bringing freedom as national independence onto the horizon for colonial 
Africa was something of an innovation in official circles. What is more 
striking, though, is the deep structural similarities of teleological thinking 
across the political and academic spectrum in Britain at this time. Empire 
was not a purely instrumental project, but a moral one directed from the 
centre.89
In historical scholarship, the transfer of power model – in which 
‘imperial design’ explains not only empire’s expansion but also its dénoue-
ment – held currency for some time, particularly for the generation that 
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lived through the Second World War.10 For those on the left or centre- left, 
the imperial development and modernization efforts of the immediate 
post- war Labour government under Clement Attlee were matters of polit-
ical and intellectual interest, a practical approach to social and economic 
change at home and in the empire. The more sympathetic readings speak 
of what is described as a ‘conscious effort’ on the part of the British ‘to con-
tain, if possible to collaborate with, and ultimately to transfer power to 
the accelerating force of African nationalism’.11 Accounts of this moment 
of post- war modernization could also be highly personal, bound up as 
it was with the hopes and aspirations of a generation of soldiers, schol-
ars and reformers who struggled together and believed in the project of 
a ‘new Jerusalem’. Echoes of this are to be found in Ronald Robinson’s 
confident account of the role of Sir Andrew Cohen (permanent under-
secretary at the Colonial Office alongside the Secretary of State, Arthur 
Creech Jones, and a key architect of Labour’s plans for colonial reform) 
as the ‘pro- consul of African nationalism’.12 Robinson wrote openly that 
Andrew Cohen was a friend, and he had in fact worked under Cohen as 
a research officer in the African Studies Branch of the British Colonial 
Office from 1947 to 1950, and later as chairman of the Cambridge con-
ferences on development from 1961. These historiographical positions 
have been very much revised by more contemporary studies, but again 
we see the persistence – across the political spectrum, across interwar 
and post- war periods and well into the age of decolonization itself – of 
a Whiggish teleological view of empire as a pax Britannica and decolo-
nization as a benevolent British- led project, whether constitutional or 
socio- economic, or both.13 Directed from the centre, featuring very little 
African agency at all, decolonization meant the flowering of empire’s lib-
eral, progressive seed.14
If the historiography of French Africa’s decolonization has been 
overshadowed by the more dramatic and violent confrontations in French 
Indochina and Algeria, there was nonetheless a palpable French belief in 
a pragmatic ‘managed decolonization’ in sub- Saharan Africa – structur-
ally similar though not identical to the British vision – that manifested in 
the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 and the creation of the French Union 
in 1946, leading to the Communauté of African states in 1958. As has 
been noted elsewhere, this gave rise to ‘the stereotype of a more or less 
orderly transfer of power from Dakar to the Congo, formulated by stages 
and implemented without grave incident between 1956 and 1960’.15 The 
French counterpart to Britain’s ‘Whig’ view of empire’s end was neatly 
summarized in 1946 by Léon Blum, the prime minister, who spoke of ‘our 
republican doctrine’, in which ‘colonial possession only reaches its final 
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goal and is justified the day it ceases, that is, the day when a colonized 
people has been given the capacity to live and to govern itself’.16
That said, the idea of a French mission civilisatrice to match the 
civilizing mission of the pax Britannica was not always taken seriously 
by scholars of French imperialism. In 1960 Henri Brunschwig wrote 
that, while the ‘humanitarian’ angle was important for the British and 
their empire, in France it was post- 1870 nationalism that provided the 
primary explanations for imperial expansion and legitimation.17 Early 
efforts to explore the concept more fully – particularly to examine its cul-
tural dimensions – can be seen emerging, especially in the anglophone 
literature on the French empire, by the 1980s.18 More recently a rich and 
varied literature has developed, much of it seeking to understand African 
perspectives. For example, Alice Conklin’s 1997 book A mission to civilize: 
the republican idea of empire in France and West Africa offers a nuanced 
African perspective on the implementation of the Parisian policy debates 
explored in Raymond Betts’ classic 1961 study, Assimilation and associa-
tion in French colonial theory, 1890– 1914.19 The role of religion has been 
a strong influence in the French historiography, helping to link together 
different understandings of how civilization was conceived and to stress 
the importance of the missionary element in realizing these visions.20 In 
the late nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, education was 
another vector for communicating the mission of the French state.21 In 
the interwar period we can see something of a shift in the civilizing mis-
sion away from a belief in the potential of assimilation towards a differ-
ent type of cultural engagement. For example, Gary Wilder’s The French 
imperial nation- state: negritude and colonial humanism between the two 
world wars picks up the problem of how race brushed up against human-
ist and rationalist justifications for the limiting of assimilation in the 
French colonial state.22
If the entire idée coloniale has now been subjected to severe histo-
riographical criticism, it retains a certain salience in terms of postcolonial 
memory and the way in which the history of empire and decolonization 
is debated in France today.23 Much new debate centres on the teaching of 
empire and decolonization within schools. A 2005 law designed to ‘show 
the nation’s recognition of the national contribution of France’s repat-
riate population’ was the consequence of intense lobbying on the part 
of France’s population of so- called pieds noirs, those citizens who trace 
their ancestry to the settler population in colonial Algeria. More com-
monly known as the law on the memory of colonialism, its fourth article 
called for school curricula to stress ‘the positive role of the French pres-
ence overseas’ and therefore of France’s colonial history. It eventually 
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provoked a fierce backlash and subsequently led the then president, 
Jacques Chirac, to rescind the law.24 Debates about imperial legacies have 
also crystallized around the idea of republicanism, and specifically the 
way that postcolonialism has clashed with ideas of neo- republicanism.25
In Britain, public debate about empire is often unhelpfully reduced 
to a ‘balance sheet’ approach.26 New work on the violent repression of the 
Mau Mau Rebellion, as well as the high- profile court case of the Mau Mau 
plaintiffs against the British government, led to the discovery of a very 
significant cache of ‘lost’ or ‘migrated’ decolonization archives, increasing 
public awareness of some of the brutalities of decolonization.27 Overall, 
however, the types of historians who are widely read by the public at 
large, as well as the media debates that this type of work encourages, 
tend to produce a ‘for’ or ‘against’ approach that dramatically reduces 
the complexity of colonialism.28 In these public debates, non- European 
agency has almost no role to play: only the deeds of colonizers feature, 
and most apparently still believe that, ‘on balance’, the British empire 
was a ‘good thing’ and its decolonization a largely benign or even benev-
olent process.29 The legacy of earlier historians, who believed so fully 
in Britain’s benevolent imperial mission, still seems to resonate within 
public opinion.30 Even within the academy, questions of Eurocentrism, 
the failure to account for colonized agency, the lack of attention to colo-
nial violence and the inability or unwillingness of some historians to take 
account of the prevalence of race within imperial discourse and govern-
ance remain some of the most contentious issues in the historiography of 
empire and decolonization.
The aforementioned ideas about decolonization as a relatively 
orderly transition, choreographed by metropolitan political elites, were 
being implicitly challenged by new strands of imperial historiography 
emerging in the 1960s. Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher’s theory of 
imperial expansion, initiated in their famous journal article ‘The imperi-
alism of free trade’ (1953) but developed most fully in their book Africa 
and the Victorians (1961), posited the politics of the ‘periphery’ as cru-
cial to the decision- making undertaken by the ‘official mind’ in London 
(or Paris). By extension, then, decolonization could be interpreted as the 
consequence of the breakdown of collaborative relationship at the colo-
nial periphery, which in turn shifted the balance of risk and reward for 
those seeking to prolong the imperial project. Despite the emergence of 
this ‘peripheral theory’, stressing the contingent and uncertain nature of 
imperial expansion and hence decline – and bringing a range of collabo-
rators from the colonized periphery into the narrative – the implications 
for developing a richer sense of colonized agency were arguably stymied. 
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Robinson and Gallagher still proffered an imperial framework that saw 
the ultimate decision- making role as lying within Europe’s metropoles. 
The ‘official mind’ had to react to and take into account different ‘periph-
eries’, but it was still the main agent of historical change.31 Perhaps two 
generations of historians of Britain’s decolonization have been heavily 
influenced by Robinson and Gallagher’s concepts and analytical frame-
work. ‘Official mind’, ‘periphery’ and ‘collaboration’ remained crucial cat-
egories of analysis. Beyond this, one of the definitive features of this style 
of scholarship is that the most utilized archives remain those of the for-
mer colonial powers, broadening through decolonization to encompass 
the foreign policy of the United States, the Cold War and international 
history. The emphasis is on the importance of high politics, strategic 
rationale and, above all, the decision- making power of politicians and 
bureaucrats at the imperial centre.
John Darwin, perhaps the pre- eminent historian of British imperi-
alism and decolonization, is a vocal advocate for the ongoing importance 
of Robinson and Gallagher’s work.32 He also happens to be the target of 
some of the most intense and explosive historiographical criticisms in 
the field today.33 Ironically, Darwin is a staunch defender of the princi-
ple that the study of empire and decolonization should not be a morality 
tale of any kind, left or right, progressive or conservative – an approach 
that, again, takes inspiration from Robinson and Gallagher. Gallagher in 
particular offered ‘an ironic, detached, and unsentimental view of the 
British Empire as a world system’. Empire was ‘not a cause to defend or 
a grievance to denounce but a passing historical phenomenon’, meaning 
that ‘the history of empire as Gallagher and Robinson conceived it in the 
early 1950s was thus already a history for the postcolonial age’.34 It is this 
‘unsentimental’ approach that provides the title for Bill Schwarz’s review 
of Darwin’s work, and seemingly also provides the main thrust of his cri-
tique. The problem, Darwin’s opponents suggest, is that empire is not 
a ‘passing historical phenomenon’ but one that is still very much alive. 
The problem with Darwin’s work, his critics propose – and the reason 
why he is unable to grasp the significance of empire’s many afterlives – is 
that he is
hostile not only to the explanatory power now commonly accorded 
to matters of gender and race, but more generally to the conceptual 
significance attributed to the symbolic systems which give life –  
 in our daily existence; in the work of historical interpretation –  
not only to gender and race, but to the social world, tout court. 
This marks not merely a professional spat, concerning this or that 
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approach, a lowly question about the persuasiveness of a preferred 
methodology. The differences are serious and the stakes are high. 
In this Darwin is right: the controversy turns on what we can expect 
history to do.35
Darwin’s contribution to the study of British imperial and decol-
onization is extraordinary in its range. Yet he is also very clear about 
what is and what is not important in the study of this history. Of primary 
explanatory value is the geo- strategic realm, and the decision- making 
of political elites in Europe’s metropolitan centre. With regard to British 
decolonization, Darwin is well aware – indeed, he was a leading expo-
nent of the view – that there was a ‘fourth British empire’ after 1945, in 
which modernizing forces sought to once again reconfigure the terms of 
imperial collaboration for a new age. Darwin too has discussed at length 
the ‘late colonial state’ and its historical significance.36 He is well aware 
that there was more to the story of decolonization after 1945. But as 
a system – and therein lies the key to Darwin’s historical register – the 
British empire was essentially broken and in terminal decline after the 
fall of Singapore in 1942.37
This is the aerial view of decolonization. Imperial history is surveyed 
from great heights, taking in the grand expanse of Halford Mackinder’s 
‘World- Island’ and Robinson and Gallagher’s peripheries, but extending 
the analytical framework beyond a single core to take into account the 
broadest geopolitical shifts in modern world history, such as the rise of 
the United States’ world power, fascism in Europe and Japan, China’s 
imperial claims and so on.38 But in the plane, narrating the journey 
with Darwin himself, is an exclusive grouping of imperial grandees: the 
European, mostly but not exclusively British, political elites who form the 
centrepiece of Darwin’s story.39 At one level, this seems eminently sensi-
ble: if the historical problem that Darwin has set himself revolves around 
questions of geopolitics and grand imperial strategy, these are the natu-
ral historical subjects to discuss it with. The reason why the debate about 
imperial and decolonization history gets so heated is the implication that 
this is not merely one way of looking at empire but, in reality, the most 
important. What Darwin’s critics most object to is the absence of ques-
tions about race, violence and identity, and by implication the lack of 
attention to the historical experiences of those colonized subjects who 
literally disappear out of view when the empire is seen from such heights.
What the entangled historiography of decolonization suggests, 
unhappily for Darwin, is that, even when moral views of empire and 
decolonization are explicitly eschewed, the mere choice of subject 
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matter and source material raises moral questions once again. Whether 
we look at interwar historians writing of empire as the steady unfolding 
of British constitutional liberalism, post- war modernizers and their his-
torian sympathizers accentuating the developmental mission of decolo-
nization, self- justifying politicians writing the history of decolonization 
as they act it out, popular debates about the legacies of decolonization, 
or historiographical disagreements concerning the proper focus of impe-
rial and decolonization scholarship in the present, the old questions of 
Eurocentrism, morality and ‘Who writes history?’ have maintained their 
relevance.40
From imperial centres to African agency:  
nationalism and its alternatives
The critique of Eurocentrism is nothing new. It was, in essence, the first 
objection of anti- colonial nationalists.41 As national independence was 
mooted, and before a nation itself could be imagined, a national past 
had to be created. In terms of African history, nationalism, national  – 
or, more broadly, Africanist  – historiographies seemed for a time to 
constitute a major rupture.42 Empire’s end required new interpretations 
of the African past that would correct the tendency to view metropolitan 
political actors as the leading protagonists. Nationalism needed to be put 
centre stage. Nevertheless, the nation as a framework for writing history 
has proved to be problematic for a whole host of reasons, both political 
and analytical. For some, the seeds of postcolonial national identity 
were sown in rocky and unfertile ground. African nationalism was an 
elite- led phenomenon aimed at the capture of state power, with shallow 
roots in society. Empirically speaking, the myriad diversity of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious ties within often arbitrarily constructed borders – 
essentially the creation of European colonial bargaining – rendered the 
postcolonial nation unstable and led to civil war, ethnic conflict, forced 
migration and genocide. At a more theoretical, normative level, the ‘post-
colonial’ cultural turn of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged the idea of 
the nation as a discursive construct, often oppressive in its self- definition. 
There has since been a challenge to the anti- national orthodoxy, with 
historians reasserting the broad- based nature of some African nation-
alisms as well as the greater robustness of the African nation than is 
sometimes assumed. A  different and newer historiographical turn has 
sought to re- examine and historicize the moment of political decoloni-
zation in the 1950s and 1960s, asking whether the nation state was the 
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necessary and inevitable end of empire, and whether historians have 
sometimes wrongly attributed anti- colonial resistance to the category of 
‘nationalism’.
Post- war pioneers of an Africanist perspective such as Kenneth 
Dike and Jacob Ade Ajayi of University College Ibadan were seeking to 
place far greater emphasis on African agency and to develop African his-
tories that stood apart from a unified ‘imperial framework’.43 African (as 
opposed to merely imperial) history developed rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s when historians, in sync with the actual process of political decolo-
nization itself, started to write alternative histories that did not simply 
portray the history of Africa as the history of the colonial powers. British 
repression in Kenya and Central Africa, as well as the underwhelming 
nature of Commonwealth membership, coupled with the brutal and 
ignominious collapse of the French empire in North Africa, stripped 
older explanations of credibility and created a potent opportunity to 
write histories of Africa freed from the clutches of an imperial narrative. 
Much of this new ‘national’ history aimed to examine the pre- colonial 
past, not taking European intervention as the beginning of history, and 
often searching for the pre- colonial roots of an ostensibly authentic iden-
tity and nationhood.
The new historiography was interested in African and local sources, 
including oral sources, which in many ways were the real innovation.44 
In the 1950s scholars outside Africa – perhaps above all Roland Oliver – 
also did much to shape the nascent discipline of African history. In 1948 
the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) appointed Oliver to a 
lectureship in the ‘tribal history of Africa’, the first of its kind. In collabo-
ration with John Fage, then working in Ghana, Oliver also organized the 
first international conference on African history, in 1953, at which inter-
disciplinarity flourished, drawing on linguists, anthropology, archaeol-
ogy, natural science and oral histories. Oliver and Fage produced the first 
textbook, A short history of Africa (1962), and the following year Oliver 
edited with Gervase Mathew the first volume of History of East Africa 
(1963).45 Immanuel Wallerstein, who published his Africa: the politics of 
independence in 1961, as well as Basil Davidson, Jean Suret- Canale and 
later Shula Marks and Catherine Coquery- Vidrovitch – among others – 
sought to develop the historical study of African politics, nationalism and 
independence, looking from within colonial societies themselves.46 Much 
of the direction of travel here saw imperial history fragment into regional 
and national histories and a far greater emphasis on African initiatives 
and perspectives, with a palpable concern for politics and agency within 
colonized societies.47
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Another early focus on African nationalism came from Henri 
Grimal’s pioneering comparative study Decolonization: the British, French, 
Dutch and Belgian empires, 1919– 1963. First published in French in 1965, 
and a landmark text in the study of decolonization, it offered a persua-
sive case for the central role of anti- colonial nationalism in the process 
of decolonization. Rather than sharing the strong Africanist focus of the 
early pioneers of Africa history, though, Grimal posited a different theory, 
one that has had an enduring influence in the historiography of decolo-
nization. Anti- colonial nationalism was driven, Grimal proposed, by the 
process of colonialism itself and the dissemination of European ideas 
about nationhood and democracy, these being adopted by elites who then 
mobilized the masses in the face of increasing resistance to change on the 
part of the colonial powers.48 Here the impact of European colonialism on 
African societies is maintained as an important focus of study, and the role 
of Europe returns to dominate the scene. In this sense, the historiography 
of empire and decolonization shared some core assumptions with those 
emanating from political science via modernization theory, essentially a 
focus on elite agency that sees that ‘the student of political nationalism is 
concerned mainly with the attitudes, activities, and status of the nation-
alist- minded Western- educated elite’.49 Much writing on nationalism has 
adopted a similar ‘dissemination’ approach, seeing it as a fundamentally 
modern political ideology that has its roots either in Enlightenment ideas 
or in modern socio- economic change – or, indeed, a mixture of both. 
Either way, ‘Third World’ nationalism has often been seen as essentially 
‘derivative’.50 Grimal’s perspective had important implications, however, 
for how theories of decolonization would reshape the study of imperial 
history. Whereas the new nationalist historiography pointed towards 
separation of nation – or at least region – from the prior imperial focus, 
Grimal strongly implied that imperial power and national resistance could 
not be so easily disentangled. A much more current historiography has 
stretched the chronological range of anti- colonial nationalism as a driver 
of decolonization to include the role of the First World War. The empha-
sis here is on interwar anti- colonialism and nationalism as fundamentally 
elite, intellectual projects – perhaps necessarily so – and hence the scope 
for including Africa beyond the activities of anti- colonial or pan- African 
intellectuals in London or Paris is somewhat limited.51 Nonetheless, the 
methodological shift away from seeing nationalism as a separate develop-
ment towards an emphasis on interaction, entanglement and networks of 
anti- colonialism is clear.52
Whether nationalism and the nation were elite- led  constructs or not – 
and the exact nature of any broader-based popular mobilization – remains 
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a live debate in the historiography of decolonization and postcoloniality. 
Part of this discussion has focused around the ‘second liberation’ move-
ments in Mozambique, Rhodesia, Guinea- Bissau and beyond, where 
armed guerrilla movements sought to cooperate with, some say co- opt, 
peasant movements into overthrowing the last vestiges of formal colonial 
power in sub- Saharan Africa, and ‘envisaged a different kind of freedom, 
which would not merely substitute black faces for white ones, but trans-
form the very nature of power itself’.53 In The wretched of the Earth (1961), 
Frantz Fanon talked about ‘true’ and ‘false decolonization’, and advo-
cated a deeper, insurrectionary and essentially violent struggle against 
colonial power that would purge the body politic of the charade of flag 
independence, what he called the ‘fancy dress parade and the blare of the 
trumpets’.54 National movements that were actually in existence offered 
a ‘bourgeois’ form of decolonization that involved ‘a few reforms at the 
top, a flag waving’, while ‘down there at the bottom’ there remained ‘an 
undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, still marking time’.55
Earlier Africanist scholars, such as Basil Davidson, had often stressed 
peasant involvement in national movements. In terms of economic and 
military resources, Portugal was the weakest of all the European colonial 
powers in Africa, yet it resisted decolonization for the longest, fighting an 
anti- insurgency war in Mozambique into the 1970s.56 The Mozambican 
context thus gave rise to a large historiography looking at the nature of 
peasant mobilization, and hence at the form of anti- colonial national-
ism that arose after and beyond the earlier wave of elite- led, primarily 
political movements.57 Rhodesia too provided a broad canvas for histori-
cal writing on later peasant mobilization in the anti- colonial struggle.58 
Social mobilization and social conflict within national movements in the 
1950s have now been re- examined through new intellectual perspec-
tives.59 For example, while telling the story of colonial anti- insurgency 
in all its horrific brutality, scholars such as David Anderson have gone to 
great lengths to examine not just the suffering but acts of resistance and 
rebellion during the ‘Mau Mau’ campaigns of the 1950s.60 Daniel Branch 
has taken the Mau Mau story further still. In his book Defeating Mau 
Mau, creating Kenya, the study of loyalist Kikuyu reveals the enormous 
complexity of Kenyan social movements and politicization, as well as the 
extent to which they sought to influence and manipulate each other and 
colonial authorities in ways that fundamentally challenge the category of 
‘nation’ during decolonization.61
At the same time, an entirely different historiographical turn 
has sought to question the naturalness of nations and nationalism as 
vehicles for anti- colonial dissent. Here, rather than a search for new 
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ways to look at nationalist mobilization, it is asked whether nations 
and nationalism were in fact the object of colonized subjects’ political 
aspirations in the way that we often assume they must have been. In 
work by Frederick Cooper, a focus on alternatives to national frame-
works and ways of thinking that did not see the nation state as inevi-
table prompts us to reconsider teleological assumptions about the 
nation in French and British Africa. As Cooper put it quite some time 
ago, ‘The triumph of independence movements over colonial rule in 
Asia and Africa is another one of those metanarratives that needs to be 
rethought.’ He has added that ‘[i] t is only hindsight that makes the ter-
ritorial state seem like the wave of the future’.62 In contrast to the older, 
more African- centric literature on pan- Africanism, the focus here is on 
plans for federation involving French politicians in Paris, colonial offi-
cials in West Africa and a range of African national leaders and civil 
society groups: concrete political proposals to build upon pan- African 
ideals.63 As federated components of the empire came into being – and 
the 1956 loi cadre made power at the territorial level a reality – rather 
than treating metropole and colony separately the debates surround-
ing federal alternatives for a future French West Africa placed them 
firmly in interaction, being squarely debates about the future of France 
as well as Africa.64 Even if it quickly ran into the very difficult problem 
of how the citizens of these federated parts of the French Union could 
be equal with the citizens of metropolitan France, what is remarkable 
in Cooper’s telling of this story is how far West African nationalists 
wanted to work, for a time, within the confines of a reformed, mod-
ernizing French empire.65 National resistance was a far more nuanced 
phenomenon than we may have been led to believe.
It has been suggested that, while the visions of French West Africa’s 
political elites ‘did not centre…on the compartmentalised spatial order 
that came into being with independence’, elsewhere in Africa ‘nationalist 
leaders and elites accepted the spatial order colonialism had imposed’.66 
This reflects the current bias in this historiography towards the decolo-
nization of francophone Africa. Nevertheless, what makes the experi-
ments with federations in West Africa potentially all the more interesting 
for the study of African decolonization is that this ‘federal moment’ 
was also witnessed in British- controlled territories in central, southern 
and East Africa.67 Having carved the Central African Federation (CAF) 
out of Northern and Southern Rhodesia plus Nyasaland in 1953, some 
British colonial officials briefly flirted with the idea of formally federating 
East Africa in the early 1950s. This provoked much anxiety in Uganda, 
where Buganda sensitivities about their status within the Protectorate 
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combined with wider concerns about an East African federation, which 
for them meant domination by the white settlers of Kenya, a spectre 
made all the more threatening by the now- existing CAF. In Uganda, atti-
tudes towards East African federation remained less enthusiastic than 
in Kenya and Tanganyika. In all three countries, however, opinion poll-
ing in the region suggests an apparent groundswell of public support 
for federation. Nyerere’s offer of June 1960 to delay Tanganyika’s inde-
pendence so that, together with Kenya and Uganda, a federation could 
be achieved – combined with the Nairobi Declaration of June 1953, in 
which Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere ostensibly committed their nations 
to federation – suggests that the ‘wind of change’ may have been blowing 
in different directions; not simply towards national self- determination as 
the achievement of nation- statehood. Yet, as Samuel Moyn has pointed 
out in a penetrating review essay, if that is so, then why did the nation 
state ultimately achieve its universal triumph?68
Decolonizing states in Africa and beyond were faced with the chal-
lenge of multiple and competing sovereignties. In Uganda, the Buganda 
contested the legitimacy of the political unit created by the British 
Protectorate. In Kenya, loyalty among denizens of the Kenyan coast to 
the Sultan of Zanzibar clashed with efforts to create a unitary Kenyan 
nation, as did the Somali orientation of the shifta in Kenya’s north.69 As 
Emma Hunter has argued, Tanganyika’s United Nations trust territory 
status created ambiguities between British sovereignty and international 
jurisdiction.70 Across the continent, concrete proposals for statehood 
were imbricated in wider debates about African identity and fear of ‘bal-
kanization’ – a word used explicitly and frequently in both West and East 
Africa.71 Although the federal tendency worked to accommodate and 
stabilize regional, ethnic and linguistic divisions belying national unity, 
arguably it was not in spite of but because of these divisions that the 
model of sovereign, unitary nation- statehood won out.
In Africa, as elsewhere in the decolonizing world, even while 
 recognizing the artifice of the nation state, the ‘Westphalian’ model of 
statehood offered a ‘principle of unity’ that drew together ‘the multiplic-
ity of powers within the political realm’.72 This arguably served to con-
cretize a direct link between anti- colonialism and the achievement of 
nation- statehood, with nationalism offering a catch- all solution within 
which all grievances against the colonial state could be mobilized to 
achieve independence. This reminds us, then, of the importance of the 
international dimensions determining the shape of sovereignty and the 
move to nation- statehood in the 1950s and 1960s, which Ryan Irwin and 
others have pointed to in a renewed historiographical focus on Africa’s 
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decolonization in international perspective.73 National frameworks 
could mask internal divisions in Africa, offering nationalist elites a way 
to rapidly integrate themselves into a liberal international order that 
also offered benefits for Western powers such as Britain, France and the 
United States in the context of the Cold War.
In some senses this appears to make decolonization a relatively 
contained phenomenon, rapid in its conclusion. In 1955 UN member-
ship constituted seventy- six sovereign nation states, but only seven of 
these were formerly colonized states. By 1965, though, UN member-
ship had risen to 117 countries, the vast majority of these new nation 
states having been created through decolonization, which had acceler-
ated rapidly after the independence of Ghana and Malaya in 1957.74 In 
line with the debates about federation in the 1950s, however, this inter-
national perspective also emphasizes African agency, telling a story of 
how African (and Asian) states manipulated and shaped debates about 
nationhood in an international context from the late 1950s into the 
1960s. Even if Erez Manela’s ‘Wilsonian moment’75 may not have been 
a moment for Africa, the post- war national moment saw sub- Saharan 
Africans vigorously assert ideas about race, pan- Africanism, statehood, 
equality and modernization in a new world in which the ‘subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation’ ran against the UN Charter and could be 
deemed the very cause of international and interracial conflict.76
Advocates of new national histories, such as Kenneth Dike, were 
actively involved in the process of decolonization through asserting a 
national story separate from that of Europe. Even when European imperi-
alism was brought back into the picture, there was widespread agreement 
that anti- colonial nationalism was a key part of the decolonization pic-
ture, whether because of the dissemination of ideas from Europe, socio- 
economic processes of change, elite mobilization or more complicated 
patterns of popular mobilization. And the latest move to question the 
naturalness and inevitability of the nation state has already been called 
into question: an important new book by Michael Goebel addresses the 
question of alternatives to the nation, chronologically reframing nation-
alism in the interwar as well as post- war periods once again, and positing 
the ‘various discourses envisaging a postcolonial world as competing or 
mutually complementary strands of nationalism, not as federalisms or 
regionalisms versus nationalism’.77 Goebel’s assertion is that, even if ‘the 
nations that interwar anti- imperialist’s imagined did not always coin-
cide with the postcolonial states emerging in the 20  years after 1945’, 
this alone is ‘not a good enough reason not to treat these discourses as 
nationalist’.78
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Whether nationalism must necessarily be such a large- tent phe-
nomenon, so that anti- colonialism once again finds its proper resting 
place in the post- war nation state, remains a moot point. It is likely that 
the historiographical debate over the place of nations and nationalism in 
Africa’s decolonization will continue for some time. Even now, the ongo-
ing debate about nationalism and the nation state during post- war decol-
onization is yet another reminder that the field continues to surprise us 
with its vibrancy, with fresh questions and perspectives being churned 
up from the seabed of empires’ ends as each new wave of critical thought 
crashes in.
The colonial and postcolonial state
Perhaps nowhere is this truer than in the area of the colonial state, in 
its late manifestations and its postcolonial legacies. The penetration 
of the colonial state into colonized societies  – whether through 
taxation, the policing of labour unrest, surveillance, anti- insurgency 
or ostensibly more benign ‘development’ schemes – was itself a driving 
force of nationalist consciousness. But the historiographical focus on 
the state – distinct from, though historically and analytically connected 
to, the rise of anti- colonial nationalism – has brought into view a range 
of other important questions. The early Fanonist critique of an elite- led 
‘false decolonization’, in which very little changed – and, crucially, core 
elements of the state and economy carried over in the transition from 
colonial to postcolonial periods – has evolved through various forms 
of analysis and criticism of the postcolonial state from within Africa 
itself. A different historiography, more imperial in its focus, has sought 
to bring the late colonial state into analytical perspective as something 
that marked both colonizer and colonized. Fanon’s position would feed 
into postcolonialism, a mode of critical enquiry citing knowledge itself 
as a form of colonial power and control. Initially theoretical, concen-
trating on the sometimes overly abstract idea of discourse, one can 
detect the influence of this mode of enquiry in the new historiogra-
phy of decolonization that advances a more empirical social history 
of ideas, seeking to elucidate the ways in which colonial knowledge 
was reified in state practice and social organizations that bridged the 
late colonial and colonial periods, for example through the field of 
‘development’. This has meant looking not only at the composition and 
support base for national movements but also at the nature of the state 
inherited from the colonial power.
 
 
 
 
 
britAin,  FrAnCE And thE dEColonizAtion oF AFriCA34
34
Economic explanations for imperial expansion were prominent 
throughout the twentieth century, and as early as 1957 an economic 
explanation for decolonization was being offered by Paul Baran in his 
seminal The political economy of growth. Baran argued that, whereas 
empires had previously been advantageous to the fortunes of interna-
tional capitalism, after 1945, and increasingly into the 1950s, the politics 
of imperialism and the interests of international capitalism were at log-
gerheads. Where multinational businesses felt that they were well placed 
to work with new nationalist leaders, the intransigence of colonial rul-
ers was likely to create anti- foreigner and anti- capitalist extremism that 
would play into the hands of the communist world.79 For this reason, 
European imperial powers were under huge pressure to facilitate a swift 
political decolonization, enabling the capitalists to carry on with busi-
ness as usual, under new arrangements. The emergence of ideas based 
around ‘dependency’ or the neo- colonialism of markets and international 
organizations drew heavily on neo- Marxism and on the politics of the 
Cold War context out of which they emerged. Andre Gunder Frank’s 
highly influential Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America 
(1967) provided a great deal of the theoretical apparatus for work on 
other parts of the Third World.
A classic example for the African context is Walter Rodney’s 1973 
How Europe underdeveloped Africa, a longue durée perspective on colo-
nial exploitation leading right through to the postcolonial persistence of 
dependency.80 From a different political perspective, Ronald Robinson 
and Roger Louis’ important article on ‘The imperialism of decolonization’ 
stressed the role of the United States, particularly through collaborations 
with Great Britain, in pursuing informal empire after decolonization as 
a means of fighting the Cold War.81 Broad ideas of dependency and ‘neo- 
colonialism’ continued to resonate throughout the developing world, 
particularly in Africa and Latin America, through the 1980s and well into 
the 1990s. Opposition to the ‘Washington Consensus’ on neoliberal state 
reform, thought to be imposed on Africa via the ‘structural adjustment’ 
plans of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, became a ral-
lying cry. In terms of decolonization scholarship, one of the few histo-
rians to engage in a careful rebuttal of the arguments advanced by the 
dependency theorists was David Fieldhouse, who argued that, in fact, 
the emphasis on commodity exports in sub- Saharan Africa after inde-
pendence was, first, ‘not necessarily fatal to economic development’ and, 
moreover, explanations for underdevelopment should place far more 
emphasis ‘on the policies adopted by the new rulers of Africa, on the way 
these were carried out and, above all, on the political systems evolved 
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to support the ruling elites’.82 Within the field of history, the economics 
of decolonization as it affected Africa remains an area of enquiry that is 
arguably in need of expansion, though the literature on the metropoli-
tan economic dimensions of decolonization has been more thoroughly 
explored.83 A current contribution to the historiography has in fact sub-
jected the whole idea of neo- colonialism to scrutiny, suggesting that, in 
East Africa at least, the claim that colonial structures of power remained 
in place after decolonization because former colonial powers had willed 
it to be so is too simplistic.84
To bring the dispute about neo- colonialism full circle, the critique 
of the postcolonial state has actually extended far beyond the realm of 
the economy to include, in some cases, calls for the establishment of a 
‘new trusteeship’ to rescue the supposedly ‘failed’ African postcolonial 
state from itself. This debate probably reached its most heated point in 
the mid- 1990s, in the context of strong disagreement about the bearing 
of structural adjustment in Africa. Perhaps the most controversial figure 
at that time was Ali Mazrui, the Kenyan- born author of many works in 
history and political science, who by the 1990s held a professorship in 
the humanities at Binghamton University, New York. Mazrui’s interven-
tions in the press calling for the ‘benign colonization’ of Africa by African 
hegemons (a Pax Africana) drew predictable outrage from many quar-
ters, but were in fact provocative expressions of a wider anxiety about 
the viability of the African state.85 Attention has also been focused on the 
African state from the fields of political science and international rela-
tions, less out of a concern for African welfare than from a fear of the 
African ‘failed state’ being a seedbed of international terrorism. An early 
proponent of this thesis was Robert Jackson, who termed the African post-
colonial state a ‘quasi- state’, which could survive only because the ‘pre-
cipitous decolonization’ in Africa had been facilitated by an international 
state system whose legal principles worked against the maintenance of 
domestic jurisdiction on the part of colonial powers, and hence encour-
aged a rapid decolonization process.86 The upshot, Jackson argued, 
was that ex- colonial states had been ‘internationally enfranchised’ with 
‘juridical statehood’, but many of them have not ‘been authorised and 
empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features 
of sovereign states, as also defined by classical international law’.87
While Jackson and others point the finger of blame towards the 
legacy of decolonization in the realm of international law, others have 
argued for a process of ‘second independence’, which takes into consid-
eration the international realm but seeks to combine this with historical 
particularity and specificity in its search for solutions to the problems of 
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the African state.88 According to Eghosa Osaghae, ‘second independence’ 
is a popular movement from below that calls for decentralized, some-
times federal forms of government that can meet the development needs 
of African people.89 As Paul Ekeh has put it, second independence – or 
what he calls ‘second liberation’ – is not about the violent guerrilla wars of 
the 1970s but ‘about gaining democratic rights from post- independence 
domestic tyrants’, which must be done by developing ‘a sharp focus on 
the behavior of the state, especially in its uses of the public domain and 
its interaction with the institutions of civil society’.90 For Africa, then, 
the debate about the postcolonial state hinges not simply on the colonial 
legacy but, equally, on the nature of postcolonial political participation, 
pointing us yet again to the interconnectedness of past and present when 
seeking to reimagine new future trajectories of political and economic 
development.
Despite the ongoing conceptual and political resonance of ‘depend-
ency’, ‘neo- colonialism’, ‘failed’ or ‘quasi’ states, Osaghae’s point about 
popular participation and interaction with the state reminds us once 
more of the importance of placing agency – or, put simply, just ‘people’ –  
centre stage; this is something that, arguably, historians are more prone 
to doing than their political science and international relations counter-
parts.91 Mahmood Mamdani’s Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa 
and the legacy of late colonialism (1996), for example, utilizes the concept 
of the ‘bifurcated’ colonial state, split between the direct rule of admin-
istrative colonial cities and towns and the decentralized, indirect rule of 
the rural areas. The legacy for Africa has been rural power structures that 
were not broken but, rather, further ‘Africanized’ and that maintained 
their coercive capabilities vis- à- vis rural labour. As such, questions of civil 
society, political leadership and collective action have become central to 
the analysis.92 Frederick Cooper’s influential Decolonization and African 
society, published in the same year, shows how African workers and trade 
unionists interacted with and hence shaped French and British schemes 
for colonial modernization.93 Cooper posits the idea of colonial states as 
‘gatekeeper’ states, which had ‘weak instruments for entering into the 
social and cultural realm over which they presided, but…stood astride 
the intersection of the colonial territory and the outside world’.94
The implications of this were that Africans under colonial rule 
sought ways to circumvent the colonial state’s control of access to the 
world beyond its borders. At the same time, anti- colonial nationalist 
elites were aware that the power they were inheriting was limited, and 
indeed the reality was that ‘the postcolonial gatekeeper state, lacking 
the external coercive capacity of its predecessor, was a vulnerable state, 
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not a strong one’. As a consequence, ruling elites after  decolonization 
have tended to utilize methods of patronage and coercion in order to 
maintain control of ‘the gate’. In a political version of the economic 
‘resource curse’, in which efforts to seize control of single or very lim-
ited economic resources such as mineral wealth or oil tend to lead to 
corruption and dictatorship, the gatekeeper state is vulnerable for the 
simple reason that anyone who seizes control of it must stay in power. 
No one can afford to lose control, because there are no avenues for 
wealth or other loci for power other than controlling the gate. Cooper 
suggests that the gatekeeper state concept helps us to look at the post- 
war era in its entirety, enabling us ‘to explain the succession of cri-
ses that colonial and postcolonial states faced, without getting into a 
sterile debate over whether a colonial “legacy” or the incompetence 
of African governments is to blame’.95 The overarching point is that 
contextualized political action, fundamentally a problem of struc-
ture and agency, has shaped Africa after decolonization in ways that 
require more subtle forms of analysis than the ‘culpability quest’ that 
has sometimes seemed to predominate in the older literature. Social, 
economic, political and cultural structures in postcolonial Africa are 
neither imported nor indigenous, but have developed through the 
interaction of the said structures with African agents at all social lev-
els, and in particular contexts.
The idea of the African state as a bridge between colonies and ‘the 
outside world’ takes us back to a historiography of the colonial and post-
colonial state in which there is an alternative line of investigation:  re- 
centring the realm of imperial politics towards an emphasis on the impact 
of the state for both the colonizer and the colonized. Here, the debate 
does not ignore the role of the colonial state in Africa; far from it. Instead, 
it seeks to keep both colony and metropole in the same framework of 
analysis, and, in so doing, also points towards the ways in which the late 
colonial state in Africa had commonalities with colonial states elsewhere. 
As discussed above, historians have argued that the whole project of late 
colonial ‘modernization’ gave impetus to processes of social change that 
in turn increased demands for decolonization. At the same time, what 
Anthony Low and John Lonsdale famously termed the ‘second colonial 
occupation’ also gave rise to a new impetus for colonial economic devel-
opment, science, technology and modernization schemes that would 
have ramifications for the colonial powers themselves, and indeed for 
newly emerging international institutions.96 The concept of the late colo-
nial state therefore points not just to the politics of decolonization in the 
newly emerging nation state itself but also to the imaginings of continued 
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colonial rule, in modified form, on the part of the politicians and policy- 
makers in imperial centres after 1945.97
In Martin Shipway’s comparative study of decolonization, the late 
colonial state – particularly in Africa – plays a central part in revealing 
connections between the late colonial and decolonizing experiences 
of Britain and France. Thinking about the view from London or Paris, 
Shipway argues that, even before the material and ideological shifts 
effected by the Second World War, colonial powers were having to work 
far harder to maintain the imperial equilibrium as they ‘confronted the 
deeper continuities of imperial instability, or of resistance or challenge 
to colonial rule, or contemplated the sort of policy reforms which were 
to become commonplace after 1945’. What is brought sharply into relief 
is the fact that any ideological division between ‘liberals’ and ‘conserva-
tives’ in Europe after 1945 was simply false: both groups were intent on 
preserving empire ‘in some shape or form’ in order to at least ‘manage the 
process of colonial change over the medium to long term’.98 The added 
advantage of Shipway’s emphasis on the late colonial state is that it pro-
vides another framework for thinking about agency from the perspectives 
of both the colonizer and the colonized. The evolving nature of the late 
colonial state’s adaptation, contestation and rejection explicitly involved 
the colonized not simply as an undivided nationalist ‘mass’, represented 
by a handful of elite leaders, but a delineated range of actors and groups 
interacting with colonial powers, and each other, as the postcolonial state 
entered into view.99 On the other side of the spectrum, the project of late 
colonialism, varied as it was, required ongoing commitment from met-
ropolitan actors that raises yet again the importance of decolonization –  
and often specifically African decolonization – in which British and 
French academics, intellectuals, policy- makers and administrators con-
tinued to see themselves as having a major role to play.100
One area of interest that draws out the ways in which the colonial 
state had local, as well as comparative or even transnational, dimen-
sions lies in the study of colonial violence and coercion. The previously 
discussed historiography on Mau Mau has been an important driver in 
this area, as has the vast literature on French colonial violence, particu-
larly in Algeria.101 Yet colonial violence cannot be reduced to large- scale 
massacres or brutal acts of violence that captured international media 
attention. In fact, the everyday, banal nature of colonial violence is cru-
cial to our understanding of colonialism and decolonization. The colo-
nial state’s capacity to police and control colonial populations at the local 
level was, as is now widely understood, heavily dependent on indigenous 
collaborators.102 This is turn shaped the politics of intra- and inter- ethnic 
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violence that has been a marked legacy in the postcolonial era. Violence 
and coercion arose too in the context of the political economy that was 
fundamental to the daily workings of colonialism – indeed, that was 
arguably central to its rationale. For example, historians have explored 
the ambivalent effects of colonial taxation as a means of coercing natives 
into the labour force or to produce certain kinds of cash crops.103 As Ann 
Laura Stoler has made us aware, albeit from a South- East Asian angle, 
the repression of anti- colonial resistance often involved a blurring of the 
lines between political agitation, economic grievance and criminality, 
which brought labour relations very much to the forefront of the minds 
of colonial administrators and their police powers.104 Martin Thomas’ 
recent seminal work on Violence and colonial order places great emphasis 
on the centrality of political economy to our understanding of how the 
colonial state reacted to and evolved its approaches to coercion, with the 
control and policing of labour unrest being central to this development.105 
Thomas’ work also makes a major contribution to a decolonization histori-
ography that is comparative and transnational in its perspective.106 While 
going to great lengths to detail spatial and temporal specificity, Thomas 
borrows from more sociological and theoretical approaches to develop a 
cross- imperial comparison taking in British, French and Belgian policing 
regimes, revealing some of the ‘distinctively colonial types of repression 
as written in the very formation of colonial states’.107
New work is now being done in an area of decolonization historiog-
raphy that explores not just empire – or colony- specific case studies – but 
also the broader networks of knowledge and practice that offer another 
linkage between the late colonial, decolonization and postcolonial peri-
ods. Here we also see, either implicitly or explicitly, the legacies of post-
colonialism’s theoretical innovations at play, with an emphasis on the 
longevity of colonial ‘power- knowledge’ and the need to move beyond 
formal, flag independence to look at deeper processes of decolonizing 
in the realm of culture and intellect as well as the postcolonial state.108 
At the level of Foucauldian discourse, the postcolonial turn has had a 
major sway in studies of the postcolonial state in Africa and the limits 
of decolonization as manifested in the legacies of international influ-
ence and control.109 James Ferguson’s The anti- politics machine (1990) 
was a major interdisciplinary contribution, focused on the ‘depoliticiz-
ing’ effects of ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ discourses in Lesotho 
that substituted technocratic perspectives for the views of those actually 
being governed.110 In general terms, however, particularly when they 
operated most clearly as a form of theoretical, moral or literary critique 
of broad, abstract categories such as ‘the imperial’, ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’, 
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the openings offered by the postcolonial turn have also arguably obscured 
and closed down some areas of investigation. As Stephen Howe put it in a 
typically trenchant critique, some of what emerged from postcolonialism, 
particularly in the 1990s, appeared to abandon the idea that colonialism 
was at its core ‘a juridical relationship between the state and territory; 
one in which the colonizing state took complete power over the govern-
ment of the territory which it had annexed.’111 Others, such as Achille 
Mbembe, have articulated similar concerns about the abandonment of 
the political in favour of the discursive.112 As Andrew Zimmermann has 
put it, historians can sometimes be too keen to resist Eurocentrism by an 
exploration of the European racist discourses that inform it, rather than 
the non- European histories that Eurocentrism obscures.113
Much of the best literature now operates as a form of social-  
intellectual history, what might be termed a social history of ideas, in 
which the abstract notion of discourse is supplemented by a more con-
crete investigation of how forms of knowledge were developed and 
deployed in particular institutional or social contexts. This can be seen 
in the important work on both anglophone and francophone Africa of 
Christophe Bonneuil, which homes in on the crucial role of scientific 
thought in the processes of development that marked the late colonial 
and postcolonial state and ‘played a central role in the making of this 
development regime and its maintenance after decolonization’.114 In 
recent years a very large literature focusing on decolonization and the 
legacies of empire has centred on these problems of development and 
scientific knowledge, again demonstrating the possibilities of studying 
the decolonization and postcolonial condition of Africa by drawing on 
the insights of postcolonialism and using a wider lens that seeks to incor-
porate international and transnational perspectives as well as the older 
metropole– colony perspective.115 The focus on science and development 
in Africa’s decolonization has provided strong empirical grounds for such 
investigations. A new interest in the history of humanitarianism seeks to 
understand the shifting relationship of non- governmental humanitarian 
organizations in relation to colonial power and authority as well as the 
challenges of operating in newly sovereign postcolonial Africa.116
What is clear, then, is that, from many different angles, there is an 
enduring and in fact renewed interest in and emphasis on the nature of 
the state during and after African decolonization. Whereas many African 
historians have long asserted the importance of the state, and indeed 
the related concept of ‘political economy’, this is a move that consti-
tutes something of a departure in terms of the ‘New Imperial History’, 
which has often tended to focus on questions of discourse and identity. 
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Richard Price, a social historian of Britain who, along with many others 
of a similar generation and early training, took the ‘imperial turn’ in the 
1990s, has pointed to the renewed vigour in the study of the history of 
the British empire and its decolonization, particularly in the wake of the 
‘linguistic turn’ and its emphasis on culture; but he has also asked: ‘Is it 
possible to write a history of Empire without considering political econ-
omy or without some notion of the state as a historical actor in the impe-
rial process?’117
Integration and new orientations
There are now very many ways of thinking and writing about the history 
of African decolonization that point to a welcome openness and pluralism 
in the current historiographical climate, as well as new possibilities for 
‘unity’ in terms of former imperial, postcolonial, regional and national his-
toriographies engaging fruitfully with each other. The early incarnation of 
postcolonialism as a form of critique grounded predominantly in literary 
studies and high, abstract theory has largely passed. Amidst this ecumeni-
calism, it is clear that in the wake of the postcolonial turn there is renewed 
interest in questions of politics and economics, which engages with the 
concept of discourse but seeks a strong empirical basis upon which 
to investigate and identify the complex, multi- layered ways in which 
decolonization reshaped the lives of Africans. This means, for example, 
rethinking the terms under which the nation or national political unit 
came into being. Understanding these processes of imagining, adopting, 
adapting and contesting requires us to link social and cultural history to 
the business of the state and international politics. In fact, the colonial and 
postcolonial state offers an integrating analytical framework for a whole 
range of historical problems from the practice of politics and African 
agency, nationalism and its alternatives: control and coercion, territory 
and sovereignty, networks of knowledge and the enduring question of the 
moral legacies of empire.118
What is also clear is that decolonization is not simply about the 
end of empire as an event – even a prolonged one – that implies a more 
or less discrete historical object of study. In this sense, decolonization 
should not be seen as a point at which empire ceased to be important 
in the world, nor as the moment when nations recovered their auton-
omy from the shell of imperial domination. This is also a critique of 
triumphalist narratives, whether on the part of self- congratulatory 
former colonial powers or anti- colonial nationalist elites. As colonized 
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and colonizer are brought back into the same analytical framework, 
those binaries are broken down. Decolonization ceases to be a tele-
ological triumph, and is instead a messy, contingent, uneven and 
unresolved process of change in which our understanding of what hap-
pened in the past enables and constrains our sense of possible futures. 
Decolonization might thus be seen as a point at which certain aspects 
of a world shaped by empire fell away, while others continued and 
some morphed into new forms of power, exchange, integration and 
fragmentation. In adopting an anti- teleological approach such as this, 
we offer ourselves the intellectual space to examine the unrealized 
potentialities of decolonization beyond the ‘empire– nation dichotomy’ 
and to imagine the possibility of alternative forms of sovereignty – and 
hence of Africa’s political future.119
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‘The winds of change are blowing 
economically’: the Labour Party 
and British overseas development, 
1940s– 1960s
Charlotte Lydia Riley
Imperial entanglements drew not only on painful legacies of exploita-
tion but also on laboured traditions of debating development. Towards 
the end of empire, continued imperial engagement was often predicated 
on the supposed bounties from colonial development programmes  – 
depending on the audience, for either the metropole or the colonial 
people; after decolonization, postcolonial engagement was framed by 
the ongoing legacy of expired colonial schemes. This chapter examines 
the Labour Party’s approach to overseas aid and development at two 
key moments in the context of British decolonization, the 1940s and the 
1960s. From the 1920s British colonial policy had become increasingly 
articulated through a language of ‘progress’ and ‘development’. This was 
enshrined in British law with the Colonial Development Act (1929) and 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (first passed in 1940). During 
and after decolonization, this approach was continued in Britain’s rela-
tionships with the newly independent nations of the ‘developing world’, 
and the legacies of colonial policies, rhetoric and ideology can be traced 
in the Ministry of Overseas Development (established in 1964) and the 
Department for International Development (1997). After the empire 
ended, ideas about ‘civilizing missions’ and imperial burdens did not melt 
away; instead, they were absorbed into a wider dialogue about Britain’s 
(and Britons’) place in the world.
The contemporary construction of a British identity within the 
international community as a giver of aid, within a network of inter-
national and transnational humanitarian organizations, has been 
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constructed within the ongoing legacy of British colonialism and decolo-
nization. In turn, this international identity has shaped, and been shaped 
by, domestic British politics, with the rhetoric of aid and development 
having been enthusiastically embraced by the British left. This chapter 
explores the connections, ruptures and continuities between British 
development policies in Africa at the end of empire and in the newly 
postcolonial world. It spans the imagining of colonial futures, and revis-
its those late colonial dreams in post- imperial daylight. In doing so, it 
contributes to a wider discussion of how the British dealt with the transi-
tion from colonial development to postcolonial overseas aid – and from 
empire to the end of empire.
The chapter begins by exploring a specific moment in the history 
of colonial development, the period immediately following the end of 
the Second World War. Despite its position among the victorious Allied 
powers, this period saw Britain trying to come to terms with itself as a 
world power dwarfed by two superpowers, an economic powerhouse 
crippled by debts and supported by foreign governments, and an empire 
losing its territories. This decline of British power and prestige must not 
be exaggerated, however. The 1950s and 1960s saw economic growth 
and an increase in living standards for much of the population. Britain 
maintained an international diplomatic role, holding crucial positions in 
the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, 
although the later twentieth century would see widespread decoloniza-
tion, the seeds of that independence struggle were only just being sown 
in many territories in the British empire.
The history of British imperial rule in the post- war period has often 
focused on the struggles for independence and the gradual dismantling 
of the British empire in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. 
The mobilization of the empire in the Second World War, arguably the 
point at which the empire was at its most cohesive, has itself been identi-
fied as responsible for the wave of decolonization seen in the post- war 
period.1 There was in fact, however, a concerted reassertion of met-
ropolitan control over the empire in the immediate post- war period, 
often described, in Anthony Low and John Lonsdale’s words, as a ‘sec-
ond colonial occupation’; it was perhaps instead this new ‘intrusive and 
often haphazard imperialism of the era of reconstruction’ that provided 
the ‘fundamental watershed’ for European decolonization.2 The period 
is therefore critical for the wider understanding of British overseas aid 
and development policies in the twentieth and twenty- first centuries; in 
many ways, the policies pursued in the immediate post- war period set 
the tone for the relationship between Britain and its (ex- )colonies in the 
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following decade. Efforts to prolong empire in the period after the Second 
World War through developmental colonialism fostered lingering entan-
glements between Britain and Africa, not least within the Labour Party. 
This suggests important connections between this period and the Labour 
Party’s approach to aid and development in the 1960s, when most of the 
British empire had been dissolved.
The Labour Party’s engagement with the history of development 
can be used to explore not only the relationship between Britain and the 
developing world but also how a specific group within the (former) metro-
pole perceived this relationship, and how this perception shaped Britain’s 
aid and development policies.3 Focusing on the Labour Party enables the 
exploration of aid and development as a topic of political thought and an 
area of political policy that is sold in the domestic sphere but that oper-
ates in foreign climes; in this way, aid and development can be used as a 
prism through which to understand how Labour viewed itself and its key 
principles both at home and overseas. The history of aid and develop-
ment policies can be used to elucidate the long roots of decolonization in 
European imperial history, as well as the practical, rhetorical, ideological 
and (above all) human continuities that blur the transition between liv-
ing and dying empires. Throughout the twentieth century, development 
and aid policy occupied a specific space in political discourse, incorporat-
ing a number of different themes, including charity and philanthropy, 
progress and change, and the ongoing legacies of colonial rule. In this 
way, development (and, in turn, the developing world) can act both as a 
canvas, onto which ideas about the world could be projected, and a lens, 
through which attitudes can be examined and interrogated.
The issue of overseas aid and its relationship to colonial policy has 
been tentatively addressed in a number of edited volumes over the last 
decade; these have mostly focused on the connections between colonial 
development and other forms of humanitarian action, or the legacies of 
colonial development programmes in contemporary policy in ex- colonial 
states, and have tended to emphasize the role of non- governmental organ-
izations (NGOs).4 Similarly, Michael Barnett traces the history of over-
seas intervention from the imperial age to the end of the Cold War, yet, by 
framing this history within a narrative of progression, he fails to empha-
size the continuities between the periods under question.5 By contrast, 
Michael Jennings, in his work on development in Tanzania, highlights 
the continuities in personnel and approach between colonial and postco-
lonial development; this issue has also been addressed by Joseph Morgan 
Hodge, in his work on agrarian policy.6 Again, however, these texts focus 
mainly on NGOs and charities rather than official policy, despite the long 
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history of intervention by former colonial metropoles in the developing 
world, and despite the fact that this intervention is irrevocably shaped by 
the colonial legacies of the relationship between nation states in Europe 
and the global South. As Hodge has argued, the European powers used 
the rhetoric of development to make claims that discontent among colo-
nial populations was rooted not in political, racial and economic oppres-
sion but in ‘substandard living standards and inadequate government 
services’. In this way, the British could focus on ‘large- scale government 
planning and state- directed welfare schemes’, to dismiss the inequalities 
inherent within imperialism as mere ‘technical problems’ that were easily 
remediable without the radical solution of decolonization.7 The contin-
gent factor in this metropolitan analysis did not stem, therefore, from the 
inherent asymmetries of empire; rather, it was a more flexible relation-
ship predicated on commitments to development itself inherent in the 
civilizing mission. This can also be extended into the postcolonial period, 
when the rhetoric around development and humanitarian aid served to 
maintain this dynamic, while eliding the ways in which underdevelop-
ment was rooted in recent colonial history. By charting these debates on 
aid and the economy, we can gain some insight into the historical con-
stellations that guided Labour policy- makers, and the winds of change 
that buffeted them. Enduring themes thereby emerge that allow for a 
sustained analysis of agency, intent and the entanglements that beset the 
Labour Party and British overseas development.
British overseas development: a chronology
The British empire had traditionally been managed through the idea 
that colonialism should pay for itself; the ‘civilizing mission’ professed 
by nineteenth- (and twentieth- )century colonialists was tolerated only 
because imperialism was itself profitable for the metropole. This profit 
could either be financial and tangible – oil from Nigeria, cotton from 
India, diamonds from South Africa, as well as the large revenues that 
Britain drew from imperial- preference trade and the sterling area – or 
more abstract, such as the increased power and prestige that Britain 
gained through its imperial position. But profit and power were at 
the heart of empire.8 Colonialism was based on ‘conquest, exploita-
tion and subjugation’, impulses that might have been justified through 
Enlightenment claims to universal principles but that functioned only to 
deny these principles to the colonial subjects against whom they were 
employed.9
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The 1929 Colonial Development Act can be read as a continuation 
of nineteenth- century imperialist exploitation, framed within a new dis-
course of ‘development’ that had become more popular in the interwar 
period; for example, the provision of ‘technical assistance’ to the colonies 
had been tentatively embraced in the 1920s, with improved staffing of 
medical, agricultural and scientific departments around the empire.10 
The act had two purposes:  to promote colonial development, and to 
benefit the British economy, which was suffering from high unemploy-
ment. As a report by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 1964 
describes, ‘[T] he second [motive] has been stressed in later comments’; 
although many people involved were doubtless motivated by progress in 
the colonies, it was as a panacea for domestic unemployment that the 
act was packaged and sold.11 In this it was a categorical failure: shortly 
after the act was passed, Wall Street crashed and the Great Depression 
took hold of the world economy, unemployment in Britain rocketed and 
the funds available for colonial development were severely curtailed. By 
January 1931 the act had provided work for around 13,000 men, out of 
2.7 million registered unemployed.12
Nevertheless, enthusiasm for colonial development was not 
destroyed by the failures of the 1929 act. The first Colonial Development 
and Welfare (CDW) Act was passed in 1940, largely through the efforts of 
Malcolm MacDonald, the pioneering ‘National Labour’ Secretary of State 
for the colonies, appointed in 1938. The CDW Act moved away from the 
simple imperialist mercantilism of the 1929 Colonial Development Act 
to also provide for the development of welfare resources; MacDonald 
believed that, if Britain did not provide ‘proper social services’ for the col-
onies, then it would inevitably and deservedly lose them.13 The CDW Act 
was therefore ‘authorised to make schemes for any purpose likely to pro-
mote the development of the resources of any Colony or the welfare of its 
people’.14 The British government could spend up to £500,000 a year on 
schemes either ‘promoting research or inquiry’; another £5 million was 
budgeted every year until 1951 for all other projects.15 The CDW Act was 
administered directly by the Secretary of State for the colonies, rather 
than the Treasury, which had overseen the 1929 Colonial Development 
Act. The CDW Act of 1940 was hampered by the fact that ‘the purposes 
of war’ had to have ‘the first call on the resources of the country, whether 
in men, material or money’.16 By the end of March 1946, however, 595 
development and welfare schemes and 105 research schemes had been 
initiated, at a total cost of £28,841,000.17
Even before the end of the war, Parliament had voted to ‘increase 
the provision for colonial development and welfare in order that colonies 
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should be enabled to pursue an active policy of development when peace 
returned’. The 1945 CDW Act, which came into effect on 1 April 1946, 
made available £120  million over ten years, with an annual limit of 
£17.5 million, of which £1 million could be spent on research. These fig-
ures enabled the planning of long- term development, with the realization 
that projects would initially require a smaller share of the funds because 
expenditure would increase as the schemes progressed; therefore, more 
than one- tenth of the overall funds could be granted in any one year.18 In 
total, just over £13.25 million was spent in a combination of grants and 
loans under CDW Act provision between 1940 and 1947. The funds were 
split between residual Colonial Development Fund schemes, research 
projects, development and welfare schemes, and salaries and expenses 
accrued in the administration of the programmes, with the bulk of the 
amount, more than £12 million, being spent on development and welfare 
schemes.19 The CDW Acts also resulted in the creation of several research 
bodies and advisory boards. This included the Colonial Economic and 
Development Council, which was created by the Secretary of State for 
the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, in September 1946 to advise on ‘the 
framing and subsequent review of plans for economic and social develop-
ment in the Colonial Empire’ and on ‘questions of general economic and 
financial policy’.20 In the post- war world, development was thus already 
established in the policy debates of the Labour Party. That it would con-
tinue to shape the party’s approach to the future of the colonies was, in 
itself, unsurprising.
As well as mobilizing colonial resources for the demands of the 
metropole, colonial development could be directed at fulfilling the needs 
of the colonies themselves. Kathryn Tidrick, in her book on the relation-
ship between empire and the English national character, highlights the 
transition from traditional British extractive imperialism to a different 
attitude, created through the ‘erosion of the once sacrosanct idea that the 
colonies must be, if nothing else, self- supporting’.21 As Rita Hinden, the 
South- African- born Fabian economist pointed out, this focus on develop-
ment funded only through locally raised revenue had historically meant 
that colonies became ‘caught in a vicious cycle of low productivity, low 
revenues, and low expenditure’, unable to afford public investment even 
when it might lead to higher profits.22 Tidrick draws a clear distinction 
between the ‘old imperial system’, whereby colonies had ‘puttered along 
as virtually independent satrapies’, and the new imperial attitude, which 
‘involved the Colonial Office intimately in economic planning for the 
empire’ and ‘forced the British government to take a more visible interest 
in colonial welfare’.23
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This newfound concern for the living conditions of the colonial 
populations led to social welfare development that mirrored the contem-
poraneous implementation of the British welfare state. The development 
of health and education services was also supported by the provision of 
transport and communication services. This slow move towards develop-
mental colonialism created a framework in which the post- war Labour 
government could engage with the British colonies. This was no mean 
feat, given the historic attitude of many Labour Party members towards 
imperialism as a global economic and political system.24 The Labour Party 
had engaged critically with colonial politics right from the beginning 
of its history; perhaps unexpectedly, this engagement was not framed 
around issues to do with labour or class- based inequality, but was more 
generally shaped by an understanding of ‘the more purely moral case for 
human rights’ and a critique of racial and political oppression through 
the colonial system.25 This framing of anti- colonial thought as a funda-
mentally moral issue, rather than as part of a broader structural critique, 
became central to the Labour Party’s conception of its own relationship 
to imperialism – even when the party was itself an agent of imperial rule.
The Fabian approach to empire
In 1940, in response to the debates surrounding the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act, the Fabian Society established the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau (FCB) in order to define clearly British left- wing thinking on 
imperialism. For twenty years it represented the most consistent left- wing 
intellectual response to the British empire, developing into an important 
policy group. It commissioned research, which was disseminated across 
more than sixty territories in a journal, Empire (from 1949, Venture); 
briefed Labour Party MPs, many of whom were asked to sit on parlia-
mentary committees; and campaigned on issues including independence 
and constitutional progression, economic development, the exploita-
tion of natural resources in the empire, and rural and urban land use. 
Many of the people involved in the creation of the FCB were to become 
influential in colonial government policy and academic study; as well as 
Arthur Creech Jones, who was its first chairman, Rita Hinden edited and 
wrote much of the FCB’s journal; they were joined by Margery Perham, 
the influential historian and anthropologist, and W.  Arthur Lewis, the 
development economist, as well as by Leonard Woolf, Frank Horrabin 
and Margaret Cole. To raise publicity for the organization, Creech Jones 
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enlisted a panel of MPs to ask ‘Questions in Parliament’ on colonial issues, 
and the Manchester Guardian and the Reuters overseas correspondent 
were courted as sympathetic media contacts.26
The FCB was the ‘sole political research group devoting its efforts 
to colonial affairs’ during the period and, as such, had some public 
authority. The organization has been characterized as the ‘only traceable 
Fabian influence upon the thinking of Members of Parliament’ during 
Attlee’s government (not least because of Creech Jones’ dual role), and 
as the ‘main inspiration’ for Labour’s imperial policies.27 The influence 
of the FCB was no doubt magnified by the previous lack of concentrated 
research within the Labour Party on imperial issues, which had been 
addressed only in the most ‘cursory manner’. Within this policy void, 
the Fabians ‘studied, debated, elaborated, criticised and honed down to 
desirable goals’ the most vital colonial issues.28
The FCB certainly engaged in some blanket criticism of imperial-
ism. For example, the prominent anti- colonialist author, and former 
Colonial Service medical officer, Norman Leys wrote a piece expressing 
anger at the social conditions of Africans in British territories, whom 
he believed enjoyed a ‘place in society…nearer to that of chattel slaves 
than to that of freemen’. The group as a whole, however, fundamentally 
wanted to bring about a change, rather than an end, to British colonial 
rule in Africa. Leys himself shied away from promoting the dissolution of 
the empire as a solution to the problems he identified, instead suggest-
ing equal franchise conditions between white and black communities in 
Africa as a way to address inequality.29 As a whole, members of the FCB 
exemplified the principle that it was possible to be anti- imperialist, in the 
sense of opposing imperial exploitation, without calling for the immedi-
ate decolonization of the British empire.
This accommodatory approach to imperialism became more politi-
cally expedient when the Labour Party, under the leadership of Clement 
Attlee, won the 1945 election and was forced to confront the reality of 
colonial rule. Rita Hinden wrote, in 1959, an outline of what Labour’s 
options had been when it came to power in 1945 and inherited a vast 
colonial empire:
Enjoy it? No, that would have been a violation of socialist principle. 
Reject it outright, and so remain true to the anti- imperialism which 
socialists had always preached? Or, better still perhaps, accept the 
heritage, but with the determination to nurse and develop it for the 
advantage of its rightful owners till they themselves should have 
come of age?30
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Colonial development provided the Attlee government with a way of 
engaging with the colonies that could be justified within the Fabian 
and socialist ideologies underpinning the Labour Party in this period, 
while maintaining a fundamentally paternalistic approach to colonial 
territories. This focus on development rather than the maintenance 
of colonial rule enabled the Labour Party to engage with the politics 
of colonialism while simultaneously critiquing others  – including, 
importantly, the Conservative Party as a whole  – for their supposedly 
exploitative and imperialist attitudes. This was a means of planning for 
an imperial future in which questions focused on the nature and quality 
of future engagement, rather than the nature of sovereignty. That debate 
took this form owed much to the assumptions that guided it within the 
FCB, reflecting a belief that the future was defined by looser bonds, and 
greater liberty, but not independence as such.
Before he became colonial secretary, in his work with the FCB, 
Creech Jones framed colonial development as part of a long- term trajec-
tory that would eventually see self- government for the African colonies. 
He acknowledged that complaints about colonial exploitation were ‘well 
founded’ and that a critique of economic imperialism was fully justified; 
Africans had a right to ‘bitterly complain’ about the wealth ‘drained’ from 
the continent and the small amount returned from the ‘huge profits’ 
made from colonial goods.31 To rectify this, ‘consultation and coopera-
tion’ with indigenous Africans was ‘required in the planning of all future 
development’, because local communities were knowledgeable about 
their own economies, infrastructures and societies.32 The FCB itself 
argued stridently against the imperialists who wanted ‘to suggest that 
the British Empire is a blessing to the world, and, in particular, to the 
Natives’.33 Instead, the FCB promoted what it believed was a new attitude 
to empire, based on collaboration and cooperation between colonized 
and colonizers.
The FCB raised traditionally socialist concerns and applied them 
to the colonial territories. Creech Jones decried the fact that African 
wages were ‘determined only by what is necessary to keep a body and 
soul together on a level as low as human existence can just manage’, 
arguing that African agricultural workers would achieve acceptable liv-
ing standards only when they received a fair price for the fruits of their 
labours.34 This rhetoric clearly echoed the earlier demands of socialists in 
the metropole. There was a focus within the FCB from the 1930s onwards 
on ‘riots and strikes’ within the non- self- governing empire, which did 
not ‘suggest contentment’ with the status quo and mirrored the politi-
cal action taken by marginalized groups in Britain.35 Paul Kelemen, in 
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his work on Kenya, has emphasized the development of ‘trade unions, 
co- operatives and local government’ as central to the ‘specific contribu-
tion’ of the Attlee government to ‘post- war metropolitan thinking on 
Africa and on the colonial question’.36 Venture, the FCB journal, heralded 
in 1950 the ‘existence of a thousand colonial trade unions with a mem-
bership of over 600,000’ and celebrated the work of British ‘trade union 
advisers who have brought the “know- how” of British unionism to the 
Colonies’.37
Writing in 1959, Rita Hinden summarized the interests of the FCB 
to include such typical Fabian and socialist priorities as
the establishment of trade unions and cooperative societies, schools 
and welfare services and the money to pay for them, grand projects 
of colonial development (and again the money to pay for them), 
irrigation, sanitation, the conservation of the soil, better prices for 
colonial products, [and] the establishment of new industries.38
These concerns, which included ‘anything and everything that would 
relieve the pressing burden of colonial poverty’, are clearly analogous 
to the welfare and labour issues that were demanded by Labour for 
British people in the metropole.39 They illustrate an identifiable left- wing 
approach to empire, which was co- opted into development policy in the 
post- war period by Creech Jones and an amenable Colonial Office.
Several historians have examined the connection between the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Labour government’s colonial policy in 
this period.40 Among others, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton agree 
that post- war Labour governments’ efforts at colonial development can 
be located in Fabian thinking, which they link to Joseph Chamberlain 
and the development of ‘great estates’ in the empire. Their article 
focuses on economic development, and investigates the role of Fabian 
ideology in formulating ‘a doctrine of development which would meet 
the claims of liberalism within the contours of a socialist version of 
trusteeship’.41 Arguably, however, the Fabian influence is most discern-
ible in social welfare projects. Decision- making about colonial develop-
ment was governed by an ideological conviction that it was necessary 
to improve the standards of living for colonial populations in the short 
and long term, primarily as a method of creating self- sufficient colonies 
that could progress towards self- government. Creech Jones and the 
FCB fundamentally believed that territories were being held ‘in trust 
for the native inhabitants’, with the main aim of all colonial administra-
tion being ‘to train the native inhabitants in every possible way, so that 
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they may be able in the shortest possible time to govern themselves’.42 
For the Fabians, colonial development was central to the creation of 
new democratic states.
Not everybody in government acquiesced in the Fabian ideals 
of social welfare development (over economic programmes), or pro-
gression towards self- government for the colonies. For many within 
the Attlee government, colonial development could be supported 
only if it was ‘sufficiently remunerative’ to justify British investment 
at a time of great economic difficulty.43 This is the wider ideological 
and practical context that led to the establishment of the Overseas 
Food Corporation (OFC), proposed by the minister for food, John 
Strachey; the organization was initially set up in connection with the 
East African Groundnuts Scheme in Tanganyika, perhaps the most 
infamous and ill- fated example of a post- war British colonial develop-
ment project. As a response, the Colonial Development Corporation 
(CDC), supported by Creech Jones, was created to support ‘develop-
ment for new sources of supply of foodstuffs and raw materials from 
the Colonies’, but again with a focus on profit for the metropole as 
well as development on the periphery.44 This type of mercantile devel-
opment sat uneasily against the Fabian- inspired welfare programmes, 
and enjoyed only limited success.45 But the context in which colonial 
politics were being created, and the inherent tensions of bureaucratic 
politics, meant that these disagreements about the fundamental pur-
pose of colonial rule had to be thrashed out between the Colonial 
Office, the Foreign Office, the Treasury and any number of other 
interested parties.46
In other words, many within the Attlee Cabinet were happy to sup-
port development that was aimed primarily at the economic progres-
sion of the metropole, although they were less willing to publicly admit 
that this was their main priority. Creech Jones, the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau and many within the Colonial Office, on the other hand, sup-
ported development policies that prioritized the needs of colonial gov-
ernments and their populations (notwithstanding the thorny issues 
of minority government in the white settler colonies) over the desires 
and demands of the metropole.47 Frank Heinlein has highlighted 
the resistance by Colonial Office officials ‘on moral grounds’ to any 
development plans that might engender exploitation, or even the 
perception of exploitation, of colonial populations for British finan-
cial gain.48 In this way, development policies could be cast as a more 
‘moral’ way to run an empire, which fitted into broader Fabian concep-
tions of how Britain should exist in the world.
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Development and decolonization:  
managing the transition
In this context, the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), which 
was established in 1964, can be seen both as the descendant of British 
colonial development policies in the first half of the twentieth century 
and the predecessor of British overseas development and humanitarian 
aid in the twenty- first century. It represents both a break in the narrative – 
as the first time that aid was delivered to a generalized set of recipients 
‘overseas’ rather than to fellow imperial subjects  – and a continuation 
of attitudes and approaches that were forged in colonial rule. Colonial 
development did not end with decolonization; instead, the metropole 
maintained its relationship with its former colonies through overseas 
aid and development programmes that clearly echoed the rhetorical and 
ideological approach to imperialism that was established during the post- 
war Labour government.49 This continuity was also evident in domestic 
party politics in Britain; throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century the Labour Party used the rhetoric of aid and development to 
identify itself as belonging to a particular tradition within foreign policy 
that could be understood as distinct from the Conservative Party.
The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts were renewed 
in 1949, 1950, 1955, 1959 and 1963; in addition, the Colonial 
Development Corporation continued to promote capital projects. These 
programmes were supported from 1961 to 1964 by the Department of 
Technical Co- operation (DTC), which was responsible for all technical 
assistance to foreign countries; alongside the DTC, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office controlled capital aid to Commonwealth countries, and 
the Foreign Office was in charge of all capital aid to foreign countries 
outside the Commonwealth. In 1964 these functions were all brought 
under one umbrella, when the ODM was created as an independent 
department by the first Labour government of Harold Wilson. The ODM 
represented the first British attempt to develop a cohesive overseas aid 
policy in a postcolonial context. It also, simultaneously, demonstrated 
how far British responses to the ‘developing world’ continued to be 
shaped by ongoing colonial entanglements.
When the ODM was created, its policies were clearly histori-
cally rooted in British imperialism, especially the post- war concep-
tion of colonial rule as enacted through social welfare and economic 
development projects. As I have argued, a section of the Labour Party 
self- consciously identified itself with an ethical approach to colonial 
rule, which it established through the rhetorical lens of Fabianism 
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and in the context of ongoing debates about developmentalist colo-
nial policies. By the 1950s and 1960s this approach had become more 
universally associated with the Labour Party as a whole, which was 
keen to define itself as having a specific approach to the colonies and 
former colonies. This was elaborated by key thinkers such as Barbara 
Castle, Tom Driberg and Judith Hart. For example, in one of Barbara 
Castle’s electoral addresses in 1955 she criticized the Tories for 
spending £5,800 million on arms compared to £69 million on colo-
nial development, and drew comparisons between these policies and 
their domestic approach, which also ‘put wealth before social develop-
ment’. Castle directly connected her views on overseas development to 
her broader political beliefs, writing that she was a socialist because 
‘people…are very much the same the world over: with the same needs 
and the same right to a decent life’.50 In this way, she worked to orient 
her approach to the developing world within the broader fabric of the 
Labour Party, which in turn served to exclude those from a separate 
political tradition.
The Labour approach to development in this period simultaneously 
demonstrated how far British responses to the ‘developing world’ were 
shaped by ongoing colonial entanglements. British aid was overwhelm-
ingly concentrated within the Commonwealth, because Britain’s sense of 
its own international duties and responsibilities remained closely tied to 
its recent imperial history. The Labour Party was keen to emphasize this 
continuity and maintain these ties with ex- colonial nations, as an inter-
nal positional paper makes explicit:
Perhaps Afghanistan, with a per capita income of less than $100, 
is in greater need of capital investment than Ghana, whose per 
capita income is over $100, but Ghana is our particular responsibil-
ity. If a choice has to be made, Ghana comes first… A multi- racial 
Commonwealth will not hold together for long if the mother coun-
try aids other states at the expense of its Afro- Asian members.51
Ghana, of course, had been officially independent from Britain since 
1957, and had not been Britain’s ‘responsibility’ for some time; the 
process of decolonization did not stop British governments, including 
Labour governments, continuing to conceptualize aid and development 
within the ideological framework and imagined community of the 
Commonwealth.
In this way, aid and development programmes worked to replace 
or replicate the old power structures and relationships of imperialism. At 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
britAin,  FrAnCE And thE dEColonizAtion oF AFriCA56
56
the same time, development provided a conceptual framework within 
which a modernizing Labour government could interact with colonies 
and former colonies, without undermining the party’s rhetorical and ide-
ological commitment to decolonization. As under Attlee, Wilson’s Labour 
Party worked hard to ensure that its approach to overseas development 
was perceived as part of a broader Labour philosophy on politics and gov-
ernment. In fact, overseas development was characterized as fundamen-
tal to the Labour mission:
To the doctrinaire Socialist, the answer…is simple. We should par-
ticipate wholeheartedly in the UN programme, even if it means 
increasing our own contribution to 2 per cent or more of our national 
income. What is economic aid, after all, but the global application 
of the basic tenet in the Socialist creed – from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his need?52
This type of rhetoric not only advocated for Labour to promote an active 
development programme overseas; it also drew on connections between 
Labour’s foundational ideologies and overseas aid and development, 
which in turn served to create a connection between the Labour Party 
itself and these policies, both historically and in contemporary politics.
Overseas aid and development provided a framework for the 
Labour Party to talk about Britain’s place in a rapidly changing world. 
In the early 1960s Barbara Castle and others within the Labour Party 
believed that the provision of British overseas aid was inefficient, spread 
as it was between several different government departments, and inad-
equate, given the urgent need for humanitarian, economic and technical 
aid around the world. In February 1964, eight months before the Labour 
Party would narrowly win the general election, Castle advocated pas-
sionately in the House of Commons for the creation of a specific govern-
ment aid department:
We all dilate about the difficulties – and, heaven knows, they are 
immense; the amount of aid already voted is like a drop in the 
bucket of need, when we face it – but much more could be done. 
A Ministry of Overseas Development in this country…with Cabinet 
rank [would] show the importance which we in Britain attach to 
the challenge of the Development Decade… This country is full of 
warm- hearted people. They have shown this by their response to 
various voluntary bodies – Oxfam, Voluntary Service Overseas, and 
others. I believe that they would respond to this challenge if it was 
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put to them… The wind of change is not blowing only politically. It 
is blowing economically, too, and it is for this potentially influential 
country to give the lead.53
Castle rooted state- led overseas aid and development within a 
broader context of both NGOs and transnational organizations, specifi-
cally citing the UN Decade of Development. She invoked recent imperial 
history – the ‘wind of change’ speech that Harold Macmillan had deliv-
ered in Ghana and South Africa in 1960 – to explain the need for aid at 
this particular time, locating British aid and development policies within 
the decolonization process. She also framed overseas development aid 
not as charity but as ‘a vital factor’ in the ‘survival’ of both Britain and the 
wider world; while this can be read against a backdrop of Cold War strug-
gles for hearts, minds and resources in the developing world, it can also 
been seen as a call for the ‘survival’ of Britain’s international role. Castle 
declared Britain a ‘potentially influential country’ in the field of develop-
ment, a declaration that sits at odds with ideas of British post- war decline 
and hints at a further motive for aid and development policies beyond the 
continuation of colonial ties or a sense of responsibility for former impe-
rial possessions.
Wilson’s Labour Party worked hard to ensure that its approach 
to overseas development was perceived as part of a broader Labour 
approach to politics and government at home and in foreign affairs. In 
its 1964 manifesto, the party promised that a newly created ODM would 
coordinate both Commonwealth aid and Britain’s work within the spe-
cialist agencies of the United Nations. Again, the manifesto drew upon 
classic Labour values to justify spending on aid:  ‘[W] e believe that the 
socialist axiom “From each according to his ability, to each according to 
his need” is not for home consumption only.’ The new ministry and the 
wider development policies were fundamentally presented as a way to 
deal with a newly postcolonial world; appearing in the manifesto under 
a larger section entitled ‘A new role for Britain’, with the subheading 
‘The end of colonialism’, overseas aid was a way for Britain to take on a 
new role and thus to ‘keep pace with the dramatic changes in the world 
scene’.54 This was an entanglement predicated on a long- running engage-
ment with aid, and not fixated on concepts of sovereignty. By identifying 
itself with a progressive approach to the end of the empire, Labour could 
argue for a continuing role for Britain in its former overseas colonies 
without drawing accusations of neo- colonialism; this echoed attempts by 
Attlee’s government to utilize colonial development to maintain British 
control over potentially volatile colonial citizens and territories, as well 
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as reiterating ideas that British prestige was rooted in the maintenance of 
spheres of hard and soft power overseas.
As the first minister for overseas development, Barbara Castle 
oversaw technical and capital aid to both Commonwealth and non- 
Commonwealth countries, as well as scientific research and liaison 
with outside bodies. Both in the type of aid programmes enacted and 
in the language used to talk about aid and development, the ODM 
clearly drew on attitudes and expertise that were rooted in recent 
British colonial rule in the developing world. So, for example, in 1965 
the department published an introductory report entitled ‘Overseas 
development: the work of the new ministry’, which stated that the 
motivation of British overseas aid was to ‘help developing countries 
in their efforts to raise living standards’. This included ‘reducing pov-
erty and unemployment’, but also ‘fulfilling aspirations towards steady 
and continued social and economic progress’ and thus ‘the transforma-
tion of traditional societies into modern ones’.55 The rhetoric of ‘mod-
ernizing’ African, Caribbean and Asian countries, to restructure their 
societies in the model of Britain and other Western European nations, 
clearly drew upon Fabian thinking from the 1940s and earlier, as well 
as broader narratives of British colonial power from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. While the Labour Party tried to frame its approach 
to the developing world within its wider progressive political policies, 
it is clear that the party also situated its approach within its own ideo-
logical history, which included far more collusion in imperial rule than 
it was comfortable to admit.
Under the Wilson government, the ODM funded development 
programmes around the world, though they were overwhelmingly con-
centrated in the Commonwealth and the few colonies yet to gain their 
independence. The ministry recruited some 2,000 people a year, includ-
ing teachers, doctors, engineers, nurses, geologists, planners and econ-
omists, with an annual budget of more than £200 million despite cuts 
in the public spending allocation.56 In 1967 the Overseas Development 
Institute asserted that the ODM’s work meant that overseas development 
aid had become ‘an integral part of international relations and an impor-
tant ingredient in international affairs’.57 By 1970, Economic and Political 
Weekly reported, ‘a remarkably well organised and articulate lobby’ had 
been developed in Britain in support of overseas aid. That year Judith 
Hart, then Minister for Overseas Development, announced an increase 
in aid of 50 per cent over the next five years, which was greeted not with 
‘a quiet glow of satisfaction from the small group of aid specialists, and a 
snort from the Daily Express’, but with demands from voluntary agencies, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59thE lAbour pArty And brit iSh ovErSEAS dEvElopMEnt
59
churches and other groups for an even more significant increase in 
spending.58 The Wilson government used this success to proclaim itself to 
be ‘the guardian of those social values which market forces, left to them-
selves, will erode’; the identification of Labour with the ‘moral’ issue of 
international aid seems also to have been broadly successful among the 
electorate.59 This long- running colonial entanglement suffused Labour 
Party debates, with a focus on development considered more chiefly con-
tingent than the issue of sovereignty.
Conclusions
This chapter has sketched out two examples of Labour’s approach to 
overseas development, the first in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the second, not even twenty years later, at a point when most 
colonies had gained their independence from Britain. The chapter has 
explored the ways in which development programmes were seen as 
preparation for independence – or to perform the idea of granting inde-
pendence – or to manage the relationship between ex- colonies and the 
former metropole. For Arthur Creech Jones, and the Attlee government, 
colonial development policies were an ‘ethical’ way of doing imperialism; 
for Barbara Castle and Wilson’s governments, development was a 
way of maintaining colonial ties in a postcolonial world and forging a 
new identity for Britain in a world without empires. In both periods, 
Labour governments cast aid and development as being fundamentally 
connected to the party’s founding principles – whether Fabianism or 
socialist tenets of collectivism and labour rights. They imagined futures 
predicated on their own values, in which the contingent factor was the 
quality of and commitment to engagement, and not a broader focus on 
political sovereignty.
This rhetoric continued to be employed by the Labour Party through-
out the twentieth century. For Tony Blair’s government, in the late 1990s, 
overseas development became a fundamental plank in the newly pro-
claimed ‘ethical’ foreign policy, often in a way that served to deny or elide 
Britain’s colonial legacy. It is tempting to see development policies mov-
ing smoothly from the Colonial Development Act of 1929 to the work of 
the Department for International Development (DFID) around the world 
today. The actual history of British development policy was more frac-
tured, however. In its original incarnation, the ODM survived only until 
the Conservative victory in 1970, when responsibility for overseas aid 
was returned to the Foreign Office. When Labour returned to power in 
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1974 it created a Ministry of Overseas Development again as an inde-
pendent department. The Conservative government headed by Margaret 
Thatcher, in turn, restored control of overseas aid to the Foreign Office 
in 1979. In 1997 the Department for International Development was 
created when Tony Blair’s government was elected with a landslide. It 
seems that, both during and after decolonization, the Labour Party main-
tained a belief in the importance of overseas development as something 
separate from foreign policy. More work needs to be done to address the 
ways in which the Labour Party has, historically, made a unique and con-
scious effort to associate itself with an ‘ethical’ approach to international 
relations, as well as examining exactly how the ‘ethical’ use of aid and 
humanitarianism was framed by the wider British political establishment 
and media.
There are also important questions to be asked about agency and the 
place of the developing nations themselves in this narrative. The British 
government, and the Labour Party specifically, vacillated on whether 
they wanted to implement development themselves based on their his-
toric colonial ‘expertise’, or whether they wanted to facilitate develop-
ment that responded to local requirements and demands in a way that 
would put power in the hands of local populations. In fact, it seems that, 
as imperial ties loosened and the duties of imperial rule were diluted, the 
act of granting aid and enacting development became more performa-
tive, and it became more important to emphasize Britain’s role overseas 
and to justify continued British involvement in the developing world. For 
example, in 2009 the Conservative Secretary of State for development, 
Andrew Mitchell, announced the rebranding of DFID overseas as UK Aid, 
complete with a union flag logo. Mitchell stated that this was being car-
ried out to make sure that ‘emergency grain packets, schools and water 
pumps’ could be ‘easily and clearly identified as coming from the UK’; 
this would help Britain to receive ‘the credit it deserves’ for its overseas 
initiatives.60 Emphasizing British ownership of aid seems at odds with 
encouraging local agency over aid initiatives, but clearly delineates areas 
of British influence overseas and thus, presumably, is aimed at using this 
influence to strengthen British power and prestige on the world stage.
Pointing out that aid and development programmes, whether 
enacted by governments or NGOs, often reflect or even overlap with 
the ideology and rhetoric of colonial development programmes is 
not terribly groundbreaking. The fact that the relationships between 
ex- metropoles and ex- colonies continue to be structured by colonial 
entanglements is, after all, widely accepted. Nevertheless, the his-
tory of decolonization is often framed, both in scholarly works and in 
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the popular imagination, as a moment fundamentally characterized 
by transition and change: revolutionary movements, the collapse of 
empires and the creation of new nation states. Unpicking entangle-
ments and thinking about decolonization as a longer process, which 
started earlier and finished later than this narrative allows, can there-
fore be a fruitful exercise for historians. It also illuminates a debate in 
which the primary issue was not the discussion of sovereignty but the 
quality and capacity for constructive engagement. The history of aid 
and development, which starts at the high point of European impe-
rialism and continues into the twenty- first century, and which repre-
sents a resistance to the end of imperialism, an attempt to manage that 
process and, finally, an attempt to maintain imperial entanglements 
after empires have collapsed, offers one possible framework for this 
discussion.
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‘Oil will set us free’: the hydrocarbon 
industry and the Algerian 
decolonization process
Marta Musso
1956 was a pivotal year in the entangled histories of North Africa and 
Europe. In June the negotiations for the establishment of the European 
Economic Community started in Brussels at the Château of Val- Duchesse, 
and they would continue until March the following year. In September 
the beginning of the outbreak of violence that went down in history as 
‘the battle of Algiers’ marked the descent of the Algerian rebellion into 
open warfare. In October the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company 
by the most active African ruler, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the 
ensuing crisis that lasted until March, showed all the weakness of former 
European empires in post- war foreign politics. These facts are well- 
documented developments in the history of the twentieth century.1 Less 
attention has been given, however, to another set of events that occurred 
in 1956 and that, at the time, was welcomed as a fundamental change 
for the economics and geopolitical position of Europe and Africa:  the 
discovery of large reserves of hydrocarbons in the Sahara Desert.
The presence of hydrocarbons in northern Africa gave Europe, 
and especially France, a unique opportunity to develop a domestic oil 
industry. In fact, while the traditional production areas outside the 
Soviet bloc were a prerogative of a few large US companies (the so- called 
‘Seven Sisters’), the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Sahara on the part 
of French companies opened the possibility for European operators to 
develop a new oil district, closer to Europe and perceived as more pro-
tected than Middle East supplies. For France, this was not simply the 
occasion to boost its own domestic oil industry – the richest business 
of the post- war era – but to control a powerful geopolitical tool, and to 
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retain its influence in North Africa. At the same time, for Algeria’s Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN), as for many newly independent govern-
ments, oil became the symbol and the basis of economic independence, its 
bargaining chip against the West and against France in particular.2 In this 
narrative of oil as power, two opposite views of the world’s future alliance 
system unfolded. France tried to revive the idea of creating a Eurafrican 
space, an integrated system that would allow Europe to rise again as a 
global power thanks to energy independence. The Algerian fighters, on 
the contrary, promoted a nationalistic view of the oil industry against 
Eurafrica and against Europe, with the idea that oil would allow them 
to reverse the dependency pattern between Europe and Africa. In this 
complex political, military and economic scenario, oil companies played 
an intensively active role. Private and state- owned companies alike acted 
according to their own rules, interfering in the Algerian decolonization 
process through secret diplomacy, overt aid and mutual influences on the 
governments. Rather than promoting integration, the main effect of the 
hydrocarbon discoveries was to prolong the Algerian War and to aggra-
vate the negotiations over the control of the Sahara, the one condition 
from which neither party was willing to give an inch.
This chapter aims to reconstruct the political and economic dis-
course around the Saharan reserves, from the moment of their discovery 
up to the Évian Agreements. The contingent visions of the future out-
lined during this period outline the importance of the oil industry in the 
Algerian decolonization process both on an ideological and a material 
level. The historiography of the Algerian War has generally focused on 
French and international politics, leaving non- state actors and the eco-
nomic aspects of decolonization in the background. Given the fundamen-
tal importance that Algeria had in contemporary French history, and the 
messy political and social fallout of the war in both France and Algeria, 
it is perhaps of little surprise that non- state actors have been marginal-
ized. Furthermore, national, diplomatic and even military archives are 
generally open and offer a vast amount of information; business archives 
are often more difficult to access. Reconstructing the history of the strate-
gies of non- state actors, especially private companies, presents particular 
challenges, therefore. Yet, as this chapter will show, the role of non- state 
business actors was paramount in the unfolding of the war. In general, 
international industry followed the decolonization process closely, as 
shifting sands promised profits for the prudent. The withdrawal of tra-
ditional European control left open new territories in which to seize new 
economic opportunities; in effect, the Cold War could itself be read as 
a global competition to seize resources and new markets on the part of 
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two opposite systems of power.3 While Algeria is an exception in the his-
tory of decolonization, because of its stronger ties to the metropole, the 
history of the oil industry in the Sahara shows that France was willing to 
accept Algerian independence as long as the new status of the country 
would not endanger French access to its oil resources. This was believed 
to be France’s right not only because of its historical control over the terri-
tory, but also because of the sustained investments by which it had sought 
to develop the Sahara. Controlling these resources altered the contingent 
vision with which France plotted out Algeria’s future. Maintaining this 
para- political entanglement became an important consideration for the 
French Republic. With that in mind, the difference between the political 
independence and the ‘actual’ independence of Algeria was very clear at 
the time, yet the latter was both much more elusive and much more dif-
ficult for France to accept.
Europe’s double dependency and the discovery  
of the Saharan resources
The shape of the international oil industry in the 1950s and 1960s ably 
reflected the new world order that followed the Second World War. It 
promised its champions a political and economic prize, and seemed to be 
a vehicle through which to achieve Cold War dominance. Both the main 
powers had their own reserves, and their geopolitical influence meant 
that they could influence reserves that lay beyond their borders. This left 
little for Europeans to squabble over, and, as they sought to strengthen 
their position against the Soviet bloc, they tasked collaborative bodies 
with investigating the problem. In 1956 the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) published a report on the European 
energy needs outlook for the next decade. Its outlook was bleak: based 
on GDP and industrial growth projections in the OEEC area in relation to 
energy input, Europe’s energy gap (the difference between total demand 
and indigenous supplies) was predicted to widen from 22 per cent in 
1955 to 32 per cent in 1975. This in turn would mean increasing balance 
of payments problems and threats to the security of energy supplies, 
which could halt economic expansion and weaken the continent against 
the Soviet bloc.4
The energy deficit was a major headache for European politi-
cal and economic actors. Between 1954 and1956 oil consumption in 
Europe had gone up by 20 per cent, a growth rate that did not seem to 
be slowing down in the short or medium term.5 As a consequence, oil 
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imports were becoming an ever- growing burden on the balance sheets 
of European countries, and fears grew in parallel to the widening energy 
deficit that a sudden arrest in supplies would cause a new economic crisis. 
Forecasts expected total energy consumption in Europe to double over the 
next twenty years.6 The Hartley Report, commissioned by the OEEC and 
chaired by Sir Harold Hartley from the University of Oxford, suggested 
promoting domestic production through coal and nuclear energy, but this 
could be done only up to a certain point. It warned that the coal indus-
try had little prospect of substantial increase, due to prohibitive costs, 
and that hydroelectric energy also would not plug the gap. The highest 
hopes were invested in nuclear energy, but the technology was still in its 
infancy and the electrical power it produced was not yet convenient.7 The 
most accessible and most efficient forms of energy in the decades to come 
would be oil and gas, which were very scarce on the continent. In the age 
of oil, Europe had become a territory of scarce energy resources.8
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the largest oil producer in 
the world was the United States, with 36 per cent of total production. The 
Middle East came second (24 per cent), followed by Venezuela (16 per 
cent) and the Soviet Union (13 per cent). The rest of the world combined 
accounted for only about 10 per cent of production.9 The Middle East was 
developing rapidly as the most important hydrocarbon area, however, not 
only as a producer (in 1964 it would surpass the United States)10 but as 
the largest basin of proven reserves (63 per cent in 1960, against 12 per 
cent in the United States, 6 per cent in Venezuela and 9 to 10 per cent in 
the Soviet Union).11 Furthermore, the United States was also the largest 
world consumer, with almost 500 million tons per year. From 1948 it had 
become an importer country, which had caused the Truman administra-
tion to implement a series of measures to limit overseas exports and to 
secure the largest quotas of imports from Latin America, which were seen 
as easier to defend than the Middle East in the case of a Soviet attack.12 
In contrast, the communist bloc was able to provide for itself, with 130 
to 135 million tons of annual production and consumption.13 This left 
Europe exposed as the world’s third-largest consumer but producing only 
3.5 per cent of its supplies.14 Once the United States had cut down on 
exports, Europe became inescapably dependent on Middle Eastern sup-
plies for 90 per cent of its needs.15
Moreover, neither crude imports nor product sales were directly 
controlled by European actors. Supplies and markets were managed by 
a group of large Anglo- American companies that exerted an oligopoly 
outside the United States and Soviet Union, controlling more than 85 per 
cent of the rest of the world’s fields and markets.16 These companies were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
britAin,  FrAnCE And thE dEColonizAtion oF AFriCA66
6
five American enterprises (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Texaco, 
Standard Oil of California and Socony Mobil) and two European concerns 
(British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell). At the end of the 1920s, in order 
to stabilize the market and avoid overproduction crises, these large compa-
nies had accepted each other’s relative standing both in the downstream 
sector (refining and marketing) and in the upstream sector (prospection 
and extraction), establishing a cartel through a series of informal but rigid 
pacts.17 This system created a seller’s market in which prices and flows 
were established by the cartel, with very little room for free markets.18
The world’s largest globalized industry by value was thus dominated 
by a strong oligopoly, which guaranteed stability in the market by con-
trolling the supply of this vital asset.19 It caused some consternation in 
US administrations, however, and even more in Europe, where the cartel 
controlled between 60 and 90 per cent of the oil market.20 As Paul Frankel, 
the most important expert on the oil industry at the time,21 wrote,
[T] he oil companies involved have become, almost in a state of 
absentmindedness (a state of mind allegedly responsible for the 
formation of the British Empire), international institutions which 
perform a vital role for all the countries involved. At the same time 
they remain unmistakably private enterprises, responsible for and 
to their shareholders.22
Outside the cartel, only a few independent US companies were able to 
carve out niche pockets in the extraction and marketing of oil. These 
companies were relevant domestically both for production and marketing, 
but they did not have access to relevant oil fields outside the United States 
and therefore had a much smaller importance internationally. In effect, 
as Frankel noted, ‘the only truly independent oil company [Standard 
Oil of New Jersey] is more balanced and self- sufficient than any other, 
depending on no one for either supply or disposal’.23 In 1960 Standard had 
a turnover of $8.9 billion, half that of the French state. Shell, the second 
largest, owned a 10- million- ton tanker fleet, twice as big as the French 
merchant fleet.24 These non- state actors were titans in their own right.
A third category of oil companies was state- owned enterprises 
(SOEs), at the time almost exclusively European. They mostly conducted 
research within the national perimeters and in colonial territories, or 
they focused on the downstream sector, buying crude from the cartel and 
selling it on at national level, thus exerting some influence on domestic 
prices. The power of these companies was very limited compared to both 
the cartel and the US independents: in 1956 the American independent 
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Sinclair could count on a capital of $100 billion, while the Compagnie 
française des pétroles (CFP), the largest European SOE, had capital of 
only ₣34 billion.25 Before the Second World War European governments 
had not been excessively concerned with the power of the cartel, partly 
because oil was still much behind coal as an energy source, partly because 
the supplies had always been reliable. On the contrary, the US admin-
istration had fought to break the oligopoly tendencies on its domestic 
market. As the status of oil as a fundamental resource became evident, 
however, together with the economic and political power of the car-
tel, European states became concerned by their double dependency on 
Middle Eastern supplies and Anglo- American control over the industry. 
The importance of SOEs seemed to offer some corrective for the dimin-
ished status of Europe both in the Cold War and the energy markets.
This was the global energy paradigm in January 1956, when French 
probes finally struck oil in the Sahara. Hopes of discovering important 
new fields in the desert had been chased by the French government since 
the early days of the European oil industry; in the 1920s a geological study 
had suggested the possible presence of substantial quantities of hydro-
carbons.26 After the Second World War France became the most active 
European country to promote the development of a national oil industry, 
with the Sahara providing a natural place to look for new reserves. In 
1947 the Bureau de recherche de pétrole (BRP), the body that coordi-
nated France’s oil policy, launched a vast research campaign in the area. 
Four companies were created to explore around 150,000 square kilo-
metres: SN REPAL, entirely state- owned and controlled by the BRP and 
the General Governor of Algeria; CFP- A, jointly owned by CFP and two 
French financial groups; the Compagnie de recherche et d’exploitation 
de pétrole au Sahara (CREPS), controlled by the state- run French con-
cern Régie autonome des pétroles (RAP) with a minority participation 
by Shell; and Compagnie des pétroles d’Algérie (CPA), 35 per cent con-
trolled by the BRP and 65 per cent by Shell. It is important to specify the 
ownership of the companies because the French oil code at the time was 
very strict: foreign companies were allowed to invest only through joint 
ventures with French bodies, and, though it was not specifically stated, 
no foreign enterprise could hold the majority of shares in a consortium. 
Shell was to remain the only exception, principally because of the per-
sonal relationship between Pierre Guillaumat, head of the BRP, and Shell’s 
CEO at the time. This was to become typical of the cooperation between 
the French state and industry, which ‘enabled targeted investment to be 
realized and guided by para- political interests’.27 The French government 
was hoping to develop the Saharan resources on an autarchic basis, but 
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the extreme working conditions imposed by the desert and the complex 
geological structure of the subsoil did not make the area desirable to the 
international oil industry. By choice and by necessity, the French state 
had invested most of the capital in the research campaign. Finally, after 
four years of exploratory drilling, the efforts paid off:  in January 1956 
CREPS found 100  million tons of oil reserves in Edjeleh, in south- east 
Algeria; in June SN REPAL discovered the oil fields of Hassi Messaoud, 
with 600 million tons of proven reserves, and in December gas at Hassi 
R’Mel, one of the largest gas fields in the world.
France went from being the European country with the larg-
est energy deficit to a significant producer country.28 This would 
become even more important over the coming months as the Suez 
Crisis unfolded. In order to be considered a producer country, how-
ever, France needed to ensure that the Sahara remained within its 
imperial borders – an idea that was increasingly contested by 1956. As 
Algerian politics became more strained, and nationalist demands more 
sharply stated, the boon of energy resources were imperilled by a very 
different vision of the future.
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Controlling the Territoires du Sud: a new Eurafrica
Up to the end of 1956 the Sahara remained chiefly a French concern. 
The fights against the Algerian nationalists were concentrated in the 
north of the country, and the desert was not of particular interest to the 
international oil industry, which preferred to exploit fields in the Middle 
East. Historically, Algeria comprised three départements, established in 
1849 and all situated in the north (Oran, Algiers and Constantine). The 
conquest of the territories south of Mount Atlas only started in 1899, 
and was completed in 1902 with the establishment of the Territoires du 
Sud. These districts had a separate administrative system and a separate 
budget, which was under the jurisdiction of the General Governor of 
Algeria; effectively, they were a colony of the northern departments.29 
Information on the area was scant: estimates of the population suggested 
somewhere between 1 and 4 million people, mostly nomadic Tuareg 
groups, of whom around 1.7 million lived within the French borders.30 
The standards of living were lower than the rest of Algeria, with an annual 
average income calculated at 105 kilograms of wheat and ₣600 for the 
sedentary farmers, while the nomadic Tuaregs, who also owned tracts 
of land, could count on around 145 kilograms of wheat and ₣1,200.31 
In the same year the average annual salary of a French manual labourer 
was ₣5,099.32
Nevertheless, it was widely known among the French authorities 
that the Saharan subsoil had a lot of potential, not just for hydrocarbons 
but also for iron, phosphate and other mineral riches. The desert had 
been at the centre of discussions on how to develop the area for a few 
years already, not only in terms of practical difficulties but as a motor 
to initiate and drive economic growth across the whole area. France 
was aware of the importance that Africa had in the new post- war 
geography, and it was determined to retain its African outlook while 
also building the European Community. In March 1957 Guy Mollet, 
the prime minister, was able to include the Overseas Territories in the 
European Economic Community, which entered into force on 1 January 
1958. Paris was afraid that ignoring African demands for development 
would mean losing it to one of the superpowers: the United States or, 
worse, the Soviet Union. In contrast, the creation of a Eurafrican space 
geared to the Common Market could give Europe the possibility to rise 
again as a superpower.33
Already, in the years before 1956, a series of administrative bod-
ies had been formed with this goal, such as the Bureau d’organisation 
des ensembles industriels africains (BIA), the European consortium for 
the development of African natural resources, and the comité des Zones 
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d’organisation industrielle africaine (ZOIA). All of these were French 
bodies directly controlled from Paris, with the objective of coordinating 
mining exploration in French Africa and promoting the development of 
a local processing industry.34 The discovery of hydrocarbons significantly 
accelerated the process of administrative reforms. On the one hand, oil 
could provide France with the budget to implement a series of develop-
ment projects; in the words of the French diplomat Erik Labonne, the 
Sahara could become the ‘European Siberia’.35 On the other, it was fun-
damental to redefine the legal framework in which capital would be 
invested; between 1957 and 1958 a series of research permits expired 
and had to be reassigned. Both the will and the means of realizing a 
French foothold in African markets existed in the 1950s, and attempts 
to develop this imagined a Eurafrican future. The contingent factor of 
energy reserves remained both the biggest prize and the greatest liability 
in this quest, however.
Deciding on whose capital and which companies would be allowed 
in the Sahara was of fundamental importance for France’s efforts to 
retain control over the area. A few weeks after the discovery of the 
Edjeleh oil field, in February 1956, Mollet declared from Algiers that ‘the 
development of the desert is the great task of our generation’.36 Pierre 
Cornet, head of the financial commission of the French Union, wrote a 
book entitled Sahara: terre de demain (Sahara: land of tomorrow), pub-
lished in October 1956. In this, he firmly supported reform in the area, 
stating that the development of the Sahara was a moral imperative for 
present- day France:
On our planet where, without truce, the mass of human beings 
multiplies at a dizzying speed, the immediate needs of their exist-
ence enjoin to the owners of unused space the duty to develop the 
resources or riches that can satisfy all human needs.37
With this new sense of urgency, a project that had been under dis-
cussion since 1953 was finally approved in January 1957: the creation of 
the Organisation commune des régions sahariennes (OCRS). The OCRS 
was an intergovernmental body for the management and development 
of the Saharan resources between the countries bordering the desert.38 
Its main objective was the development of the oil industry and the nec-
essary infrastructure, such as roads, landing fields and communication 
facilities. It harnessed the promise of increased employment opportu-
nities for the local population, with assurances of an associated rise in 
standards of living.39 Under OCRS control, the borders of French colonial 
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authority were redrawn; the north- east area of French Soudan (today 
Mali), and the north of Niger and Chad, all still belonging the French 
Union, were amalgamated with the southern Algerian territories, which 
were for the first time departmentalized in two provinces, Saoura and 
Oasis. These districts were put under the direct control of the newly 
established minister of the Sahara, and taken away from the administra-
tive duties of the General Governor. This way, the Sahara was officially 
separated from the rest of Algeria and attached to the metropole. On 
a political level, the main objective of the OCRS was to create a strong 
juridical separation between the north and the south of Algeria; aware 
that the northern départements were slipping away from their control, 
the BRP and the French government wanted to create a legislative frame-
work that would allow them to retain control over the Territoires du Sud 
even in the event of Algeria becoming independent.40 The creation of the 
OCRS was one of the signs that France was prepared to grant independ-
ence to Algeria, but not to lose control over what had been revealed to be 
the most strategic area of the former empire. The contingent factor gov-
erning France’s colonial future was not the control of Algerian territory 
but the oil beneath its sands.
Retaining control over the Saharan riches thus meant that care 
had to be taken over the type of companies that could be granted 
extraction and selling rights in the area. Financial penetration by for-
eign industries, wrote Pierre Cornet, could become a Trojan horse to 
seize control over French territory: the origins of the capital for the 
development of the Saharan resources was therefore a primary mat-
ter.41 Initially, therefore, Guy Mollet’s socialist government pursued 
an almost autarchic approach. Indeed, from the early 1950s the area 
had been subject to the envious gaze of foreign interests: since 1952 
the British government had been requesting detailed information 
on the BRP’s plans for the Sahara from its embassy in Paris.42 Up to 
1954 the investments for developing the Saharan oil industry had 
mostly come from the state through the BRP; after this date, given 
the size of the investments required, two financial bodies were set 
up to channel private French investments. In March 1956 the minis-
ter of foreign affairs, Christian Pineau, openly criticized British and 
American encroachments on French territory and their desire to 
replace France in North Africa.43 Before the establishment of the Fifth 
Republic in 1958, French attitudes to development in Algeria oscil-
lated between a nationalistic approach, which rejected incursions of 
foreign capital, and concern about the lack of foreign investment, 
both in terms of capital and of market outlets for the crude oil. The 
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characteristics of the Saharan subsurface, the high costs of operations 
and a hostile climate deterred surveyors and made it very expensive to 
set up an oil industry; furthermore, the fact that foreign enterprises 
could not control more than 49 per cent in the joint ventures did not 
attract investments. Foreign companies also had to provide technical 
know- how and expertise; purely financial investments were not per-
mitted. France lacked the know- how, the technology and the budget 
to run prospections in the Sahara alone, yet it was desperate to secure 
access to the area’s hydrocarbons. Although the French government 
fancied foreign funds, it was not willing to abdicate control of this 
important resource in exchange.
There were many good reasons to justify this jealous guarding of 
control. First of all, the country wanted to develop its own national oil 
industry, in order to enjoy the enormous revenues that oil promised, and 
to develop the technical competence to run its own oil industry. Second, 
the BRP feared that the cartel, if it was let in, would implement the scar-
city system that it was applying in the Middle East and Latin America, by 
strictly controlling production quotas and keeping crude prices higher. 
For the cartel members, the Sahara was mostly a competitor against 
Middle East oil, and it was in their interest to leave it underdeveloped. For 
France, in contrast, full- scale development of the resources and cheaper 
oil were an absolute necessity. A third reason, most important in the con-
text of the Algerian War, was that French intelligence strongly suspected 
that the cartel was in contact with the Front de Libération Nationale. As 
early as October 1956 the aeroplane that was taking FLN’s leader, Ahmed 
Ben Bella, from Morocco to Tunisia had been hijacked and the passengers 
arrested. Soon after the arrest the French press speculated that, among 
the documents confiscated from Ben Bella, there was an agreement 
between Aramco (Arabian- American Oil Company, the subsidiary of 
Standard Oil of California for operations in the Middle East) and the FLN 
for priority exploration and exploitation rights once the country achieved 
independence.44 The US ambassador in France, Clarence Douglas Dillon, 
denied the allegations, but also made sure that the documents would not 
be published. Mollet, for his part, lent weight to the rumours, even after 
it became clear that Algerian General Governor, Robert Lacoste, had 
leaked the information to the press without evidence.45
While documentary proof of the contacts between oil companies 
and the FLN is scant but present, it should not be a surprise that the atti-
tude of the cartel took into account its wider position in the Middle East. 
Ben Bella’s arrest caused many protests in the Arab world, and Aramco’s 
vice president, James Duce, received a request from King Saud of Saudi 
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Arabia to contribute to a fund for the prisoners. Officially, Aramco did not 
answer this appeal, but rumours about contacts between the company and 
the FLN continued throughout the war.46 This contributed to the mount-
ing diplomatic tension between France and the United States with regard 
to Algeria, especially after then senator John F. Kennedy took an openly 
pro- independence stance in July 1957, soliciting President Eisenhower’s 
administration to take a definite position in favour of Algerian independ-
ence and the internalization of the Algerian War.47 The United States, it 
seems, was no fast friend of French imperial interests in the Sahara.
For all these reasons, opening the Sahara’s door to the cartel not 
only meant that France was letting the management of its immense 
resources devolve to powerful foreign bodies; it also meant opening the 
doors to industries that did not necessarily recognize French sovereignty 
over the territory and were independent enough to implement their 
own international policies. Nevertheless, the French oil elite faced a real 
dilemma, caught between the political and strategic risk of losing con-
trol over the Sahara and the need for the technical and financial means 
that only the American oil industry could provide. Furthermore, while 
concerns that the cartel would not adequately market Saharan oil were 
reasonable, its companies did have strict control over the European mar-
ket. It would have been impossible to simply break this monopoly, espe-
cially given that the Saharan oil had higher costs of production and was 
therefore not competitive on the market. This explains why, during the 
very weeks that the Aramco/ FLN scandal was unfolding and complaints 
against the international appetites over the Sahara multiplied, a delega-
tion from the BRP was striving to persuade American oil companies to 
invest in North Africa.
In April 1957 Christian Pineau declared that France would not 
allow foreign companies to obtain research permits in the area; only 
three months later, however, Pierre Guillaumat contradicted him by 
declaring that, for the permits expiring between 1957 and 1958, there 
would be 60,000 square kilometres reassigned in the following months.48 
His statement appeared to signal that France would adopt an open door 
policy. Nonetheless, the government was determined to keep the car-
tel out of its territories. In order to attract foreign capital and US tech-
nologies without surrendering to forces beyond France’s control, the 
BRP tried to sign deals with the US independent companies only. While 
not quite as titanic as the cartel, American independents still had capi-
tal and technologies that were not available to the French oil industry. 
Because they did not have access to relevant fields outside their domestic 
territories, they would have a significant interest in fully exploiting the 
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Saharan reserves, both in terms of extraction and of marketing. Likewise, 
they seemed more willing to accept the conditions imposed by the BRP, 
accepting minority shares in the joint ventures, and the inducement to 
sell the crude primarily in the franc area. Last but not least, although 
they represented an important lobby domestically, they did not have the 
international diplomatic leverage to implement their own policy. On the 
contrary, they could be excellent allies for France in putting pressure on 
Washington.49
The independent companies immediately showed a strong interest 
in the Sahara. In July 1957 the US Cities Service Company agreed to an 
exploration contract with SN REPAL. Sinclair Oil, Newmont Mining and 
Phillips Petroleum also applied for the new concessions in partnership 
with French bodies. By December 1957 six American and two British 
companies had been granted exploration concessions. On 11 January 
1958 the first consignment of Saharan oil arrived under armed escort at 
the Algerian port of Philippeville, after travelling through a baby pipeline 
(6- inch diameter) from Hassi Messaoud to Touggourt, then via railway 
to the port of Philippeville and finally via tanker to Marseille.50 By April 
1958 the Sahara was producing 1,200 tons of crude a day.51 The French 
desire to outsource development while maintaining control looked to be 
on the road to fulfilment.
While extraction took its first steps, however, discussions about the 
creation of a specific petroleum code for the OCRS became tangled up 
in difficulties. Throughout 1958 investments and the assignment of new 
concessions were slowed down by the lack of an appropriate framework. 
One of the main points of debate concerned whether or not to formal-
ize the limit for foreign companies to own up to 49 per cent of shares. 
Imposing the limit would have automatically excluded the participation 
of the American multinationals to the Sahara, because the companies 
would not accept a joint venture with less than 50 per cent. In particular, 
this was the case for Standard Oil, which was interested in establishing 
a presence in the Sahara and to this end had been negotiating with CFP 
since 1957. A  long debate ensued, against the backdrop of the Fourth 
Republic’s collapse and the return of General Charles de Gaulle to power. 
Finally, a new petroleum code was approved in October 1958, though it 
was valid only for the Algerian provinces of the OCRS, and not for the rest 
of Algeria. This important clarification stressed the division between the 
territories, and sought to maintain political control of the development 
for the French Republic.
Soon after its promulgation, President de Gaulle made a trip 
to the Saharan oil fields, inviting the international enterprises to 
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contribute to the development of the oil industry and the general eco-
nomic growth of the area. On the same trip, de Gaulle announced the 
Constantine Plan, a general programme for the social and economic 
development of the Muslim population of Algeria; with this visit to the 
oil fields, de Gaulle linked the feasibility of the Constantine Plan to the 
development of the oil industry in the area. The new code was designed 
to attract foreign investment in the area, by introducing strong fiscal 
privileges and not placing a ceiling on foreign participation.52 In this 
matter, the new rule set the state free. The code was very favourable 
to the prospective concessionaires, more than the codes developed in 
the same period in Venezuela and Iran.53 At the same time, however, 
the state retained control over the origin of the capital invested and 
over possible changes in the internal control of the enterprises, with a 
substantial continuity in the BRP’s approach of giving away exploita-
tion rights only through joint ventures, and in exchange for technology 
transfer with France.54
Soon after the promulgation of the new petroleum code, in January 
1959, Standard, CFP and the government- controlled investment com-
pany Pétropar formalized the agreement for the creation of a joint ven-
ture in which Standard controlled 50 per cent of the shares. After signing 
a series of deals in a position of relative strength with the independents, 
de Gaulle and the BRP thought that the French position in the Sahara 
was strong enough to come to an agreement with the largest company 
in the cartel. In fact, de Gaulle was playing a subtler game. He worried 
that Standard might entertain talks with the FLN and be at an advantage 
should France lose the Sahara to the Algerian malcontents. Instead, de 
Gaulle hoped that, by coming to an agreement with the cartel, it would 
also be motivated to defend the status quo, thereby supporting French 
actions in the Sahara.55 France was seeking a corporate ally in a politi-
cal conflict. The sole policy of these foreign companies, however, was to 
safeguard their investments and their interests in the area, regardless of 
political conflicts. As support for independence and the FLN was grow-
ing, interactions between Algerian nationalists and the oil industry in the 
Sahara intensified.
The FLN and the oil industry
With the new petroleum code setting the rules for the OCRS area and 
the entry of the majors, the Saharan oil industry boomed. Between 1959 
and 1960 four new pipelines came into operation, and by 1962 the port 
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of Bougie was handling more than 14 million tons of crude per year. 
Alongside the French and US companies, several European companies, 
from the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, started to operate in the 
area. Production in the Sahara was expected to reach 20 million tons by 
1963.56 As of March 1962, when the Évian Accords marked the end of the 
Algerian War, £425 million had been spent in the area to give value to 
the hydrocarbon reserves.57 At first glance, it seems that the oil industry 
was able to operate without any interference from the war. In reality, the 
construction of the pipelines and the general strategy for transportation 
was deeply affected by the conflict. As early as July 1956 all activities in 
the north had had to be abandoned because of safety concerns. A series of 
attacks on workers’ camps, pipelines and railways required the deployment 
of military forces along all transportation routes. In November 1957 a 
team of CPA prospectors was attacked, and many were killed.
At the same time as these military actions against engineers and 
infrastructure, Algerian nationalists were monitoring developments in 
the Sahara very closely. Indeed, they were just as active as France in seek-
ing the help of the international oil industry to affirm their rights over the 
desert. Echoing France’s concerns about independence and control of the 
resource, the FLN repeatedly made clear to oil companies that it would 
consider any agreements made with French institutions to be void. They 
did show themselves willing to open the Sahara to international enter-
prises, however, as long as they recognized the sovereignty of Algerians 
over the territory. In an article dated 15 November 1957, the FLN official 
organ El Moudjahid wrote:
We understand that the development of such an immense territory 
requires technical and financial means that not even France can pro-
vide, let alone a nation subject to foreign domination for more than 
125 years. […] However, the Algerians intend to determine by them-
selves the conditions and modalities of these indispensable foreign 
contributions. […] Only a free Algerian government will be entitled 
to approve such contracts and to grant concessions on the national 
territory. The foreign companies that have invested their capital in 
the Sahara and those who refer to the French government to obtain 
research permits are building…on sand.58
The approach of the FLN towards the hydrocarbon resources 
 mirrored that of France, in both the geopolitical and economic spheres. 
Just like France, the FLN was firmly convinced that control over the oil 
industry would bring economic independence, prosperity and power to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77thE hydroCArbon induStry And AlgEriAn dEColonizAtion
7
the nation; in other words, freedom. Also, just like France, the construc-
tion of integrated hydrocarbon transportation networks and a common 
market were considered a means of building a union with neighbour-
ing countries, in order to gain more geopolitical power. For the Algerian 
nationalists, however, the Eurafrican perspective was utterly rejected, as 
well as that of being a part of the European Common Market. The OCRS 
was described as nothing more than a neo- colonial move:
France hopes to perpetrate in the Southern area a typical example 
of economic colonialism. In its traditional form, colonialism was 
characterised by an evident occupation that exploited the country; 
subsequently, it seized political power to ensure a regime of pseudo- 
legality. Nowadays, an enclave system has replaced territorial occu-
pation, allowing the intensive exploitation of the natural resources 
of the colonial area. The South of Algeria, with its economic and 
industrial potential, with its large energy resources under the sand, 
must now be extremely interesting for those who prefer this new 
direction of French colonialism.59
Against the dangers of economic neo- colonialism, the FLN pushed 
for a federation with Morocco and Tunisia to form a Maghreb Union, a pro-
ject to be developed in parallel to the war of independence against France. 
Following Nasser’s Philosophy of the revolution, the FLN claimed that, 
together with religion, oil was the unifying element of northern Africa, the 
weapon against colonial and neo- colonial powers. ‘It is a fact that half the 
world’s reserves of petroleum are still underground in the Arab regions,’ 
wrote Nasser in 1952. ‘The great catastrophe is that we do not know the 
extent of our strength.’60 It was expected that the oil industry would pro-
vide the basis for joint industrial projects and for the development of an 
integrated economic system. In an article entitled ‘L’indépendance…par le 
pétrole?’ (‘Independence…through petrol?’), El Moudjahid outlined that 
only a united Maghreb could use the Saharan reserves to promote an ‘econ-
omy of liberation’ founded on industrialization.61 A united Maghreb could 
count on a market of 25 million people, and an integrated energy network 
that would provide the capital to start the industrialization process.
It is interesting to note that the oil industry also attempted to pre-
sent itself as a liberating force of development, whose mission was eco-
nomic growth – providing the newly independent country promoted a 
free market and the free circulation of capital. In fact, developing coun-
tries represented perhaps the fastest- growing market for the oil indus-
try.62 In the Petroleum Press Service, several articles were dedicated to the 
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relevant role that the oil industry could play in the fight against global 
poverty. Capital formation was in fact one of the most urgent problems 
for developing countries, and the oil industry was a major contributor 
of capital, both through investments and through large sums paid to the 
local governments of producing countries. In 1957 alone the oil indus-
try had poured $2,200 million into the Venezuelan and Middle Eastern 
treasuries, without counting the income those treasuries received from 
further oil revenues. Overall, international organizations and govern-
ments from the free world had raised some $4,000 million in funds for 
developing countries.63 ‘The whole prospects of future peace and eco-
nomic growth in all parts of the world would be seriously affected if 
the under- developed countries as a group were to fail to attain signifi-
cantly higher standards of living within a reasonable time,’ warned the 
Petroleum Press Service, which also invoked on behalf of the non- aligned 
countries ‘a more enlightened attitude towards private capital’.64
Interestingly, up to the end of the war El Moudjahid barely dis-
cussed the possibility of nationalizing the oil industry. With regard to 
the private foreign industry, and especially the cartel, the attitude of the 
Algerian nationalists was similar to that of France. At times, the outwardly 
socialist El Moudjahid called for strong state control over the industry, 
showing antipathy for the cartel and the large multinationals. Indeed, in 
1959 Algerian protests against penetration by Standard looked very much 
like the protests being simultaneously aired in the left- wing French press. 
On the other hand, the FLN did not want to antagonize forces that could 
become powerful allies. For this reason, while conducting sabotage and 
various other attacks, the Algerians also kept up their pronouncements 
that promised the oil industry very good deals on independence. In 1957 
the French secret service, the Service de documentation extérieure et de 
contre- espionnage (SDECE), wrote that the FLN had secretly contacted 
foreign oil companies and reassured them that an independent Algeria 
would seek their collaboration and recognize their legitimate interests in 
exchange for their help.65 As we have seen, however, what the SDECE was 
reporting in its classified dispatches could also be read openly in the pages 
of El Moudjahid. The ambiguities of the Algerian position were every bit 
a product of gamesmanship, as were the French government’s conflicting 
desires. Both saw oil as the contingent force that governed their vision of 
the future, and both sought to find corporate allies in this political war.
In this tug- of- war for the oil industry’s favour, France gained an impor-
tant advantage with the agreement between CREPS and the Tunisian gov-
ernment for the construction of a pipeline between the oilfield of Edjeleh 
and the Tunisian port of Gabés.66 The agreement caused a diplomatic 
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incident between Tunisia and the Algerian nationalists and compromised 
the federative process in North Africa. Thanks to this pipeline, France 
found an alternative route to transport the oil to Europe without having to 
cross the war- ravaged north of Algeria. For the FLN, the agreement repre-
sented a stab in the back. In an open letter to the Tunisian government, it 
protested that, by signing a deal with a French company, Tunis had implic-
itly recognized the right of France to dispose of Algeria’s riches, and was 
therefore taking the side of the colonizers. The FLN warned that it con-
sidered the contract equivalent to hostile military action against Algeria, 
because it severely undermined its strategy of sabotaging oil facilities. 
Furthermore, the agreement showed that Saharan oil could be immedi-
ately available, even with the war, and this incentivized international 
capital to side with the colonialist powers, damaging the struggle of all 
countries fighting for independence.67 Each point scored in this game had 
broader ramifications in the battle raging over political control.
By the end of August 1958 the pressures of war forced the Algerians 
to back down on the pipeline crisis. El Moudjahid reported an official 
declaration of the FLN saying that, while the French– Tunisian agreement 
had ‘deeply affected Algerian’s public opinion and deteriorated the North- 
African front, the common action and Tunisian solidarity to the Algerian 
cause would continue notwithstanding the difference of opinion on the 
pipeline’.68 Any mention of implementing a common energy policy in the 
area disappeared from the pages of the newspaper, however. Diplomatic 
relations could continue in the circumstances, though the political fall-
out altered the future vision of independence. The federal project was 
undermined, in part, by relationships that fractured over oil and inter-
national investment. This influence on the future shape of Algerian sov-
ereignty, and its envisaged relations with its neighbours, was shaped by 
the actions of non- state actors, and the incursion of commercial interests 
into geopolitics. The 1958 agreement with Tunisia was undoubtedly a 
victory for France, yet the FLN was also able to turn contacts with the oil 
industry to its own advantage. In particular, as will be analysed in the 
next section, the Italian national oil company was a precious ally during 
the peace negotiations in the town of Évian.
The Évian Agreements and oil
After the Algerian population had voted in a referendum early in 1961 
to accept de Gaulle’s proposal for self- determination, French– Algerian 
negotiations officially started on 20 May 1961, resuming several times 
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before concluding in March 1962. For France, the main objective was not 
to be expelled from the desert, in order to maintain both the right to test 
nuclear weapons and control over its oil undertakings.69 De Gaulle tried 
to hold on to sovereignty over the Sahara till the bitter end, by proposing 
several reforms of the OCRS in the direction of a more internationalized 
management between France and African countries, including Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco.70 In order to favour the negotiations, in June 1961 
the OCRS rules were changed so that 25 per cent of oil revenues would 
go to the Algerian Development Fund for the northern department; for 
the Algerians, however, full sovereignty over the southern provinces was 
non- negotiable.71
The position of strength from which the Algerian delegation, led 
by Belkacem Krim, operated was in part due to the fact that the Italian 
national oil company, ENI, was acting as a secret adviser to the FLN. ENI 
had been the main rival to France in the Maghreb area since the inde-
pendence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956, taking advantage of its dip-
lomatic position as an alternative to the former colonial power to sign 
important agreements with both countries. France had formally pro-
tested to the Italian government over these contracts, considering them 
a foreign interference in the French area of influence. ENI went as far as 
refusing an offer to collaborate with France in the Sahara, openly pro-
claiming that it would enter the southern territories when the war had 
ended.72 The involvement of a rival state- owned enterprise showed that 
France could not expect to have things its own way, and revealed the 
complexity of this brand of diplomacy. Its own enterprises had fought 
hard to carve out a niche for themselves, between the cartel and the 
independents, and France had hedged its approach against the compet-
ing nationalist demands. The Italians had followed this process with 
interest, however, envious of the space being opened up by the BRP. As 
such, ENI had been looking for a way into this contested marketplace for 
some time. Presenting itself as a rival to the colonial power meant that it 
could appear somehow neutral, shorn of the European symbolism that 
France carried with it, and that had scared off the FLN beforehand. This 
peripheral diplomatic manoeuvring cast a shadow over the future of 
France’s vital interests, and the aspirations of Algerian nationalists.
During the negotiations at Évian, ENI provided the Algerian del-
egation with geostrategic intelligence:  it shared detailed information 
on the state of the industry in the area, and consulted on the contracts 
and technicalities of the industry.73 ENI’s information had been gleaned 
from various negotiations with the BRP, which included a trip to the 
Hassi Messaoud area.74 According to Mario Pirani, ENI’s representative 
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responsible for relations with northern Africa, the FLN’s approach to the 
Sahara problem had originally been shaped by the Italian company’s sug-
gestions. While agreeing with the Algerians that they should not give up 
on sovereignty, ENI suggested that, in order to promote good commer-
cial relations with France after the war, Algeria should agree to a shared 
management of the resources through a common agency.75 Otherwise, if 
France decided to cut imports from the Sahara, the Algerians would be 
left without the most important outlet for their oil.76
Whether or not it was the Italian company that had been the first to 
suggest this solution, the Évian Accords that ended the war on 18 March 
1962 were indeed based on the creation of a joint French– Algerian 
Organisme technique de coopération saharienne. This certainly seemed 
to follow the pattern of the Italian advice. Algeria obtained full sover-
eignty over the southern territory, and France made a commitment to 
provide the technical, financial and cultural assistance to promote the 
economic and social development of the newly independent state.77 In 
exchange, France maintained all the rights of prospection, research and 
transportation that had been granted previously. Furthermore, for the 
next six years French companies would have precedence on concessions 
over any non- French and non- Algerian operators for equal proposals. 
While permit assignment remained the government’s prerogative, the 
Organisme technique de coopération saharienne would manage the 
applications and draft the reports to assist in decisions. All in all, 
the accords are usually considered a victory for France, at least with 
regard to the oil industry. Even though legal sovereignty over the Sahara 
passed to Algeria, the new government committed to continue on the 
path laid out by France, and to maintain its interests unaffected.78 This 
sense of security is confirmed by the fact that, throughout the nego-
tiations, French and international companies ran business as usual:  in 
December 1961 the company CAMEL was established to transport gas 
from Hassi R’Mel; in March 1962 three new findings were announced.79
Nevertheless, the Organisme technique de coopération sahari-
enne was a very weak body from the beginning. It was soon ousted 
by SONATRACH, the Algerian national oil company, established in 
December 1963. Just a few months after the declaration of independ-
ence sixteen of the companies operating in the Sahara established a con-
sortium to build a third pipeline, connecting Hassi Messaoud to Arzew. 
The Algerian government refused permission to construct the pipeline, 
and assigned the works to SONATRACH. Unsurprisingly, the consor-
tium companies did not accept being ousted by the newly established 
state company, and swiftly appealed to international arbitration.80 This 
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froze the negotiations between the Algerian government and France for 
nearly three years, until a new agreement, the Association coopérative, 
or ‘Ascoop’, was signed in July 1965. This second treaty granted more 
privileges to the Algerians while leaving the Saharan code in place. Both 
Algeria and France trumpeted the agreement as a new model of state– 
state contracts between a consumer and a producer country, with oil 
as the basis for further cooperation and development projects between 
Algeria and France. Despite this optimism, however, the Ascoop was 
also destined to be short- lived. Disagreements immediately arose over 
the revision of the taxation system for oil revenues, scheduled for 1969. 
SONATRACH continued to seek, and continued to privilege, commercial 
and technical agreements with other countries rather than France, with 
the clear intent of differentiating its market outlets and acquiring techni-
cal competences independently. Cooperation had its limits, and neither 
party seemed willing to damage its own interests for the sake of progress.
The best- laid plans of negotiators were further undone as tur-
bulent international events eroded French claims, and weakened 
the outlook for the Ascoop. During the Six- Day War between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours, in 1967, the Algerian government seized 
the moment to nationalize the American and British infrastructures, 
thus quadrupling SONATRACH’s assets. Neither the British nor the 
American governments intervened, for fear of escalating the conflict. 
Most importantly, Algeria joined the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) officially in 1969. Thanks to coordination 
with the other producer countries, the Algerian government gained 
the upper hand in the negotiations. When France refused to agree 
to new selling prices unilaterally imposed by Algeria in 1971, at the 
end of general negotiations between OPEC and the international oil 
companies the Algerian government decided to end the Ascoop agreement 
and to nationalize all the oil assets in the country, taking full control 
over the foreign presence in the Sahara. Contrary to what the French 
government had hoped, its state companies lost the most in Algeria.81 
As for ENI, the sudden death of the company’s president in a plane 
crash in October 1962 had caused a political and financial storm that 
forced the company to reduce its independent activities in northern 
Africa, and to simply sign a deal with Standard to buy Libyan oil.82 
Neither state could break the cartel, and neither saw satisfaction 
through its manoeuvring in the Maghreb.
As the French politician Robert Bisson observed, the Eurafrican 
dream of a third bloc of power built on its mineral wealth and energy 
self- sufficiency died with the Évian Accords and the acknowledgement 
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of Algerian independence.83 This failure was attributable not to African 
autonomy, however, but to the earlier inability on the part of French 
governments – probably the impossibility – of accepting a backward step 
in favour of new relations with Algeria. These new relations envisaged 
the development of a new oil production area independent from both the 
Soviet bloc and the US- dominated oil industry, yet the ongoing political 
tussles, and the guarded desires of all the parties involved, meant that 
complex entanglements could be undone only by cutting the knot.
Conclusions
In October 1957 the former freedom fighter and journalist Claude 
Bourdet published an article in France observateur entitled ‘Sahara, no oil 
without peace’. In the article, Bourdet argued that the plan for developing 
the oil resources of the Sahara without first ending the Algerian War was 
just irrational propaganda:
The French were getting tired of this war, perceived as a use-
less waste of lives and of money. […] It became important to the 
establishment to wave the flag of oil: ‘Sure the war is expensive, but 
at the end of the day it is an investment to protect the Sahara. What 
are ₣700 or ₣1,000 billion per year, compared to the oil that will 
soon fertilise France?84
The great names of French capitalism, which had invested a lot in the 
companies seizing the land, needed to save what Bordet called ‘their 
speculations’. Instead, France passed up the opportunity to use the 
Saharan resources to start the peace process, so that oil would become 
a vehicle for shared wealth between France and the independent African 
countries, including Algeria. Oil became the contingent factor that fun-
damentally separated the French and Algerian visions of the future, 
rather than the bond that could foster a lingering entanglement.
The French government showed itself willing to open its door to 
American companies, hoping that the US administration would thus 
back French interests in Algeria. Yet, despite all this scheming, Saharan 
resources were being handled with a mixture of short- sighted egoism and 
consumerism that did not take the local population into consideration. 
In a desperate bid to retain its resources, France was forced to change 
the motto ‘No oil without a French Sahara’ into ‘No oil without peace’.85 
Otherwise, warned Bourdet, when American companies took an interest 
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in the Sahara they would indeed pressure Washington, but to end the war, 
not to continue it on the side of France – something the minister of the 
Sahara, Max Lejeune feared, saying: ‘And it will be their peace, not ours.’86
This chapter has explained, on the one hand, the hopes for eco-
nomic integration invested in the oil industry, especially because of its 
tendency to favour long- term agreements and coordination between 
different actors. On the other, it has exposed the problem of legitimacy 
for France’s influence in Africa, eroded at the expense of the globalized 
American industry. French development of the Sahara’s oil was charac-
terized mostly by the rush to seize as much control as possible, without 
creating solid bases for development. The oil industry in the Sahara 
did not bring Africa closer to Europe, barring short- term agreements 
wrought through tense negotiations; nor was it possible, at the time or 
in the subsequent forty years of European history, to develop a common 
energy policy. Beset by clashing visions of the road ahead, the decoloni-
zation of Saharan oil became a lost opportunity in the construction of an 
illusory Eurafrican dream.
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Future imperfect: colonial futures, 
contingencies and the end of 
French empire
Andrew W. M. Smith
Books can be objects as well as texts. At times, their material nature 
can speak of their cultural and political provenance just as much as the 
ideas contained within them. I found, perhaps, the clearest sense of this 
chapter tucked in the pages of an old book ordered online from a second- 
hand shop in Perpignan. It arrived in an envelope festooned with stamps 
bearing the portrait of Francis I, originally painted by Jean Clouet around 
1530. This Renaissance monarch is perhaps remembered best as a ‘great 
patron of the arts’,1 yet he was also a significant force in expanding the 
horizons of France’s early empire.2 Aptly, the envelope contained an aged 
and battered- looking copy of Le destin de l’Union française (The future of 
the French Union), written by Paul Mus and questioning the fate of that 
self- same empire some 400 years on.3
If the book’s title was suggestive, its date of publication made 
it positively tantalizing. Released in 1954, the book poses important 
questions at an awkward moment of French imperial history. At first 
glance, its pages were frayed. In fact, they were largely uncut, and 
actually reading the book became as much a craft project as an act of 
research. But as I worked through these pages, slicing each with a blade 
to unlock its contents, a piece of the original marketing material tum-
bled out. This relic of its original release was a yellow (and yellowed) 
half- sleeve, with two words written prominently upon it:  Indochina, 
and Africa. The word ‘Indochina’ is roughly crossed out with a styl-
ized printed cross, while ‘Africa’ bears a question mark beside it. In 
fact, much of this chapter lies in the odd feeling that came of reading 
those two words. Juxtaposing the simple effacement and the lingering 
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question highlighted an uncertainty that existed for only six years after 
the book’s release.
This was a book being sold on its timely nature. With ‘Indochina’ 
emblazoned across the cover, it knowingly played on popular concerns 
about the French military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, which 
marked the decolonization of Indochina. Invoking the fate of France’s 
African colonies only exacerbated the tension. The publisher, Seuil, was 
using popular anxiety as a means of seizing the attention of readers. 
Evidently, France would cede her African territories between 1960 and 
1962, answering the implied question and confining the future of the 
French Union to the scrapheap. That shift in perspective makes an obvi-
ous point about chronology, but raises more nuanced questions about 
contingency and perspective. By revisiting the conditional in this context, 
we get a real sense of its true identity as the future imperfect tense.
This piece of marketing material started a process of thought that 
drew me increasingly to wonder about divergent visions of the future 
during the 1950s: how confident projections became negotiated settle-
ments, and imagined futures faded to difficult realities. The idea of ‘what 
was going to happen’ ineluctably shaped the ability of ordinary people to 
respond to these challenges and to conceive of their present.4 To explore 
this, I set Paul Mus’ book against two other documents that seemed to 
complement its distinctive historical qualities:  extracts from children’s 
homework, gathered by a late colonial administrator seeking out dissent; 
and a summative report produced by a colonial governor at the end of 
his role, reflecting on his experience and political challenges to come. 
These three documents cut across categories to consider the question-
ing voices of commentators, children and colonial officials. With each 
document, we can learn more about the conditional questions posed by 
recreating the ideational context in which these questions were formu-
lated. By reading along the grain of the archive, the historian accentuates 
the granular nature of the object of enquiry, and can make some attempt 
at the ‘articulation of perspectives’.5 In this vein, we can consider, in the 
words of Ann Laura Stoler, ‘colonial archives as sites of the expectant and 
conjured – about dreams of comforting futures and forebodings of future 
failures’.6
To consider the concept of colonial futures and contingencies, this 
chapter will analyse three specific documents in historical context. All 
these documents date from 1954 to 1956, all concern French involve-
ment with sub- Saharan Africa in this late colonial period, and all offer 
some vision of the future untainted by our retrospection. This process of 
investigation aims to analyse the sources and their expired contingency, 
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illuminating the possibilities they consider and the processes that consti-
tuted them.7 All three of these sources can be read against the grain of 
the archive. By considering the provenance of each document, I am also 
engaging in the process of, as Antoinette Burton terms it, ‘re- materialising 
the multiple contingencies of history writing’.8 Each of these documents 
has its own contingent story, relying on a certain serendipity in the 
archive. Yet serendipity belies agency. The ability of each to illuminate the 
concept of contingency in the late colonial state stems, in part, from their 
own material histories. This seems, at first, an intuitive observation, and 
reflective of common sense and good historical practice. Nevertheless, 
in trying to recover this expired sense of contingency from the unknow-
able, historical heart of the moment, we are drawn into a reflection on 
the sort of ‘colonial common sense’ described by Stoler. This ‘common 
sense’ governed things that were often not recorded, not because they 
formed some great secret or hidden truth but, rather, because they were 
commonly held and intuitively related to contingent factors that contex-
tualized these impressions.9 By considering the research story behind 
each document, I am outlining the context of my own enquiry into the 
historical constellations that shaped these visions of the future, and the 
expired contingencies with which they engaged.10
Common sense held within it an internal logic of colonialism and 
power, and this is reflected in the archival collections that sprang from 
it. It is also reflected in the implied selectivity of documents that did 
and did not survive, whether through ‘conspiracy’ or ‘bungle’.11 Within 
this search for expired common sense are examples of how some voices 
can be excluded and silenced from historical memory.12 The potential 
for incompleteness necessitates an acknowledgement of when we are 
attempting to work with fragments, and to ‘mend the torn fragments 
of the past’.13 This is crucial when recreating the intellectual climate of 
the late colonial state, both among its critics and its defenders. In his 
piece On the concept of history, Walter Benjamin criticized the temp-
tation for historians to ‘tell the sequence of events like the beads of a 
rosary’.14 As observed by Todd Shepard, the end of the 1950s ‘gave birth 
to the notion that “decolonization” was a causal force with an all but 
irresistible momentum’.15 The momentum transformed material pro-
duced during that time, and contributed to the way in which historians 
read the period itself. When Stoler advocates reading ‘along the archival 
grain’, it reflects this acknowledgement of material that has garnered a 
retrospective value. It is necessary, therefore, to consider not only the 
material but the methodology for gaining access to colonial futures and 
contingencies.
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Working against the teleological assumptions of history has opened 
up important discussions about the material we use to construct histo-
ries of the past, and, in particular, how people in the past considered the 
future. One of the most difficult aspects of recovering these past visions 
is in reconstructing an ontology of the common sense that surrounded 
them. We can focus our lens on a broad scope of the period, but much of 
our understanding of 1954 and the fall of French Indochina, for exam-
ple, is conditioned by our understanding of its proximity to 1956 and the 
devolution of political power in the significant legal reforms of that year. 
Yet further, we can look to the fall of the French Fourth Republic, and 
de Gaulle’s tenure during the unravelling of empire that followed from 
1958 to 1962. In looking at these documents, I am charting a path trod-
den by moderates, closer to the establishment and far less ambitious in 
their imagining of the future than diehards on either side of the debate. 
These documents illustrate fear as much as they do hope, and ideas about 
the future of empire that focus more on reworking colonial relationships 
than on recasting the terms of empire. In a sense, this chapter sets up a 
way of looking at the genealogy of these ideas, not among the top rank of 
thinkers or theoreticians but among administrators, academics and chil-
dren. Recreating ideational contexts, alongside the research stories that 
form my own, allows for a constellation of micro- histories that relate to 
the broader historiographical discussion around historical contingency.
The inside of pagodas: The Future of the French Union
Back, then, to Paul Mus’ book and my momentary unease at the discovery 
of its original marketing material. The unanswered question emblazoned 
on the cover contained within it the force of the expired contingency 
that inspired this chapter. Yet, in posing this question about the future 
of the empire, Mus was far from a marginalized voice. Although he had 
been born in Bourges, he was raised in Vietnam, attending school in 
Hanoi. Steeped in the fortunes of the French empire, he had taught Asian 
languages at the École française de l’Extrême- Orient, and served the 
Free French in Africa and Indochina. After the war he was the director 
of the prestigious École nationale de la France d’outre- mer (ENFOM) 
and professor at the Collège du France until 1950, when he resigned 
his ENFOM post in protest at French policy in Indochina to work at Yale 
University.16 The book itself was received well, and continues to be of 
use to academics.17 Indeed, contemporary reviews from figures such as 
Stanley Hoffman praised it over other works as the ‘richest in substance 
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and reflection’ on the topic.18 Importantly, Mus’ experience and personal 
history in the territory of French Indochina informed his reaction to 
its loss. He had been an influential figure in shaping the French Union 
project, and in 1944 had sought to persuade Henri Laurentie, the director 
of political affairs for the Ministry of Overseas France, to construct an 
engaged and participatory union:  ‘[A] nother possibility for the idea of 
the French Union.’19 The failures to realize this alternative vision formed 
part of his cumulative disaffection with the viability of the endeavour 
and the capability of France to realize these possibilities. His book is 
as pessimistic as it is outraged, and its colonial future is tainted by its 
proximity to this perceived calamity. Mus ‘foresaw a future haunted by 
his historical present’.20
This book followed his more famous work, Viêt- Nam: sociologie 
d’une guerre, which had been published two years earlier.21 It represented 
an exasperation with the colonial project, following on the heels of the 
Indochinese War.22 Inside Le destin de l’Union française, however, there is 
some hope. Mus reads the conditional nature of France’s imperial future, 
though it was diminished in the light of Dien Bien Phu. This loss is the 
event that stains his vision of the future, condemning the way that France 
had conducted her imperial policy, and confirming a narrative that had 
begun after France’s own liberation led to the reassertion of colonial 
mastery in Indochina. As noted by Agathe Larcher- Goscha, ‘The world 
had changed since the war, France had changed, and Indochina had 
Figure 3 The original marketing material found inside Le destin de 
l’Union française
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changed, but the colonial relationship between Indochina and France 
remained the same, not in its administration but as an Ideal.’23 Too much 
of the same old thing, from the same old mentality, Mus felt, would con-
demn France to losing her empire in its entirety.24 What was needed was 
flexibility, and a desire to engage with new options. He compared the 
formal French approach to more adaptive British policies:
We ought, I would say, to learn to love the exception, and not the 
one that proves the rule. Rather, the one that spills over the top, 
that invades, and swallows up every option but action. This attitude 
and stance is the part of the English naturalist. It is the counter- 
point to the classicism on which we obsess, not least administra-
tively but also constitutionally. Contrast the four little words that 
say it all, in the active social balance of the English language, ‘it is 
not done’, and that long word of ours, ‘anti- constitutional’.25
Mus built this call for flexibility on his own cultural engagement with 
France’s Asian colonies in particular, following a lifetime of academic 
work and lived experience.26 Emphasizing the influence of Mus’ 
background on the writing of his contemporary history is not simply, as 
Richard Drayton observes, a mere epistemological game. Rather, ‘it urges 
us to take stock of the foundations of our modes of historical subjectiv-
ity, and of the imagined human futures in which they are complicit’.27 
Mus’ pessimistic future reflected both his personal experience of loss 
and the broader climate of imperial uncertainty that haunted the late 
imperial state.
Mus’ scepticism captured a growing trend of wary engagement 
with empire during this period. It was not the only frame through 
which the relationship could be understood or challenged, though. 
In 1956 the journalist Raymond Cartier publicly questioned the value 
of the French empire in the pages of the weekly journal Paris- Match. 
Cartier’s articles provide an interesting insight into a current of opin-
ion in the metropole. The three pieces, published on 11 and 18 August 
and 1 September, followed a visit by Cartier to West Africa. They con-
tain three key messages within them: that overseas possessions were 
costing more than they contributed; that this was holding back France 
economically; and that this impediment could not be justified politi-
cally, as ‘the emancipation of colonial people was unavoidable’.28 This 
stance has since been referred to as ‘utilitarian anti- colonialism’, and 
it spawned a contemporary movement, broadly known as Cartiérisme, 
that criticized colonial spending and instead advocated domestic 
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investment.29 Why, he asked, is France wasting money on empire, 
when it could support more important causes closer to home?30 Yet, 
for those subject to the often cruel impositions of the colonial rela-
tionship, development might well be expected alongside the notional 
‘civilizing mission’. There is wrapped up in this debate a gap between 
rights, responsibility and agency.
Mus’ book demonstrated that dissent was growing among com-
mentators (even those once engaged in outlining the possibilities of colo-
nial humanism), offering critiques of current policy and exhortations for 
reform. It denounced the complacency with which French administrators 
were allowing the empire to spin out of control.31 This cosy imperial con-
sensus was also the one targeted by Cartier’s articles. His refutation of 
the central logic behind imperialism, that it was politically and economi-
cally beneficial for the colonizer, offered a difficult prospect for contem-
porary media by challenging an accepted narrative. Cartier’s view was 
rejected as, variously, ‘the view from the Hexagon’ and ‘metropolism’, 
stressing the insular nature of its perspective. Interestingly, it was also 
condemned as ‘economically Maurassian’, invoking the ultra- nationalist 
Charles Maurras, whose Action française had advocated an essentialist 
and exclusionary national identity that mingled with the fascistic cur-
rents of interwar Europe in an unpalatable way.32 Above all else, it cal-
lously used economic logic to cut through the social, cultural and political 
bonds that marked ‘Greater France’ as an overarching imperial entity.33 
The curmudgeonly reaction from members of the press seems to indicate 
that they were as emotionally affronted as they were moved by Cartier’s 
argumentation.
As one prominent British civil servant observed in 1967 after the 
end of empire: ‘There was something inert about the white man’s burden, 
and I don’t think he expected it to get up and walk.’34 This observation well 
describes the ‘colonial common sense’ that limited the French adminis-
tration’s willingness to endorse the agency of the colonized (or, at best, 
to endorse it with strict limitations) throughout the Fourth Republic. The 
milieu in which these administrative visions were formed affected the 
contingent limits governing their visions of the future. In the words of 
Frantz Fanon, ‘The colonialists are incapable of grasping the motivations 
of the colonized.’35 Paul Mus tapped into a sense of this judgement, cit-
ing a ‘vicious circle’ in which dehumanizing the subjects of empire led 
ineluctably to violence.36 Drawing on his own experience, Mus relates an 
illustrative anecdote: ‘Few Europeans are really familiar with the inside 
of pagodas.’37 When they are remarked upon, he says, people focus on 
the depictions of hell that they see painted on the internal walls. Yet, he 
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warns, there is more to it. On the walls are traditionally depictions of 
the ten judges or kings who weigh souls after death, and send them to 
nirvana or to one of the many purgatories. The Western visitor, he points 
out, sees only hell, ignoring the tribunal, and the potential reward, as 
they lack the eyes to see them.38
Mus’ work builds on his own imperial connections to counsel a more 
nuanced engagement with the concept of the French Union. This was, 
above all, an attempt to challenge the ‘disconnect’ of the French impe-
rial mind, and an appeal to consider colonial subjects ‘on the same level 
of humanity as the French’.39 He saw a future for the Union, but outside 
the formalism, inflexibility and violence he felt had characterized it to 
date, despite his attempts to counsel Henri Laurentie towards a reformed 
Union. Real reform, and not endless debates about the constitution, would 
offer something more tangible: ‘A less legalistic and cramped definition 
of the French Union would better allow us to find a solution – or, dare one 
say it, perhaps to save it?’40 There was a marked difference between the 
abandonment called for by Cartier and the development advocated by 
Mus. The experiences of the long past clouded visions of the future, pre-
senting stark moments of disjuncture. This disjuncture, in part, informed 
Cartier’s jaded rejection of the value of imperial entanglement. His scal-
ing of value is important, however:  the value of development and the 
future, versus the value of self- interest and the present. Mus’ valuation 
placed development and the future foremost, inspired by his own per-
sonal entanglement. At that moment in 1956, we can see the coexistence 
of multiple epochs during the same turbulent time, of distorted presents 
and emancipatory futures.41 Against this backdrop, disengagement with 
empire promised relief, but also abnegation of the future.
Mus continued to campaign for colonial humanism, even as 
France’s policy continued to rehash the past errors it had committed. By 
ignoring the present, he felt, France was damning her future. In a letter 
to Le Monde in 1957 he extended this analysis:
Three years ago, when finishing a book on Le destin de l’Union fran-
çaise, I warned that we were, to my eyes, in the final moments when 
we could do something about it. Make no mistake on this point: we 
have not done it. We are now in the last hours where it is possible, 
by removing any qualifications, for us to introduce an alliance of 
equal peoples.42
He remained resolute in his commitment to a future that involved a 
peaceable settlement founded on ideas of sympathetic engagement. In 
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this letter, he reaffirmed his sense of the present and of crisis, with France 
approaching a juncture. For Mus, this was something new, and particular 
to the present moment. He set this late colonial moment up as a sort 
of liminal space between the many wrongs of the colonial past and the 
uncertainty of an imminent future. In this same letter, Mus wrote: ‘Two 
wars, a historic upheaval, and a new world outlook separate us from the 
recent past.’43 The fallout of the Second World War and France’s defeat in 
the Indochinese War increased tension and the sense of crisis. For Mus, 
this was a moment in which change needed to be actively defined. The 
French state, he felt, had to live in the present tense.
In Mus’ flexible and empathic desire to recognize the agency 
of the colonized, we can see a very distinctive engagement with 
the future of the French Union. This gives us insight into the bonds 
formed in what Gary Wilder has termed the ‘French imperial nation 
state’, recognizing that the national republic could not be ‘considered 
apart from the imperial nation’.44 Mus’ personal loss is reflected in the 
broader loss of colonial society, and the severing of ties beneath the 
level of state (while acknowledging the inequality of these relation-
ships).45 Through his work, we can access a personal sense of what 
would have happened, but for the inflexibility and unresponsiveness 
of the colonial administration.46 It seems apt that this was revealed 
through a very personal and contingent enquiry:  cutting pages in a 
book and revealing old marketing material. These were tokens of a 
world in transition, and the question on the yellow half- sleeve was as 
much a marketing trick as it was a lament to the severing of Mus’ own 
imperial bonds.
A master and his dog: extracts from  
school homework
I came across the second document in the Archives nationales d’outre- 
mer (ANOM), in Aix- en- Provence, during a course of research dedicated 
to the writing of an article on the loi cadre of 1956.47 The visit to ANOM 
was marked most memorably by meeting a group of elderly pieds noirs, 
the former settlers who had left Algeria following independence. I helped 
one of these men conduct some genealogical research, by helping him 
to use a computer in the catalogue room. He was looking for the birth 
certificate of his sister, who had been born in Constantine. He was, he 
claimed, too old to use computers. Delighted to be of assistance, I fell 
down a rabbit hole of research that was not my own, helping find relatives 
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and reconstructing the legacy of a family who had been in Algeria since 
the nineteenth century. It went well and, as a result, I earned myself an 
invitation to lunch that day. This was an impressive affair, and much 
more than a meal for two. I had actually been invited to a friendly meet- 
up of around eight pieds noirs, a veritable old boys’ club. Presiding over 
festivities was a larger- than- life personality by the name of Guy – or, as 
his friends suggested I call him ‘the Impresario of Aix’.48
These self- described ‘Algerian Europeans’ formed part of the unan-
ticipated exodus that surprised French authorities in the early 1960s. This 
tide of people was triggered by the end of French rule, provoking disbe-
lief and denial ‘long after the movement had become a veritable ground-
swell’.49 For these men, in their lugubrious lunchtime reflections, Algeria 
had been lost, and its loss was definitive. That unexpected loss evoked 
a refusal to play any part in the future, or at least any future designed 
to develop an independent Algeria. As Shepard describes, the process of 
decolonization itself had led ‘the unthinkable for most French intellectu-
als and politicians until the late 1950s, to become obvious to almost all in 
the early 1960s’.50 Unearthing the roots of this pied noir family involved 
helping someone use archival technology to access documents produced 
in France relating to a historical narrative suffused with notes of loss and 
finality. These families, whatever their status or values, had been washed 
over by the tide of history.
The next day I returned to the archives to pursue my own research. I 
ordered a box with the reference ‘112 APOM.27’, as it contained a minis-
terial report on ‘Internal autonomy in the French Community’ from 1958. 
This promised to give an official reflection on the late colonial state at the 
dawn of the Fifth Republic. The document that proved most interesting, 
however, was far less official, and, indeed, less circumspect. It was in its 
own sleeve, among a variety of documents that looked at the implemen-
tation of legal reform from the private archives of Louis Berthier, a long- 
serving inspecteur des colonies (he had been appointed in 1942). The 
green folder bore no date, but simply the intriguing title ‘EXTRAITS DE 
DEVOIRS SCOLAIRES’ (extracts from school homework). It contained 
three typewritten pages, containing eight short extracts, from students 
ranging from fifteen to twenty- six. The responses are rich and interesting 
insights into the everyday understanding of colonial relationships. They 
also show how perspective altered visions of the future, and how unequal 
power relationships can be read from unusual sources. I photographed 
these documents in July 2008, though they were largely irrelevant to the 
project I was working on. They seemed important, however. For a long 
time the memory of these responses percolated, seeming to suggest some 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97FuturES,  ContingEnCiES And thE End oF FrEnCh EMpirE
97
comparison with the lunch I had enjoyed with the ‘Impresario of Aix’ and 
his coterie of pieds noirs. Their memories, which were openly and joy-
fully shared, reflected a story of which I had been aware, of the lingering 
resentment of those forced to leave, their position on the political right 
and their hankering for a bygone era. Between the privileged voices of 
these men, and the subsumed voices of these school pupils, there was an 
important distance.
Figure 4 The first page of extracts in front of the green folder in the 
archives at Aix
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This homework was, in reality, submissions to the journée scolaire de 
l’Union française, a study day that sought to familiarize children in France 
and the colonies with the French Union, and France’s ongoing develop-
ment work. This was the brainchild of Albert Sarraut, an experienced 
politician (who had twice been prime minister in the Third Republic) 
and colonial reformer who had sought to ensure that France retained an 
interest in the colonies and remained committed to development. That 
he maintained a ‘dream of colonial development’ was evident in the 
interwar period, when he fought to ‘sustain limited governmental, 
parliamentary, and public interest in colonial development’.51 He 
published La mise en valeur des colonies françaises in 1923, calling for 
continued economic engagement with the colonies (a sort of opposite 
to Cartier’s assessment). He viewed development as intrinsically bound to 
stable societies and the assumed goal of any civilizing mission. This task, 
he advised, involved the creation of the ‘material well- being required for 
Western values to flourish’.52 Development could clash with the mainte-
nance of peace in the minds of administrators, however, as can be seen in the 
French empire’s schools, which maintained limiting curricula throughout 
the interwar period. After the Liberation, however, these schools became 
more open, and the values Sarraut promoted became central to their mis-
sion: ‘The era of deliberate limits was over, but its educated products would 
be the major component of the first generation of African nationalists and 
government leaders.’53 An interesting illustration of this importance can 
be seen in the fact that Paul Mus, the author of the first piece in this chap-
ter, attended the Lycée Albert Sarraut in Hanoi, where he fostered his own 
imperial bonds.54 In this second document there is a sense of potential, 
of the importance of ‘youth’ to a durable colonial future. The belief was 
central to the orchestration of the journée scolaire in the first place. Yet, 
in these submerged voices, we also gain a sense of the blocked mobility 
of colonial youth, one of the precipitate conditions that imperilled the 
imperial status quo.
This post- war initiative was intended to continue that work, and 
Sarraut’s position as president of ‘l’Assemblée de l’Union française’, until 
1951, allowed him to establish a ‘Prix de l’Union française’, and later enabled 
the Assembly to develop the work by creating the study day. Established in 
1955, the study day was held on the same day in both France and the colo-
nies, usually in April, and promoted ‘fraternal perspectives’ between stu-
dents. It promised a tempting reward that went beyond prestige: first prize 
took ₣50,000, second took ₣30,000 and third took ₣20,000.55 More than 
this, the winners (and those who were commended) could enjoy a ‘colonie 
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de vacances’,56 spending a week in the south of France at Anglet- Biarritz.57 
These opportunities for leisurely pursuit and scholastic recognition were 
valuable persuasive tools. Drawing young people into a system of reward 
engaged and encouraged them to become young foot soldiers of the con-
cept of union. A trip to the Basque coast with a cohort of your peers, fol-
lowed by a visit to Paris, offered an attractive lure for eager young minds. 
As such, the journée scolaire seemed an important and well- supported 
competition.
The prize was won in 1956 by Stelio Farandijs, a nineteen- year- 
old metropolitan student (of Greek parentage), who went on to have 
a glittering career as a champion of the concept of francophonie.58 In 
the 1980s Farandijs became secretary general of the Haut conseil de la 
francophonie, attached to the office of the French president. He became 
the perfect example of the competition’s aims. Yet, clearly, not all 
respondents were young foot soldiers of the civilizing mission or franco-
phile agenda. In the jaded climate of the late colonial state, the compe-
tition faced ridicule from both participants and observers. The Marxist 
journal La Pensée mocked the prompts with which schoolchildren were 
provided, under the headline ‘No sign of the critical spirit!’:
Each year, organised in France’s educational institutes, there is 
a study day for the French Union. Here is the text from Marshal 
Lyautey which has been offered up for consideration by pupils of 
philosophy and elementary maths, just before the Easter holiday:
The successful man is always the one who holds an ideal, who 
loves action for the sake of action, who strives without cease, aims for 
the best, and puts in the effort, who doesn’t spare the horses, and doesn’t 
over- complicate things… Perhaps he’ll die, but he will have lived!
To hell with reason! By inviting our school pupils to conflate 
a man of action and a dare- devil, university administrators are no 
doubt hoping to recruit the next generation of ‘paras’ to ‘pacify’ 
Algeria…59
Juxtaposing colonial violence with a fairly transparent attempt to avoid it 
showed up how little the competition could hope to achieve. This critical 
spirit was, perhaps, a cynical one, though the script provided by the 
competition organizers certainly seems a worrying way to live your life. 
This sort of prompt gives a useful indication of the sort of thing students 
were asked to engage with, though it also gives a good insight into the 
ways they could react against it.
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The responses included in the green folder can be dated contextu-
ally from neighbouring documents as having been for the competition in 
1955 or 1956. The prompt provided by the prize committee that year had 
asked students to consider the following:
The French Union is a constant creation that has its legal frame-
work but depends more meaningfully on human connections. One 
can only speak of the French Union in the terms Michelet used to 
describe the Motherland: ‘It is a grand friendship.’60
The phrase ‘constant creation’ projects the colonial project into the future, 
casting it as an ongoing process that requires the active participation of 
its subjects. From the sampled extracts, the response of a fifteen- year- 
old pupil contains one of the most striking phrases. His name is given as 
Njok Hiol Hiol, and no other information is listed. We can discern from 
the distinctive name that the student was male and most probably from 
French Equatorial Africa (AEF).61 The only thing reported is an extract 
from his essay, which reads: ‘The French Union is a union between a 
master and his dog, yet there can never be unity between a free man and 
a collared, ill- fed dog.’62
Another response, from Nganso (nineteen years old), questions the 
sustainability of the French Union, offering insight into how the French 
defence of empire percolated into those territories perceived as peaceable:
The French Union has long been a constant creation, but since 
1954, this French Union ceased to grow and has only shrunk. To 
tell the truth, there is a strong chance it will one day disappear 
altogether. It has not been long since Indochina went to war with 
France. One could ask why. The Algerians have risen and are also 
looking for their liberty. Monsieur Soustelle has seen the outcome 
of this rising and declared: ‘If we leave Algeria, all of Africa is lost 
and France will cease to be a great power.’ And can one really talk 
about the French Union in this day and age without talking about 
black Africa? If France loses Algeria, will the Paris– Brazzaville line 
be replaced by a Casablanca– Tunis line? And we should not forget 
that all the people of the French Union are waiting for their time to 
rise. In those circumstances, France may well shrink and cease to 
be a great power. It is an objective solution, my country need play 
no part in the French Union, nor in its particular problems, which 
seem to be in the process of being resolved anyway.63
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Nganso’s response echoes the historical writing of later years, offer-
ing a strikingly perspicacious account of the empire’s ills. In particular, it 
sits well alongside this summary from Gary Wilder:
But by the 1950s, the French Union appeared to be an anachro-
nistic and unrealistic attempt to retain an empire from which the 
Indochinese people had already separated and the Algerians were 
rejecting, Americans were undermining, and French capitalists 
were abandoning.64
These negative visions of the French Union seem to somewhat counter 
Sarraut’s paternalistic vision of continued development as it was framed 
at the start of the 1950s. Here, we see more of the ‘era of limits’ that 
Peggy Sabatier ascribes to the interwar period.65 We also see a sense 
of frustration at work, a suggestion of the thesis that ‘blocked mobility’ 
promotes the emergence of nationalism.66 In the colonial sense, unequal 
relationships defined the French Union, despite the rhetoric, and this 
both characterized these responses and coloured their conditional view 
of the future. This, in turn, gave a sense of the Union as a ‘frozen mosaic’, 
which would limit the ambitions of Africans.67 Koul, a twenty- year- old 
student, wrote:
It seems less about friendship between countries, than about friend-
ship between men. There are many examples that have shown the 
friendship of the French Union to be utopian. If it were a reality, 
what do we say to the movements of Indochina and Morocco, and 
to Algeria who follows the first two countries if not to independence 
then at least to their autonomy? It must be said that almost all the 
territories of the French Union want to follow this example [This 
last phrase is finely crossed out, but is perfectly legible].68
Dismissing the promise of a utopian ideal, and predicting further 
instability, the elision at the end of this article is interesting. It would 
seem either that the courage to offer this criticism faltered, or that the 
half- hearted elision was itself a sort of challenge. There is a certain 
confidence both in the projections of these young men, who presaged 
colonialism’s end, and in the aims of the competition’s organizers, who 
hoped to inspire entrants to love the French Union. There is hope in the 
vision of the future described in Michelet’s quote, and a disjuncture in the 
response of these few students. In the dwindling light of the late colonial 
state, it could be difficult to distinguish sparks from embers.
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For Elikia M’Bokolo, one of the key facets in the stability of AEF was 
the existence of an elite of petit- bourgeois African partners who had inter-
nalized the assimilationist ideology of French imperialism.69 Across the 
Federation, this class seemed neither capable nor desirous of formulat-
ing a coherent anti- colonial ideology. In AEF, there was a tiny minority of 
people who had experienced formal education, and this small elite tended 
to be close to the administration.70 As recently as 1955 the governor gen-
eral of AEF, Paul Chauvet,71 had expanded the number of African teachers 
in the education sector in a programme designed to reintegrate return-
ing graduates of metropolitan education back into the working life of the 
Federation.72 This sort of programme was intended, like the study day, to 
strengthen the connections between colony and metropole. Seeing this sort 
of criticism in the voices of these students is thus interesting for our under-
standing of the decolonization of AEF. These responses are a middle ground 
between anti- colonial nationalism and loyal collaboration. They were, after 
all, students being educated to a fairly high level, and atypical of many in 
francophone Africa, who lacked access to these resources. Likewise, they 
were participating in an international competition with a good degree of 
literacy and interesting critical ideas. Yet, in their rejection of the terms of 
the competition, they passed up the opportunity for a shot at its rewards.
In some ways, these respondents offered active resistance to the 
civilizing mission, rejecting its terms and refusing to be cowed. In others, 
though, they were simply cultural réfractaires, like those who evaded the 
Vichy government’s forced work orders yet stopped short of armed resist-
ance.73 The phrase crossed out in Koul’s answer gives us some clue to this 
small act of rebellion, and the tenor of these young men gives us some 
insight into a quiet, growing frustration with imperialism. Differing per-
spectives inflected visions of the future. For French colonial officials com-
mitted to maintaining the bonds of this relationship, their imagined future 
entailed a new type of colonial attachment:  more diffuse, perhaps, but 
bound by cultural entanglement. For those who felt that attachment like 
the leash on a ‘starving dog’, a little loosening of the collar was scant solace.
These responses give a real insight into the development of anti- 
colonial ideas throughout the 1950s. In particular, the condemnation 
of these students helps to illuminate the way that popular opinion had 
moved beyond the control of colonial authorities, and the extent to 
which hopeful visions of the future were forced to confront increasingly 
negative realities. The potential of these young voices was frustrated, 
and chafed against optimistic imperial programmes designed to foster 
a sense of solidarity. These voices evoke a sense of future conflict due 
to lost opportunities. The loss described by the pieds noirs in Aix was 
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definitive and retrospective. It noisily echoed tales about the fading of 
privilege, unlike the dissenting grumbles overheard in these snippets. 
The loss described in these extracts was one that did not fully envisage a 
future in which empire was categorically gone, yet they prefaced a turbu-
lent future for the imperial status quo.
On the spot: ‘The political problems of  
French West Africa’
The last document to be considered is a report written on ‘The political 
problems of French West Africa’ by the haut commissaire of French West 
Africa, Bernard Cornut- Gentille. The document itself was recommended 
during an anonymous review of the article that had sparked the archival 
trip to Aix en Provence mentioned in the last section. Yet it was accessed 
not through another archival search but through discussions and 
personal links. When looking for a copy, the only other reference that 
was obviously available was in the footnote of a piece by a prominent 
scholar on the subject.74 With a little trepidation, I contacted Professor 
Tony Chafer to ask if he knew where I could access a copy. As it turns out, 
he was the reviewer in question, and was happy to pass on a photocopy 
of the document that he himself had received from Joseph- Roger de 
Benoist, another prominent historian of West Africa.
The method by which the document arrived was fairly unusual, 
and, further, there is some ambiguity in the exact dating of this source. 
It can be deduced as arriving sometime between 1954 and 1955, before 
the announcement of the loi cadre, but after the battle of Dien Bien Phu. 
It is, then, strongly resonant of the difficulties described in the previous 
documents. Likewise, the method of its arrival charted connections in 
contemporary research, plotting out a logistical sense of an intellectual 
network. In this survey by a colonial official reporting to the civil servants 
of the Overseas Ministry, however, we can see another form of network at 
play, feeding back the analytical outcomes of colonial experience to the 
mechanisms of colonial control. The nature of this document’s discov-
ery reflects the para- political, often personalized nature of postcolonial 
Franco- African relations, and the system of administration that created it.
The document itself opens a vista on an older style of colonial 
administration as it came to an end. In its place, the development of new 
modes of imperial interaction threatened the basis of the colonial rela-
tionship. Between 1946 and 1954, according to Cornut- Gentille, West 
Africa had become the ‘continent of fidelity’.75 Recognizing emergent 
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threats was a prudent attempt to manage that status and not a sudden 
inversion of old assumptions. Cornut- Gentille’s report summed up well 
the task of reformers relying on an intricate knowledge of power struc-
tures and economic controls:
It is a fact that the French West Africa of 1954 appears to the casual 
observer as if it is an oasis in a world where many countries face a 
Figure 5 Cornut- Gentille’s report
 
 
105FuturES,  ContingEnCiES And thE End oF FrEnCh EMpirE
105
frenzy, and it is a fact that some 95% of the Federation’s elements 
are deeply committed to France.
However, it is a fact, too, that after seven years of living in 
Black Africa, I see, on the spot more than anyone else, the elements 
of concern that may trigger a more accelerated evolution than cur-
rently under way in French West Africa.76
The perspective of reformers who had experience of the territories 
clashed with an accepted narrative of colonial development being 
pursued in Paris. Just as the economic and cultural logic behind 
imperialism experienced challenges in the mid- 1950s, so too did the 
political project of graduated autonomy that had been outlined at the 
Brazzaville Conference in 1944.
In France, the Fourth Republic offered a chance to renew engage-
ment with the colonies, building upon a positive ‘Brazzaville spirit’77 that 
followed the promises made by de Gaulle to France’s African territories 
in 1944. These were promises made before France was itself liberated, 
offering an insight into the Republic that de Gaulle hoped to build. Yet 
there were important limits placed on the imagined future of colonial 
development:
The ends of the civilising mission accomplished in the colonies 
exclude any idea of autonomy, all possibility of evolution outside 
the French bloc; also excluded is the eventual establishment of self 
governments [sic] in the colonies, even in a distant future.78
This conditional view of the future established a firm contingent 
limit. Those limits were not simply practical, however, and they suffused 
the entire period of reform in the late colonial state. As Martin Thomas 
observes, ‘Black Africans fixed on the hypocrisy of egalitarian promises 
that came hedged with colonialist presumptions about their limited 
capacity to run things themselves.’79 Contingent limitations bred discon-
tent and resentment, as expressed by the students mentioned earlier, and 
this eclipsed the reforming spirit of colonial administrators and post- 
war governments. Writing in 1956, the Marxist historian and renowned 
Africanist Thomas Hodgkin summarized the changing nature of colonial 
relationships for the European empires:
In our generation ‘the colonial problem’ means, principally, the 
problem of the relationship between Europe and its outpost com-
munities in Africa, on the one hand, and the indigenous African 
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societies on the other. Put crudely, it means:  what adjustments, 
compromises, surrenders, must the European colonial powers  – 
and their settlers – make in face of claims of ‘African nationalism’?80
Hodgkin noted that African political institutions had to be understood 
and engaged with on their own terms, offering a sense that previous 
attempts to co- opt and countermand these institutions by the colonizer 
had failed to produce results. One feels Paul Mus would have applauded 
his willingness to learn.
Such an engagement can be seen in French colonial reform, nota-
bly the loi cadre of 1956, which sought to devolve power towards local 
assemblies, frustrating demands for equivalence.81 This built, in part, 
on the recommendations of the men on the spot who had witnessed 
the strains of existing colonial bonds. As Cornut- Gentille observed, 
the target was ‘the new social strata that were developing, whose 
place was dependent on the future of the AOF [Afrique occidentale 
française] and the relationship between France and Africa’.82 As Frederick 
Cooper outlines, the loi cadre rejected the policy of assimilation, 
dropping the emphasis on equality that had come from Brazzaville 
promises.83 No more was the colonial state looking to build a separate 
but equal French Union; now the hope was to complicate and nuance 
those relationships in the hope of continuing entanglement. In this 
moment, Cornut- Gentille’s report seems to enter into dialogue with 
the other documents, offering a connection built on differing perspec-
tives.84 The dissenting students represented the figures most likely to be 
co- opted, and the clunkiness of the political measures designed to do 
this seemed to refer to the warnings of Paul Mus. Cornut- Gentille saw 
that future in the political institutions the French could create or fos-
ter, however, stating that ‘the French are no longer an ethnic concept, 
they are a political concept’.85 This recognized a much more practical 
engagement, shorn of the idealism that had tended to mark visions of 
the future in the post- war world. As such, we can see this language 
prominently in the structures of colonial administration. In February 
1957 a note prepared for the minister of overseas France, Gaston 
Defferre, by his ministry stated:
Whilst African and Malagasy deputies are largely men accustomed 
to the realities of power and prepared to accept the necessary com-
promises, African and Malagasy [popular] opinion is more sensi-
tive than its elected representatives to absolutist ideologies and 
issues of passion.86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107FuturES,  ContingEnCiES And thE End oF FrEnCh EMpirE
107
This report echoed Cornut- Gentille’s thinking, especially on his return 
as minister of overseas France in June 1958.87 These echoes demonstrate 
a thread of institutional continuity, building on the accumulated 
knowledge of a ministry that relied on the first- hand experience of its 
administrators. The 1957 report proposed two solutions to this problem 
of public opinion: maintaining a strong line in debates, and attempting to 
support candidates for election in the territorial assemblies who accepted 
cooperation with France in order to give them the best chance possible. 
This mandated a strong information policy campaign of explaining the 
reforms, avoiding the ‘real and serious threats’ to the ‘most reasonable 
parties and party leaders’.88 Problematically, this seemed to echo Mus’ 
political diagnosis, with instrumental engagement trumping any open 
offer of meaningful reform.
All this was undertaken with the intention of perpetuating a new 
vision of a colonial future, with a different, developed but durable rela-
tionship between the metropolitan centre and the colonial periphery. 
Far more than in any other economic or cultural arena, the management 
of political loyalties was undertaken with an eye on the possibility for 
contingent change. If the French Union was to be a ‘constant creation’, 
as proposed in the second document, then it fell to its administrators to 
guide that process. The worries expressed in the first document were that 
this guidance was lacking. Indeed, it does seem within Cornut- Gentille’s 
report that there exists a certain anxiety founded on his perception of the 
colonial future. His nervous anticipation of contingent shocks moves his 
pen in the conclusion of the report, recognizing the cultural and political 
possibilities suffusing the senescent French empire:
This report, which is by necessity a synthesis, is therefore incom-
plete and inaccurate.
Incomplete because it insufficiently explores some questions 
and fails to mention certain others, whether through forgetfulness, 
or because they are secondary, or even because they do not need 
any new action.
Inexact because this depiction of the people and issues of the 
AOF tries to address change and not the problem of the present 
moment, never mind that of the future…89
These qualifications acknowledge the limits of Cornut- Gentille’s ability 
to anticipate all potential outcomes. He was not an omniscient observer, 
and so this seems intuitive, yet, again, the need to articulate this in his 
report stresses a certain unease about the sense of what is to come. 
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His report addresses the problems of the present moment, specifically 
indicating where they might impinge on future stability. His recommen-
dations focus on ways to ameliorate the problems of today in service of a 
better imagined colonial future.
Cornut- Gentille’s report gives us his own insight based on his expe-
rience. His reading of French West Africa’s political problems is intricate, 
yet his willingness to endorse that vision is limited by his sense that events 
were accelerating. This was not just true for metropolitan colonial elites, 
however. Wilder quotes Léopold Senghor in a similar sense: ‘[T] o govern 
is to anticipate [prévoir]…, to govern is to choose. In reality, choice is 
a function of anticipation [la prévision].’90 Senghor’s pleas for a federal 
solution to the tensions that faced the unravelling of the French Union 
supposed that France’s ‘anticipation’ was fundamentally based on a trust 
in the capacity of the French Republican system to weather these shocks. 
Yet, in Cornut- Gentille’s report, there is a specific rejection of that ability 
to anticipate.
This document, received through an informal network in the con-
temporary context, illustrates the challenges facing the informal net-
works of empire. Cornut- Gentille was a ‘man on the spot’, making the 
choices that Senghor described. Yet his fear over his ability to inform 
these choices illustrates a changing appreciation of the agency of the 
colonized. Importantly, however, his recommendations do not settle on 
disengagement.91 He retained a belief in the lingering influence of the 
French colonial administration, and seems, in this, to foreshadow the 
lingering influence of informal networks typified by Jacques Foccart’s 
African cell.92 His conditional view of the colonial future outlines what 
he believed should occur, in the face of turbulence and reform, to best 
serve France’s interests.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored contingencies and entanglements in the late 
colonial state, yet it has also offered some comment on contingencies 
and entanglements in the archive, interrogating our understanding of 
material and also our means of processing it. These colonial futures were 
anticipations of the journey ahead, and often saw adaptation and accom-
modation in the face of swirling possibility. Our ability to read this latent 
possibility with the same historical common sense is a difficult task of 
reconstruction. It cuts across archival collections, as it cuts across actors 
in the last days of empire. This point is reinforced by the flux of archival 
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collections revealed at sites such as Hanslope Park and around issues 
such as torture in Algeria, and suggested by the ephemeral quality of 
contemporary digital archiving.93 The provenance of these documents, as 
highlighted in each of their research stories, itself raises questions about 
discovery and context. These challenging archival issues demonstrate 
that source bases in motion influence our point of observation.
Capturing the conditional in the late colonial state allows us to 
explore the assumptions and inferences that mapped out historical 
visions of the future. There was no static vision of what came after empire 
for France. Visions of the future were contextual and contingent, reflect-
ing beliefs and assumptions about the agency and abilities of Africans and 
colonizers. Throughout the 1950s French officials planned for changes in 
the ways that they ran their colonial empires. The strains of the Second 
World War, increasingly assertive national movements and a changing 
international diplomatic climate all mandated a need to alter existing 
practices. Visions of the future could motivate nationalists to intensify 
their struggle when they saw their future at its most precarious. Worries 
about disorder could push the hand of colonial officials who sought to 
pacify dissent. From ordinary people to those statesmen and spokesmen 
at the very top, thoughts on how things would pan out could steer their 
minds and write their words.
These documents combine three personal perspectives 
on the future in the late colonial state, helping us to nuance an 
anti- teleological reading of the end of empire. They illuminate the ide-
ational context in which questions about empire were framed, and help 
plot the historical constellations under which these actors laboured. 
They re- emphasize that behind every document is another person (or 
people), and that by sifting through a mountain of documents one is 
retreading the paths of the archive, and building on established narra-
tives of the past. The first shows one man’s personal connection to the 
empire and the loss of belief in the project that the changing relation-
ship of the 1950s created. He offers visions of what would have hap-
pened, if only after the abandonment of the inflexible and unfeeling 
policies that led to the collapse of the colonial state in Indochina. The 
second shows the way in which submerged voices prefaced a sense of 
lost opportunity, especially when juxtaposed with loud voices mourn-
ing the losses of the past. This potential gives a sense of how empire 
could have developed, but for the unequal relationships that marred 
colonial education. The third lends insight into the ‘man on the spot’, 
his belief that the French could continue to control the situation, but 
his fears for the political problems that imperilled that influence. This, 
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in turn, looks to what should have happened, offering its own excuses 
alongside the analysis. All three offer pessimistic views of the future, 
yet show variance in their rationale. None of these sources challenge 
our reading of the future of these colonies as independent nation 
states, yet all nuance our understanding of the context in which these 
debates took place. We gain a sense of how contingency governed and 
shaped visions of the future in the late colonial state, and how a sense 
of crisis crossed categories.
By combining these different aspects of the conditional, we can our-
selves gain an insight into what might have happened, not in a counter- 
factual sense, but in the reconstruction of expired contingency. These 
points in the historical constellation of that moment were not fixed, nor 
permanent. Their visions were not simply carried along on the ‘tide of 
history’, nor buffeted loose by a ‘wind of change’, but were, rather, per-
sonal and insightful considerations of colonial futures based on personal 
situations and histories. The political and social climate that created the 
‘irresistible momentum’94 of decolonization was built on a dense network 
of contingent factors that promised an imperfect future. Reconstructing 
those conditional views and expired predictions is, in part, a work of 
reading along the archival grain and recognizing the contingency of our 
own enquiry that shapes our imperfect views of the past. Recognizing 
shapes in these historical constellations is not simply a work of confirma-
tion but also one of discovery.
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The dynamics of anti- apartheid: 
international solidarity, human rights 
and decolonization
Robert Skinner
What might the activities of anti- apartheid activists in West Yorkshire tell 
us about the entangled histories of human rights and decolonization? 
Rights talk in places such as Huddersfield, far from the abuses of the 
apartheid system, was not the echo of a message transmitted from above, 
nor some revolutionary mantra taken up from below. Tracing the ways 
that these entangled histories were enacted by any number of grass- roots 
activists (in Britain, or, indeed, elsewhere), necessitates examination 
of how a flexible discourse of human rights took shape during a period 
of instability. Individual actors below the level of state spoke in concert 
with liberation movements fighting states, but in service of diverse 
aims. Rights talk in the era of national liberation was often contingent 
on sovereignty, and often became conflated with it as the message was 
taken up by broader – and transnational – activist networks. Looking 
at the evolution of these discussions allows us to understand how the 
turbulent context of the late 1950s and early 1960s shaped discussions of 
human rights well into the 1970s. In this reading, responsive and flexible 
definitions of human rights mapped onto a broader category of solidarity, 
which eclipsed an initial focus on individual political rights. This was a 
definition more contingent on the context of African decolonization than 
on the reality of newly sovereign African states.
To chart this mutable concept, this chapter first looks at the rights 
abuses in South Africa that triggered transnational protest movements 
and international grass- roots activism. This oppositional movement 
would help to define the language of human rights in apartheid South 
Africa against the language of decolonization as it took shape in the 
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wider world. In part, this was a result of the networks it used to advance 
its cause. Petitioning the United Nations ensured that protests about 
South African rights abuses took on a colonial reference point. This 
was clear in the conflicting attitudes to violent struggle that sepa-
rated movements with common cause; in the UN, postcolonial nations 
endorsed violent struggles to attain fundamental rights, while Western 
sympathizers often winced at the moral implications. Despite these dif-
ferences of method, however, the discourse of rights was increasingly 
fixed to the discussion of nations and development. As postcolonial 
African nations began to speak of structural inequalities as ongoing 
forms of oppression, Western activists also took up an increasingly 
materialist language of rights. Yet, by the 1970s, this focus on struc-
tural reform and development was expressed in a way that distilled the 
legacy of the campaigns against racial violence and individual rights 
abuses that had taken place throughout the 1960s. By looking at trans-
national anti- apartheid activism and the interpretation of its legacy 
by distinct groups a decade later, we get a sense of how these debates 
had developed and been shaped by decolonization. The discourse on 
human rights, and its strong association with sovereignty and develop-
ment, had been contingent both on the networks that made these calls 
and the forums in which they were heard.
Histories of decolonization tend to be, at the same time, histories of 
the triumph of the nation state. Even when recent scholarship has drawn 
attention to alternative possibilities, such as the federalist experiment 
in French West African territories in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the narrative concludes with the ultimate succession of national 
sovereignty.1 Histories of human rights, meanwhile, have followed a sim-
ilar orbit around the institutions of state and nation, tracing the emer-
gence of a discourse of legal and moral entitlements that has become 
imbued with a disciplinary power over the actions of nation states. In 
some accounts, human rights are presented as a reflection of a cultural 
shift towards empathy and humanitarian universalism with its origins in 
late eighteenth- century Europe.2 More recently, human rights have been 
recast as a utopian vision emerging only in the 1970s, an entirely modern 
(or, indeed, postmodern) phenomenon.3 In this history, the 1960s has 
earned a poor reputation as a period in which, despite decolonization 
and an upsurge in radical idealism, the protection of individual rights 
and freedoms was locked in quiet retreat. Cold War calculations trumped 
universalist visions, and Soviet and US actions in Eastern Europe and 
South- East Asia overrode the high ideals of the late 1940s. Whatever 
student protestors, anti- Vietnam- War campaigners and anti- apartheid 
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activists discovered in the 1960s, it was not a utopian vision of human 
rights. Until their ‘breakthrough’ in political discourse in the late 1970s, 
as Samuel Moyn has argued, human rights were weakly observed and 
little understood.4 This general observation – that, in international rela-
tions, human rights were largely defined in terms of, if not synonymous 
with, the narrower right of self- determination – might equally be applied 
to those groups and individuals in Britain expressing support for and 
solidarity with anti- colonial movements in the Third World.5 As Moyn’s 
account implies, decolonization was a necessary precursor to the emer-
gence of a human rights movement, as a new utopian vision that served 
as a response to the crisis of the postcolonial state.6
During the 1960s liberation movements saw the language of human 
rights as an appropriate medium for the articulation of struggles against 
regimes whose actions were in denial of emerging international norms of 
anti- racism, democracy and sovereign rights. The South African authori-
ties provided a prime example of the deviation from these norms in their 
efforts to control political opposition by equipping themselves with an 
array of legal devices – banning orders, house arrests, extended powers 
to imprison suspects – that could be defined as threats to the fundamen-
tal rights of individuals. Although the articulation of rights language 
remained vague, functional and often subordinate to the primary aim 
of achieving ‘liberation’ and self- determination where it was denied, a 
coherent and coordinated articulation of human rights did, nonetheless, 
begin to take shape, partly in response to the ways in which the apart-
heid state demonstrated its readiness to abrogate individual rights. Anti- 
apartheid activists deployed the language of human rights sporadically 
and instrumentally, but not purely as a synonym for sovereign rights. As 
postcolonial Third World states took up the language of human rights 
in the service of their own political agendas and to cultivate collective 
strength in global institutions, the meaning and form of ‘rights’ began 
to change. Western campaigners nonetheless sought to place individual 
rights at the centre of their conceptions of global political and social 
justice. This chapter explores these ways in which human rights, as a 
transnational discourse, reflected the entanglements of international 
institutions, state officials and social movements during the process of 
decolonization.
Histories of human rights and decolonization have tended, more-
over, to limit their scope to discussions of rights talk within official cir-
cles. In the case of Britain, human rights have been seen as instrumental, 
deployed as protection against communism and totalitarianism, and 
intimately linked to the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
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influence on key officials in the Colonial Office.7 The Bills of Rights intro-
duced into the constitutions of former colonial territories were thus an 
attempt to tie postcolonial states into a transnational system of human 
rights.8 Roland Burke, in contrast, suggests that newly independent 
Third World states had indeed ‘begun to transform the human rights pro-
ject’ themselves by the end of the 1960s; while the anti- colonial dimen-
sion of human rights history was by no means the ultimate expression of 
a utopian vision of rights, it nevertheless represented a reshaping of the 
agenda of human rights.9 Burke also demonstrates how the relationship 
between rights and self- determination was multi- stranded, suggesting, 
perhaps, that human rights might be presented as an assembly of contra-
dictory and by no means consistent components – conceptual positions, 
expressed at critical moments within a particular set of institutions that 
came together in a formulation of ‘rights’. Furthermore, he argues that 
Third World actors – even prior to formal decolonization – were often a 
driving force of human rights discourse not merely as a useful vehicle in 
the service of an anti- colonial agenda.
The idea that the struggles for independence in Asia and Africa were 
struggles for ‘rights’ was widely expressed, but invariably in ill- defined 
ways that tended to accord more closely with notions of natural rights 
defined by practice rather than pronouncement. Support for anti- colonial 
nationalism in the 1950s had tended to judge actions in the decolonizing 
world through the lens of the past. Rights could, in fact, be set within a 
civilizational discourse, albeit one that promoted the ‘equal opportunity 
for all human beings to become civilized’.10 Protests against the South 
African policy of apartheid, for example, had employed the notion of 
‘human rights’ from the late 1940s and early 1950s, but these tended to 
be declarative, serving more as an expression of the general moral impro-
priety of apartheid than a programme for the establishment of a universal 
rights regime.11 That notions of ‘rights’ were deployed in such a diffuse 
manner reinforces recent interpretations of the development of human 
rights in the post- war period that cast them as a loosely held utopian con-
cept subservient to the more powerful idea of national sovereignty.
Instead, I  would argue that post- war human rights discourses 
cannot easily be disentangled from the process of decolonization. 
Human rights in their narrower sense, conflated with the notion of 
self- determination, continued to maintain a moral efficacy for anti- 
apartheid campaigners, but, with decolonization, the construction of 
an institutional structure around human rights – most particularly at 
the United Nations – provided a scaffolding that was both supportive 
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of the struggle against apartheid and at the same time reflected its 
major concerns around justice, imprisonment and the rights of those 
engaged in armed struggle. The work of key UN bodies, including 
the Commission on Human Rights and the Special Committee on 
Apartheid, meant that human rights became firmly established as a 
central instrument against the apartheid state. Rather than seeing 
transnational activism and human rights as peripheral to the politics of 
the apartheid debate, this chapter suggests that human rights played a 
constitutive role in the dynamics of transnational anti- apartheid net-
works in the 1960s.
International opposition to South African  
rights abuses
South African race polices were a primary focus for debates around 
human rights in the late 1940s. They centred predominantly on 
complaints regarding the treatment of the Indian population, lodged 
by the government of India in 1946, as an international dimension 
of the endgame of empire in South Asia. Subsequently, human rights 
became a minor theme in the examination of the South African 
administration of the territory of South- West Africa (Namibia) by 
the UN Trusteeship Committee.12 In general, early international 
opposition to apartheid tended towards a diffuse moral condem-
nation of South Africa, until (at least) the mass arrests of South 
African anti- apartheid leaders in December 1956. The arrests and 
the subsequent Treason Trial, which eventually collapsed in 1961, 
accelerated the growth of international campaigns against apartheid, 
notably the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), which went 
on to become one of the primary channels of financial assistance for 
South African liberation movements.13 The trial was also instrumen-
tal to the development of human rights movements in the United 
Kingdom, inspiring the formation of the campaign group Justice 
by a small group of British lawyers, whose members included the 
founder of Amnesty International, Peter Benenson. Another of its 
members, Gerald Gardiner QC, had been sponsored by Defence 
and Aid to observe the preliminary hearings of the Treason Trial in 
Johannesburg. In 1957 Justice was reconstituted as the British section 
of the International Commission of Jurists, and as such it drew back 
from active involvement in international campaigns but continued to 
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work to position human rights on British domestic and colonial 
political agendas.14
The British anti- apartheid movement began to crystallize in the late 
1950s, subject to the contingencies of decolonization and the Cold War. 
Anti- apartheid was defined not only as a negative campaign – against, 
and reactive to, apartheid – but also by a global politics marked by the 
ideological contest and very real existential threat associated with super-
power tensions, as well as the nuanced differences between experiences 
of the end of empire across the world. Discussion of human rights tended 
to percolate into public debate only at moments of crisis, as in the wake 
of the Hola camp massacre in Kenya in 1959, or following the shooting 
of Pan- Africanist Congress supporters by the South African police at 
Sharpeville in March 1960.15 At these critical moments, the authoritar-
ian impulse within the ‘late colonial state’ was revealed, pushing aside 
talk of ‘development’ and ‘partnership’ and underlining the moral case 
against colonialism. Human rights thus emerged as a point of refer-
ence in the politics of decolonization and the reframing of empire as 
Commonwealth.
Thus, in the wake of the shootings at Sharpeville, a cross- party 
group of British MPs drafted a petition calling for a Commonwealth 
convention on human rights.16 While, as Brian Simpson and Charles 
Parkinson have demonstrated, the Colonial Office had already begun 
to look more positively on constitutional bills of rights, the idea of a 
Commonwealth- wide convention seemed a wholly unwelcome proposi-
tion for government officials. Even within the Colonial Office it appears 
that there had been no conversion to the principle of legal protections 
for human rights; rather, it was recognition of their value in ‘expediting 
Britain’s withdrawal from her empire’ that drove the shift in policy.17 For 
officials, then, the idea of human rights was instrumental for decoloniza-
tion. In the eyes of the proponents of a Commonwealth convention, the 
suppression of political opposition in South Africa following Sharpeville 
was an ill omen for rights and liberties in a postcolonial world. But, in an 
unequivocal response, the British home secretary, R.  A. Butler, argued 
simply that the viability of the Commonwealth was ‘in great part due to 
the absence of this type of formal, institutional machinery’. He surmised 
that Commonwealth members would not welcome the imposition of 
‘rules of a central court or dictates of any convention’.18
The Sharpeville crisis precipitated a determined reassertion of 
authority by the South African prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, 
through both the suppression of the main black opposition movements 
and a consolidation of white support, embodied in the formation of a 
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republic in early 1961. South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth later 
that year was a moment of triumph for Verwoerd, but one of despair for 
the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, coming as a blow to his 
vision of a new Commonwealth.19 Ultimately, the South African policy 
of apartheid would provide a crucial point of reference in the develop-
ment of a new, multi- racial conception of Commonwealth, not, however, 
one shaped by a formal conception of human rights. Butler’s refusal to 
countenance a pan- Commonwealth convention defined the limits of offi-
cial enthusiasm for transnational human rights frameworks in the early 
1960s. While the practical benefits of human rights had begun to be rec-
ognized by senior civil servants, elected officials remained highly scepti-
cal of any legally imposed definitions of rights.
The early 1960s did, however, witness the early growth of what 
would later be defined as ‘grassroots human rights advocacy’.20 In par-
ticular, the launch of Amnesty International in 1961 saw the language of 
human rights deployed as a foundation for the depoliticized patronage 
of individual cases of injustice. The founders of the new movement were 
concerned with the sanctity of the activist as much as the salvation of 
the victim; Amnesty was a re- articulation of earlier forms of muscular 
Christianity as much as it was a new form of activism.21 Moreover, the 
Quaker and pacifist traditions that informed founders Peter Benenson and 
Eric Baker set Amnesty – in its early years – within liberal- humanitarian 
networks that had supported nascent anti- colonial and anti- apartheid 
campaigns in Britain.22 In 1963 Amnesty hosted a conference on the 
question of asylum in southern Africa, giving particular prominence to 
the ‘increasingly threatened position’ of the protectorates of Swaziland, 
Bechuanaland and Basutoland.23 Amnesty’s intervention in discussions 
on colonialism in southern Africa is suggestive of the degree to which 
a discourse of human rights was shaped in the intersection between 
political and legal questions, between the regulation of movement across 
international borders and the political sensitivities that shaped the 
enforcement – or not – of these regulations. Shaped in the multiplicity of 
forces at play in decolonization and subject to the complex interactions 
associated with transnational activism, human rights became distilled 
into the narrower questions of legal rights, de- centring the issue of colo-
nialism and sovereign rights. Moreover, the strong sense of moral propri-
ety that shaped Amnesty’s definition of ‘prisoners of conscience’ excluded 
the leaders of those African liberation movements that had embarked on 
armed struggle in the early 1960s. Thus Nelson Mandela, one of the prin-
cipal architects of the turn by the African National Congress (ANC) to 
armed resistance, though unanimously accorded the status of prisoner of 
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conscience following his arrest and imprisonment in 1962, was removed 
from the list as a consequence of his public assertions of the legitimacy of 
armed resistance against the apartheid state.24 Despite the ambivalence 
of Amnesty, the issue of South African political prisoners provided anti- 
apartheid activists a conduit to connect a campaign for sovereign rights 
to international debates around the protection of human rights.
In late 1963 Mandela, alongside other leading members of the 
ANC/ Communist Party armed group Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), were 
tried for the capital crimes of sabotage and armed insurrection. On the 
eve of the trial, ANC leader- in- exile Oliver Tambo used an address to 
the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly to describe 
the actions of the South African government as ‘genocide masquerading 
under the guise of a civilised dispensation of justice’.25 Two days later 
the General Assembly requested that South Africa ‘grant unconditional 
release to all political prisoners’.26 While Western states made little more 
than ‘timid’ approaches to South Africa, by the time the Rivonia defend-
ants were sentenced to life imprisonment, in July 1964, their trial had 
served to energize transnational campaigns against apartheid.27 A key 
contribution to this came from the World Campaign for the Release of 
South African Political Prisoners (WCRSAPP), launched under the aus-
pices of the Anti- Apartheid Movement (AAM) in November 1963. It was 
a coordinated international campaign, overseen by a small committee of 
MPs, anti- apartheid campaigners and South African exiles in London, 
and drawing on the support of groups from around the world. Eventually 
the WCRSAPP would submit a petition of nearly 200,000 signatures to 
the United Nations, while in Britain public attention was maintained 
through a series of vigils held outside South Africa House in London. It 
was in this matrix of state officials, non- governmental activists and exiled 
South African campaigners that human rights developed as an element 
of the discursive strategy of anti- apartheid. These networks intersected 
at different levels of national and international politics, with varying 
degrees of success.
The WCRSAPP had some influence through engagement with non- 
governmental activists and organizations in Britain, and, as we shall see, 
was a point of entry for interaction with international institutions. Its 
impact on politics in South Africa itself was minimal, however. Although 
the worldwide campaign might be claimed to have had some influence 
on the decision not to impose the death penalty for the Rivonia defend-
ants, the trial had dealt a severe blow to the effectiveness of the ANC 
as a liberation movement.28 Furthermore, less high- profile cases, such 
as that of Washington Bongco, who was executed in December 1964, 
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despite providing momentum for the campaign, failed to attract inter-
national interest ‘on the same scale’ as the Rivonia Trial.29 Nevertheless, 
infringements upon the rights of political activists within South Africa 
continued to provide a critical point of reference for anti- apartheid 
campaigns. Even before the Rivonia Trial, international condemnation 
of the South African government’s recourse to authoritarian measures 
had been heard. When the South African parliament approved detention 
of up to 90 days for individuals suspected of ‘political’ offences in April 
1963, the International Commission of Jurists denounced the move as 
synonymous with Stalinism.30
Within South Africa, the most unswerving critics of the apartheid 
state’s willingness to abrogate civil liberties and constitutional rights 
had been found within liberal opponents of the state, including the 
small Civil Rights League (formed in 1948), the National Union of South 
African Students and the Black Sash.31 During the 1960s experts exam-
ined the legal, psychological and moral consequences of the infringe-
ment of ‘basic’ and ‘individual’ rights enabled by legislation such as the 
1963 General Law Amendment Act.32 These assessments tended, again, 
to define rights in their narrowest sense. Similarly, while it produced 
copious testimonies of the techniques of political suppression employed 
by the apartheid regime, including the use of torture on detainees, the 
WCRSAPP made little reference to the language of human rights in its 
publicity or private discussions before 1967.
Viewed in the context of the apartheid state, a coherent and con-
sistent language of human rights had not emerged from a process of 
decolonization. Beyond South Africa, however, where colonial institu-
tions had undergone transformation, new spaces opened up that had the 
potential to foster the elaboration of a discourse of universal rights. It 
was in the intersections between networks of anti- apartheid and rights 
activists, state institutions and international organizations, from the 
Commonwealth to the United Nations, that a language of human rights 
would be formed.
International forums and colonial reference points
During the 1960s the issue of apartheid became a unifying cause for 
Third World states whose leaders sought to hitch a language of human 
rights to their respective postcolonial priorities. Thus, the WCRSAPP 
highlights the ways in which the Anti- Apartheid Movement helped 
develop the institutional structures that incubated a discourse of rights 
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in the service of Third World political identities. In February 1967 the 
WCRSAPP merged with a similar committee that had been established by 
the International Defence and Aid Fund in the previous year, and its frame 
of reference was widened to cover political prisoners across southern 
Africa.33 Under the sponsorship of IDAF, with the South African anti- 
apartheid activist Dennis Brutus as the new director, human rights began 
to feature more prominently in its campaign rhetoric. This was, arguably, 
a function of its integration within networks associated with UN bodies, 
including the Commission on Human Rights. The UN Special Committee 
on Apartheid, which had first met in 1963, has been identified as a key 
site for the development of the instruments of human rights within the 
United Nations during the process of decolonization. As Roland Burke 
has shown in his detailed account, the efforts of representatives of Third 
World states in bodies such as the Special Committee revived the right 
of petition that allowed the United Nations to monitor human rights 
within individual states.34 The movements that had emerged in response 
to South African rights abuses were broadening their reach to campaign 
against rights abuses elsewhere. That these human rights discussions 
took place during the process of decolonization, as the late colonial state 
seemed to bow in the wind of change, inflected them with the language 
of sovereignty. The tenor of the discourse was contingent on its interna-
tional context and its colonial reference points.
The international forums in which groups such as the WCRSAPP 
could operate saw their contributions shaped by the context of decolo-
nization. The UN human rights seminar on apartheid, held in Brasília in 
1966, provided one opportunity to exert international pressure on South 
Africa, and, together with the Special Committee, allowed groups such 
as the WCRSAPP to petition the world body.35 Although it allowed cam-
paigners to mobilize a language of rights, however, the Brasília seminar 
demonstrated that groups continued to define rights in terms of sover-
eignty. The ANC, in its submission to the meeting, spoke of rights with 
reference to the UN Charter and its provisions against colonialism, and 
called for support for those ‘fighting for transfer of power to the major-
ity of the people’.36 While these accorded opposition groups the capac-
ity to express their claims in an international forum, they would rarely 
elicit more than utterances of solidarity. The most concrete proposal to 
emerge from the Brasília seminar was for an International Day for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, to be held on 21 March 1967, the 
anniversary of the Sharpeville shootings.
Similarly, rights talk played a muted and contingent role in discus-
sions at the UN seminar on apartheid held at Kitwe, Zambia, in 1967.37 
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Nevertheless, the delegates at Kitwe did focus attention on issues that 
overlapped anti- apartheid and human rights concerns, notably the treat-
ment of prisoners. By 1968 the UN Commission on Human Rights had 
established a working party to investigate the conditions of political 
prisoners. As such, the conduct of the apartheid regime was explicitly 
measured against key international human rights conventions, including 
the 1948 Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.38 The WCRSAPP became intimately 
connected to the networks and institutions that were tasked with carry-
ing out this process, for example by supplying witnesses for the working 
party meeting in London in 1968.39 In the years following the Rivonia 
Trial, the fate of political prisoners became a core feature of the discourse 
of solidarity that characterized transnational anti- apartheid activism. 
Moreover, efforts to sustain public interest in the plight of the imprisoned 
leadership of South African liberation movements drew anti- apartheid 
campaigners into networks and institutions that – notwithstanding the 
limits of their sovereign power – provided a forum for the expression of 
a postcolonial language of human rights. Whether those institutions pro-
vided a viable basis for any progress towards national liberation in South 
Africa was another question entirely, however. In the aftermath of decol-
onization, apartheid became a fundamental concern of international 
organizations transformed by the participation of postcolonial nations, 
and, in the process, new visions of human rights would be advanced.
What price human rights? Debates over  
violent struggle
The twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, in 1968, marked something of a low point in the hopes of those 
who had participated in the debates of the 1940s. The UN International 
Conference on Human Rights, marked by a series of attacks on Israel in 
the aftermath of the Six-Day War, was widely regarded as the nadir.40 The 
efforts to mark the anniversary bear further scrutiny, however, insofar 
as they demonstrate the entangled debates around human rights and 
struggles against white minority regimes in southern Africa. Following 
the General Assembly’s decision to designate 1968 as International 
Year for Human Rights, the United Nations had called upon members 
to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration with 
intensified action on fundamental rights. States were urged to ratify 
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key human rights agreements, including the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the 
International Labour Organization conventions against discrimination 
in employment and equal pay for women. In Britain, plans for the Year 
for Human Rights were coordinated by a committee chaired initially by 
the former Archbishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, which instituted 
a subgroup tasked with exploring ways to assist the ‘people of Britain’s 
dependent territories to realise their human rights’.41
On one level, these discussions remained closely bound up with the 
language of sovereign rights and the anti- colonial struggle. At the same 
time, though, some began to move the debate onto new ground, seeking 
to bring human rights principles to bear on the matter of incipient armed 
insurgencies in southern Africa. During 1967 South African fighters 
had infiltrated Rhodesia alongside fighters from the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union, in search of a return route to South Africa. Operating 
independently in difficult terrain, the fighters were ultimately defeated 
after a series of clashes with the Rhodesian security forces. Although the 
mission ultimately failed, it demonstrated the capacity of MK fighters 
to engage in serious combat and marked a further escalation of insur-
rectionary violence across the settler colonies of southern African in the 
mid- 1960s.42 While some contemporary observers regretted the appar-
ent victory for the ‘apostles of violence’ within nationalist movements, 
serious discussion of the legitimacy of armed resistance to colonial rule 
began to suffuse public debate in the United Kingdom during Human 
Rights Year.43
It was here that the impact of the UN International Conference on 
Human Rights, held in Tehran in April and May 1968, was most strongly 
felt. The conference has been presented in recent accounts as a kind of 
farce, an opportunity exploited by its hosts to wrap their authoritarian-
ism in the blanket of moral principles. Rather than promote the devel-
opment of the human rights ideals first envisaged in 1948, the Tehran 
conference appeared to demonstrate that decolonization had resulted 
in the dominance of Afro- Asian blocs determined to promote visions of 
anti- colonial liberation over individual rights and freedoms.44 In advance 
of the meeting, Manouchehr Ganji, Special Rapporteur on apartheid to 
the Commission on Human Rights, had called for the United Nations to 
‘tirelessly reiterate its condemnation’ of apartheid.45 The Tehran confer-
ence certainly fulfilled this aim. African states were particularly vigorous 
in their collective pursuit of a strong line on apartheid, eschewing com-
promise in favour of robust condemnation.46 South African race policy, 
the final statement declared, was a ‘crime against humanity’ because it 
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represented an intense form of racial discrimination. The failure of South 
Africa, along with Portugal and the Rhodesian government, to respect 
the principles of self- determination was cast as a threat to international 
peace – a statement that would have seemed impossible to sustain only 
four years earlier.47 Here, the context of the campaign emboldened and 
inflected its language, ensuring that rights and sovereignty would mingle 
in the evolving discourse initially ranged at the abused rights of South 
African political prisoners.
If Tehran revealed – or, perhaps, underlined – the political expedien-
cies that obstructed attempts to pursue human rights campaigns through 
the United Nations, the organization did provide an institutional frame-
work within which NGOs could at least undertake transnational lobbying 
activities. Dennis Brutus, who attended Tehran as a representative of IDAF, 
reported that the conference had allowed him to establish contact with 
the governments that supported Defence and Aid (and provided a signifi-
cant proportion of its income), but also to meet with NGOs to discuss the 
treatment of prisoners.48 It is, in fact, striking that the conference report 
payed close attention to the rights of those fighting against ‘racist regimes’ 
in southern Africa, recommending that all states ‘take all possible steps to 
ensure that persons are not detained in prison for prolonged periods with-
out charge’, and noted that ‘minority racist or colonial regimes’ that ‘fre-
quently resort to executions and inhuman treatment of those who struggle 
against such regimes’ should instead treat these individuals as political 
prisoners or prisoners of war.49 The IDAF (and WCRSAPP) were operat-
ing in networks that mingled rights talk with self- determination, against a 
backdrop of anti- colonial internationalism. In the late 1960s, though, this 
was conditioned by the context of violent confrontations between libera-
tion movements and the lingering vestiges of settler colonialism.
It is significant that the language of human rights could be employed 
as a rationale for armed struggle, rather than being set in contrast to it. 
In September 1968 the Anti- Apartheid Movement held a conference on 
‘Human rights and the struggle against apartheid’, chaired by the Liberal 
Party MP and AAM president David Steel, and also by John Ennals, chair 
of the AAM.50 The conference, whose speakers included ANC representa-
tives Joe Matthews and Robert Resha, Guardian reporter Patrick Keatley 
and the anti- apartheid activist Ruth First, sought to demonstrate the 
extent of human rights abuses within South Africa, and thus show how 
African forces had been compelled to turn to violence in their efforts to 
obtain rights and freedom. These efforts do not appear to have achieved 
a great deal of success, and in the final months of Human Rights Year 
the AAM honorary secretary, Abdul Minty (who had also advocated on 
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behalf of the WCRSAPP), used the Human Rights Year Committee bul-
letin to excoriate British failure to support freedom struggles in southern 
Africa. Individuals who had turned to armed struggle in their attempts 
to ‘achieve their basic rights and dignity’ were not, Minty argued, ‘freaks, 
wedded to a philosophy of violence’.51 For a member of a committee 
devoted to a year of educational programmes on human rights, Minty 
struck a pessimistic note, accepting that it was a ‘major task’ to inform 
people in the United Kingdom why African movements had resorted to 
armed resistance against white rule in southern Africa. For Third World 
leaders, notions of human rights seemed compatible with armed strug-
gles undertaken in the just cause of liberation from colonialism; they 
seemed less so when viewed from the moral perspective of Western sym-
pathizers. In the second half of the 1960s redefinitions of human rights 
were fostered by the advocacy of Third World states, and in particular by 
the impact of the ongoing crisis of colonialism in southern Africa.
Individuals and (postcolonial) nations:  
development as human rights
In his recent account of the international politics of anti- apartheid, 
Ryan Irwin has argued that human rights replaced nationalism as the 
‘thematic forefront’ of debate in the late 1960s.52 As Burke has suggested, 
however, Tehran marked a shift from the standard of individual rights 
imagined in 1948 to one ‘that emphasized economic development and 
the collective rights of the nation’.53 The late colonial context of rights 
talk was a contingent marker of its increasing conflation with sovereignty 
and colonial liberation. The flurry of efforts to build and sustain UN 
pressure on South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal’s colonial territories 
should be set within a wider narrative that describes an evolving human 
rights regime shaped by the increasing power of Third World nations in 
the General Assembly. As Burke demonstrates, the influence of the non- 
aligned bloc in the 1960s was hugely significant in the development of a 
human rights regime that could hold individual states to account.54 It was 
not the diminishing power of nationalism that marked anti- apartheid in 
the late 1960s but the burgeoning agency of the Third World nation state.
In 1966 the twenty- first session of the UN General Assembly had 
approved the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Dismissed as ‘something of a curiosity’ by some contemporary 
observers, Third World and Eastern bloc states welcomed it as a shift in 
the balance of human rights from individuals to nations.55 Together, the 
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Covenant and the Tehran Conference define a moment at which postco-
lonial and non- aligned states had come to dominate the UN human rights 
agenda, while Western commentators remained squeamish about con-
temporary ‘rights talk’.56 Some of the strongest advocates of this ‘adjust-
ment’ of the principles of human rights were the heads of regimes that 
equated social and economic rights with the success of state- directed 
policies of development and modernization.57 In the late 1960s it seemed 
that individualistic definitions of human rights were in abeyance, and 
political rights were deprecated in favour of a renewed focus on eco-
nomic development.58 This shift of focus from personal, political rights 
and freedoms to social and economic rights distinguished the UN debates 
of 1968 from the discussions, over a decade earlier, at Bandung, where – 
despite the efforts of Communist states – social and economic rights had 
been integrated alongside, rather than promoted above, more individu-
alistic conceptions of freedom.59
By the late 1960s a distinctive Third World view, with an emphasis 
upon shared histories of colonization and attendant economic weakness, 
had come to mark debates around human rights. Western activists were, 
it seemed, prepared to adjust their own campaigns to suit the prevail-
ing model of rights thinking, as shown when the IDAF and WCRSAPP 
engaged in UN forums. Indeed, the emphasis on social and economic 
rights seemed to present no barrier to those who had earlier argued that 
colonialism and apartheid were primarily repugnant due to their denial 
of individual rights. In February 1968 an editorial in Africa Digest noted 
the ongoing efforts to persuade governments to align their laws to the 
principles of the Universal Declaration, but acknowledged that very real 
economic and political constraints had made African states ‘cautious in 
committing themselves on Human Rights’.60 In particular, it noted that 
obligations towards refugees had been difficult to fully honour in the con-
text of the population displacement that had resulted during the process 
of decolonization; indeed, by the mid- 1970s Africa could be regarded as 
‘the continent of refugees’.61 In this context, new definitions of human 
rights were beginning to emerge in postcolonial political discourse, 
shaped more by the contingencies associated with the process of decolo-
nization than by any formal transfer of power.
But economic conditions could also become a point of reference 
for rights claims in themselves. Quoting from article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration, dealing with the ‘right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well- being of himself and his family’, the Africa digest 
editorial called for new thinking and ‘greater generosity’ in Western aid 
programmes. At a stroke, development could thus be cast as a human 
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rights campaign, states could be conceived as rights- holders, and the 
responsibility for action returned to the former colonial power. This line 
of thought had precursors in the concerns over ‘neocolonialism’ that 
had emerged in Third World thinking at the end of the 1950s, and had 
been picked up by Western campaigners thereafter. In 1962 the anti- 
apartheid activist Michael Scott had told the UN Special Commission on 
Colonialism that a peaceful transition to a postcolonial world was bound 
up with struggles against ‘injustice and tyranny and unnecessary pov-
erty and deprivation of rights’.62 By the latter part of the 1960s, however, 
African officials, such as Ibrahima Boye, the Senegalese secretary of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, were beginning to suggest that eco-
nomic development was a more pressing issue for Africans than Western 
concepts of ‘fundamental rights’.63
Away from global institutions, the focus on economic  development 
fostered a new, materialist strand of Western humanitarian discourse 
with an emphasis on the capacity of Third World states to deliver eco-
nomic and social progress, particularly in postcolonial Africa. Beyond 
the rights advocacy of the AAM, this represented a parallel but distinct 
grass- roots movement growing out of NGOs engaged specifically in 
issues of development. In January 1968 a group of individuals associ-
ated with organizations such as Oxfam and Christian Aid came together 
to articulate their sense of an emerging crisis in the so- called ‘developing 
world’, subsequently published as the ‘Haslemere Declaration’.64 This 
group bridged the transition from rights as an individual issue (as repre-
sented by the WCRSAPP and AAM) to a focus on the nation as guarantor 
of rights, emerging from the postcolonial debates of the United Nations. 
On the surface, rights talk was absent from the Declaration:  political 
and economic independence and self- determination were highlighted 
as intimately linked to the eradication of ‘human suffering and depri-
vation’, but no attempt was made to suggest that such suffering was a 
betrayal of any universal standards.65 Rather than viewing Third World 
poverty as a breach of rights in itself, the Haslemere Declaration saw 
impoverishment as a symptom of an exploitative system that threat-
ened Western civilization:  ‘[A] system that can no longer respond to 
the individual abroad will deny human rights to those at home.’66
The Haslemere Declaration was intended to be a programme of 
practical measures to rebalance what its authors perceived to be the une-
qual and exploitative frameworks of international trade and economic 
relations. While it did not rely on references to fundamental and univer-
sal values or rights, it was evidently influenced by contemporary attempts 
to reframe the parameters of debate around development, trade and 
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aid, such as the Algiers Charter of Economic Rights for the Third World, 
drafted at the first meeting of the Group of 77 ministers in October 1967, 
and the Arusha Declaration, announced by the Tanzanian president, 
Julius Nyerere, in February the same year. The Arusha Declaration was 
explicitly referenced by the Haslemere Group as something that should 
be supported by developed nations, which ‘should welcome and sympa-
thise with attempts to create societies different from their own’.67 As Moyn 
has noted, however, the Arusha Declaration, although cast within the 
moral framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, made 
only minor reference to the ‘dignity of the individual’ and certainly did 
not position human rights as any kind of universal code regulating the 
behaviour of states.68 Nevertheless, the Haslemere Declaration signalled, 
as did the 1968 Africa Digest editorial, that formerly colonized nations 
might construe social and economic development as a right in itself.
Economic inequality could, moreover, be positioned as a continu-
ing form of personal oppression that drew formerly colonized peoples, 
alongside subaltern and deprived groups elsewhere, into humanitarian 
discussions with a global focus. In March 1969 the Haslemere Group 
announced plans to hold a convention on Third World poverty at the 
Roundhouse in London, the spiritual home of 1960s radical intellectual-
ism. The organizers of the ‘Poverty is violence’ conference invited speak-
ers who they perceived to be ‘representatives of the Third World’, who 
included the Anglican bishop and anti- apartheid campaigner Trevor 
Huddleston, the Black Panther leader Bobby Seale and the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Hélder Câmara. It was 
the latter’s contribution that was, perhaps, the most significant, in that 
it elaborated a cyclical relationship between the ‘violence’ of structural 
social and economic inequality, violent revolt on the part of the oppressed 
and violent authoritarian repression.69 Câmara, in his subsequent full- 
length treatise on poverty and violence, acknowledged the difficulties 
faced when seeking to make connections between material structures 
and principles of rights: ‘It is not done’, he noted, ‘to talk too much about 
justice, rights, structural changes.’70 The extent to which Câmara and the 
Haslemere Group were consciously seeking to embed campaigns around 
material inequalities within a discourse of rights is not clear; this was, 
arguably, the language of what Michael Barnett has called ‘alchemical 
humanitarianism’, rather than human rights.71 But these interventions 
illustrate the extent to which the language of rights could be remoulded 
in the light of the unfinished business of decolonization, with an empha-
sis on the social and economic, in contrast to the fundamental political, 
and individual, aspects of the 1948 Universal Declaration.
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In the wake of the Roundhouse convention, AAM activist Robert 
Hutchinson proposed a ‘Haslemere- style’ campaign focused on south-
ern Africa. He argued that ‘British capitalism [was] buttressing the rac-
ist regimes of southern Africa and collaborating with those regimes to 
exploit and dehumanise the (mainly) African workers’, and called for 
‘publicity and direct action’ against the British businesses involved.72 
Early in 1970 the Haslemere Group launched a targeted campaign 
against Barclays Bank, centred on the public condemnation of its invest-
ments and activities in South Africa.73 The Barclays protest campaign, 
with its emphasis on individual direct action, was timed to exploit the 
public interest that had been aroused by the distinctive ‘Stop the sev-
enty tour’ campaign against sporting connections with South Africa – an 
action that has been seen as revitalizing the anti- apartheid movement 
in Britain, effectively exploiting the repertoire of 1960s radical politics 
in the cause of anti- racism and human rights.74 Human rights had long 
been equated with civil liberties in British political discourse, but the 
connection between civil rights and anti- racism suggests the domesti-
cation of central tenets of anti- colonial and anti- apartheid campaigns.
In a striking example of this impact, the Huddersfield ‘Stop the 
seventy tour’ campaigners announced in July 1970 that they would 
continue as a ‘human rights’ group, given the success of their cam-
paign. They set up an anti- racist education campaign and provided 
practical advice on civil liberties issues, symbolically connecting the 
legacy of advocacy groups such as the WCRSAPP into the materialist 
discourse on human rights that had emerged in response to the ongo-
ing decolonization process.75 While the experience of one regional 
group of activists cannot be considered generalizable, there is a sense 
in which this shift of emphasis was representative of the trajectory of 
human rights activism in Britain in the early 1970s. That human rights 
were equated with civil liberties reflected a long and continuing trend 
in British political discourse. The practical focus on anti- racism sug-
gests a domestication of the central tenets of anti- colonial and anti- 
apartheid campaigns, precipitating a shift of emphasis towards racial 
tension within postcolonial Britain. Looking at how campaigns about 
the Rivonia Trials, UN conferences on sovereignty and changing atti-
tudes to humanitarianism among NGOs all percolated down to this 
group of anti- apartheid activists in West Yorkshire helps to draw out 
the entangled histories of human rights and decolonization. Human 
rights constitute a fluid and flexible discourse, continually subject to 
historical contingencies; during the 1960s the process of decoloniza-
tion was a primary factor in shaping the definition of ‘rights talk’.
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Conclusions
The process of decolonization was critical for the development of human 
rights in the post- war period. By the end of the 1960s freedom from 
colonialism was understood as a self- evident necessity, underpinned 
by the most fundamental ‘right’ of self- determination. The conflation 
of human rights and sovereignty by anti- colonial movements seemingly 
generated anxiety as much as hope, as the call to ‘seek ye first the 
political kingdom’ was gradually recognized as a slim guarantee of 
human rights in the broader sense.76 Nevertheless, the call for ‘rights’ in 
the anti- colonial movements of the 1960s became more than a straight-
forward exposition of the right to self- determination. The notion of 
human rights underwent a form of mitosis, with distinct and divergent 
discourses of Third World ‘rights’ emerging, including the strong (and 
troubling) sense that the postcolonial state could be conceptualized as a 
rights- holder. ‘Grass- roots’ forms of human rights advocacy, exemplified 
by movements such as Amnesty International, had focused on the 
rights of the individual, and legal protections of those rights, through 
asylum, freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and adherence to due 
legal process, but Third World governments began to claim the ‘right’ 
to social and economic development, reframing the development state 
as the primary agent of human rights. Western activists, nevertheless, 
continued to place the protection of the individual human at the centre 
of human rights discourse. It is significant that one key strand of Western 
anti- apartheid solidarity, embodied in IDAF, framed its campaign in 
support of South African liberation movements around concerns for the 
rights and well- being of individuals, and sustained its work through a 
network of anonymous mediators.
Decolonization also shaped the terrain upon which the concerns 
of Western anti- apartheid activists were played out, however. The 
unmaking of the colonial world meant that those networks and rela-
tionships that had fostered anti- colonial struggles for independence 
became transnational, both functionally and ideologically. In func-
tional terms, supranational institutions such as the United Nations 
and the Organisation of African Unity provided transnational spaces in 
which anti- apartheid activism was enacted; in ideological terms, how-
ever, these same institutions, led by representatives of former African 
and Asian colonial territories, fostered the development of an instru-
mentalist view of human rights. During the 1960s apartheid emerged 
as a central focus of concern at key international forums (well beyond 
the dysfunctional debate in Tehran), in which anti- racism and human 
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rights helped to stabilize ‘decolonization at the international level’.77 
For international anti- apartheid activists, ‘solidarity’, which had ini-
tially connoted a more straightforward advocacy of fundamental prin-
ciples of sovereign rights, had come to be set within the framework 
of Cold War geopolitics and ‘neocolonial’ relations within the world 
economy. In this context, human rights – defined in terms of social and 
economic rights – became a way of framing debates around develop-
ment and neocolonialism. The Haslemere Group thus exemplified early 
steps towards a critique of the structural inequalities of the decolo-
nized world, and demonstrated how the debate had taken shape, from 
West Yorkshire to the ‘Third World’.
Human rights, as an ‘empty vessel’ into which all manner of 
ideas and concepts could be poured, was an obvious choice of dis-
cursive framework for Western activists seeking to reconfigure their 
own agendas in the light of the transition to independence in Africa. 
At the same time, apartheid had become one of the primary issues 
around which human rights campaigns came to be defined. Human 
rights discourse was instrumental in shaping anti- apartheid activism 
in the 1960s, but, equally importantly, apartheid was a critical point 
of reference that shaped the parameters of human rights discourse at 
local and global levels. Above all, the unresolved question of apartheid 
served as a reminder that the process of decolonization was ambigu-
ous and incomplete. Even when the nation state had emerged as the 
single possibility for postcolonial independence, decolonization con-
tinued to exist as a process of becoming, marked not by its possibilities 
but by its limitations. The ongoing existence of colonialism and apart-
heid in southern Africa was a constant reminder that Africans’ experi-
ences of independence were contingent upon their place in the world. 
Apartheid was both metaphor for, and lived experience of, African 
dependency.
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‘A worthwhile career for a man who 
is not entirely self- seeking’: service, 
duty and the Colonial Service during 
decolonization
Chris Jeppesen
Writing in 1955, Kenneth Bradley, a former district officer in Northern 
Rhodesia and then director of the Commonwealth Institute, ended the 
updated edition of his Colonial Service recruitment pamphlet, A career in 
the Oversea Civil Service, with these words:
If you agree with me that the Commonwealth and Empire are our 
proudest heritage, and that to serve the Colonial peoples is the 
greatest privilege and the finest opportunity for practical, construc-
tive and selfless service to humanity which you are ever likely to be 
offered, then for you this may be only THE BEGINNING…1
In so doing, Bradley evoked the core quality of idealistic service, which 
for him stood at the heart of Colonial Service identity and mission. This 
updated version of the ‘white man’s burden’, repackaged for a post- war 
audience, continued to draw upon many of the entrenched tropes within 
Colonial Service lore. Duty and sacrifice in the service of others had 
been proclaimed the driving force behind colonial careers since the late 
nineteenth century, and widely celebrated as such in popular depictions 
of empire throughout British culture.2 The image fostered of benign and 
beneficent colonial rule had always found enthusiastic support among 
the upper middle classes, who had dominated professional careers across 
empire since the late nineteenth century.3 Bradley hoped that by stressing 
the enduring importance of these qualities, even as the structures of the 
British empire fundamentally altered, he could inspire a new generation 
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to take up this ‘historic duty’ and complete the vaunted journey towards 
colonial self- government in a multiracial Commonwealth.
This edition, revised from the original 1950 version, The Colonial 
Service as a career, did indeed highlight important changes in the ambi-
tion and character of colonial rule in the post- war empire.4 Gone were 
images celebrating the district officer (DO) as the embodiment of colo-
nial authority, replaced instead with photos illustrating partnership 
and equality between British officials and indigenous people. In a tidy 
metaphor for broader changes, a chapter entitled ‘Empire building’ had 
been renamed ‘Nation building’, and it stressed that progress towards 
the Commonwealth was now the fundamental objective of colonial rule. 
While those who responded to Bradley’s rallying call would find that 
‘the beginning’ proved far nearer to the end than anyone suspected in 
the mid- 1950s, it is clear from the testimonies of many Colonial Service 
recruits in the final years of empire that his words still resonated.5 In 
1960 alone, the same year as Nigerian independence and a year before 
three more colonial territories followed suit, the Colonial Service made 
816 new appointments to all departments across Africa, to add to the 
18,000 colonial officials still serving in empire.6
Yet Bradley’s pamphlet served a more instrumental purpose than a 
self- congratulatory celebration of selfless service and colonial progress. 
Despite the declarations of Colonial Office recruiters and retired gran-
dees, colonial officers, unsurprisingly, were never motivated by altruistic 
sentiment alone. Throughout the Colonial Service’s lifespan, the appeal 
of careers in empire rested upon a competing mix of utopian idealism and 
narcissistic egoism. Adventure, power, status and prospects were always 
as important to colonial careers as any impulse to service.7 Concerned at 
sharply falling application rates across the 1950s, the Colonial Office first 
approached Bradley to produce an ‘inspirational’ piece of propaganda 
to convince sixth formers and undergraduates that meaningful career 
opportunities were still on offer.8 Ultimately, his reassurances had little 
effect. By the end of the decade the Colonial Service could fill just over 
half the available positions each year. Once the career had forfeited its 
security, the Service laboured to sustain its recruitment cycle among its 
traditional audience. In spite of the not insignificant number of appoint-
ments, it appears that, for the majority of elite young Britons in the 
1950s, empire became less important sentimentally precisely because it 
became less rewarding materially.9
It does not follow, however, that this group simply turned inwards as 
the empire started to be dismantled. Instead, they sought out new oppor-
tunities beyond the framework of the colonial state that would allow 
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them to experience life in decolonizing territories. It is no  coincidence 
that the end of a Colonial Service career coincided with the emergence of 
overseas voluntary organizations, nor that, as applications fell, the num-
bers employed in private commerce or development initiatives increased. 
At first glance, these appear to highlight a rupture in the dominant ideas 
of service and duty, with the old guard’s outdated appeal marginalized in 
favour of a new ‘modern humanitarianism’.10 Yet this perspective omits 
important strands of entanglement that ran between the colonial state 
and new forms of postcolonial overseas engagement. Even as many vol-
untary and development organizations very deliberately sought to distin-
guish themselves from the preceding colonial regime, they nonetheless 
approximated the vocabulary of service, and drew upon organizational 
associations that had been integral to a Colonial Service career.11 
Opportunities that at first glance seem to have disappeared with the 
end of Colonial Service recruitment survived well into the postcolonial 
period, but came to be articulated in new and innovative terms to ensure 
relevance for a generation that did not hold Britain’s colonial connection 
as timeless.
Until relatively recently, accounts of British decolonization have 
paid little attention to how the end of empire reconfigured metropolitan 
culture and, in turn, was itself shaped by currents of domestic change. 
On the one hand, while imperial historians have unpicked every minute 
detail of successive governments’ colonial policy, only rarely have they 
situated the arena of high policy within a wider popular context.12 On the 
other, historians of post- 1945 British history have been equally reluctant 
to incorporate wider global perspectives into their accounts of domes-
tic social change. In explaining the profound transformations that fol-
lowed the Second World War, accounts tend to emphasize the creation 
of the welfare state as the driving force behind the democratization and 
modernization of British society in the late twentieth century. When the 
empire does appear, it tends to be either as an anachronistic remnant 
of atrophying social hierarchies or else a costly burden that determined 
national decline.13
Efforts to move beyond these narrow parameters have delivered 
rich results. Since the 1980s the new imperial histories have escaped 
the realm of high policy to demonstrate how Britain’s possession of a 
global empire profoundly reconfigured domestic culture and ideas of 
Britishness.14 By collapsing the entrenched binary of metropole and 
periphery to consider ‘home’ and ‘away’ as mutually constituted, this 
scholarship has charted how popular conceptions of race, gender, class 
and nation were transformed through encounters in empire and, in turn, 
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shaped the relationships between local people and Britons living and 
working across imperial territories.15 Even so, until the last decade the 
principal focus of these studies tended to extend backwards from the early 
twentieth century, thus giving little account to the period of decoloniza-
tion. Happily, this historiographical neglect has started to be redressed 
through a series of groundbreaking studies that bring together the histo-
ries of the post- war and postcolonial/ imperial.16 This has allowed histo-
rians of post- 1945 Britain to begin to map, in Jordanna Bailkin’s elegant 
formulation, ‘the afterlives of empire’, revealing a complex mixture of 
continuities, dislocations and reconfigurations within decolonization’s 
enduring imprint on metropolitan culture.17
The application of these approaches to studies of the Colonial 
Service has moved more slowly. During and beyond the lifespan of 
empire a wide literature has proliferated on its institutional frameworks, 
demographic profile and role in colonial administration; rarely does this 
corpus satisfactorily capture the Service’s place within metropolitan cul-
ture during the period of decolonization, however.18 Recent analyses of 
the ideological and cultural dynamics of the imperial civil services have 
delivered enlivening results, but these tend to focus on the period before 
1939.19 Long- established research traditions among scholars of African 
history have done much to reveal the limits of colonial authority in the 
field, the often insuperable gap between metropolitan expectations and 
local realities, and the racialized, gendered nature of colonial govern-
ance.20 Entirely understandably, however, the focus on African contexts 
means that it is not always immediately clear how such perspectives con-
nect to changing conditions in Britain. Larry Butler and Sarah Stockwell’s 
recent edited volume on Macmillan’s ‘wind of change speech’ refresh-
ingly demonstrates the possibilities for fresh insight offered by explor-
ing more carefully the ideational relationship between high policy and 
popular reception, and metropolitan rhetoric and its reception in African 
territories.21
To borrow and adapt Martin Shipway’s formulation, by triangulat-
ing our view of the Colonial Service during the period of late colonial 
shift to capture the relationship between official policy, attitudes among 
serving officers and the Service’s position within wider British culture, 
we gain a more textured picture of the workings – and failings – of the 
late colonial state, as well as how decolonization impacted domesti-
cally.22 In so doing, the continuities and ruptures that emerged as British 
society adjusted to the loss of empire are brought into sharper relief.23 
As Elizabeth Buettner has recently shown, the transformative effects of 
decolonization resonated as strongly and deeply in Britain as they did in 
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newly independent African states.24 By considering post- war British his-
tory within a transnational framework, and the history of decolonization 
as an important element within post- 1945 British history, we can better 
capture how the end of empire created new possibilities for Britons to 
engage with the wider world, just as it closed off others.25
To trace these ruptures and entanglements, this chapter examines 
the Colonial Service’s 1950s recruitment crisis to explore why relatively 
few responded to Bradley’s entreaties. It begins by focusing upon the role 
and ethos of the Colonial Service after 1945. Drawing upon previously 
underused recruitment literature, Colonial Office interview and training 
reports, as well as retrospective accounts written by former colonial offi-
cials, I explore how ideas of service and duty were understood within the 
Service. Until the end of recruitment these remained conditioned upon 
assumptions of class and gender, which determined who was deemed 
suitable to exercise authority during the late empire. What emerges are a 
series of contradictions that went to the heart of Colonial Service identity 
and that made a colonial career appear increasingly anachronistic in the 
context of late 1950s Britain.
Stepping back from the specifics of Colonial Service recruitment, 
the second half of the chapter situates a colonial career within the 
broader cultural landscape of 1950s Britain to examine how changing 
ideas of service and duty among Britain’s social elite meant that fewer 
and fewer were convinced the empire offered a meaningful, or attrac-
tive, career option. The chapter concludes by briefly considering one 
alternative way in which young Britons embarked upon service overseas. 
Overseas voluntary organizations, principal among which was Voluntary 
Service Overseas (VSO), helped to fill the void left by the end of a Colonial 
Service career, but in so doing relied upon networks and institutional 
entanglements forged during the final decade of the colonial project.
A gentlemanly service? The Colonial  
Service after 1945
If the growing size of the Colonial Service is anything to judge by, even 
in the late 1950s few British officials had any inkling as to the strength 
of the wind about to blow through Africa. Throughout the twentieth 
century the Colonial Service remained the bureaucratic backbone of 
British colonial authority, and, as such, an integral part of the colonial 
state.26 In the aftermath of the Second World War it underwent unprece-
dented expansion in both size and ambition as the Colonial Office sought 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
britAin,  FrAnCE And thE dEColonizAtion oF AFriCA138
138
to realize its revised mission, announced in 1943 by the Conservative 
Secretary of State for the colonies, Oliver Stanley, to guide ‘Colonial 
peoples along the road to self- government within the framework of the 
British Empire’ through partnership, progress and development.27 This 
policy gained new scope, impetus and, most importantly, funding under 
the post- war Labour government.28 With the arrival of Arthur Creech 
Jones at the Colonial Office in 1946, the old orthodoxies of indirect rule 
and trusteeship stood ready to be swept aside through a vast, transforma-
tive developmental initiative.29
Characterized by John Lonsdale as ‘the second colonial occupa-
tion’, the Colonial Service expanded from some 7,000 European offic-
ers in 1936 (of a total cadre of 200,000) to 11,000 in 1947 (of 300,000) 
and to 18,000 in 1956.30 Across an increasingly diverse range of fields, 
the Service sought to harness technocratic expertise to facilitate the eco-
nomic, material, political and civic development of colonial societies in 
preparation for self- government.31 Unsurprisingly, this change of empha-
sis was never intended as a purely altruistic act to precipitate the steady 
winding down of colonial power.32 Rather, colonial development offered 
a means to salvage the reputation of colonialism in the face of growing 
international criticism and Cold War pressure, as well as to boost Britain’s 
stuttering economy in the aftermath of the war. Few policy- makers or 
officials saw a fundamental contradiction in these aims, confident that 
British expertise could bring material progress both at home and across 
empire.
Before 1939, and in the immediate aftermath of the war, Sir Ralph 
Furse dominated recruitment to all branches. He had worked in the 
Colonial Office since 1910 and served as director of recruitment from 
1931 to 1948. After the First World War Furse’s concern that the Colonial 
Service’s reputation compared badly to the Indian Civil Service and 
Sudan Political Service drove him to raise its profile among the group 
whose applications he most coveted, the upper middle- class gentleman. 
To attract applicants, he relied upon a close network of public school and 
Oxbridge talent spotters to flag up likely candidates, followed by a per-
sonal interview at the Colonial Office.33 This ensured a large degree of 
homogeneity in the type of individual who applied, as well as offering 
Furse the opportunity to probe ‘the imponderables of character’.34
Furse’s ideal colonial official, and DO in particular, fitted a clear 
mould: educated at public school and Oxbridge, preferably with a fam-
ily member who had served overseas, physically fit and good all- round 
‘officer material’. This ensured that the Colonial Service’s institutional 
ethos aligned with the core values of the English gentleman: amateur, 
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sporty, self- controlled and, broadly, conservative in outlook. To critics, 
this list translated as incompetent, unintelligent, sexually repressed and 
reactionary. Until the mid- 1950s, though, the figure of the gentleman 
not only received wide public acclaim but was considered by many com-
mentators to be the epitome of Englishness.35 Central to gentlemen’s 
claim to constitute a natural ruling elite, at home and in empire, was 
a discourse of service and duty. Since the mid- nineteenth century this 
had oriented around the patriotic constellation of Crown, nation and 
empire.36 Nebulous qualities of character and a spirit of fair play, learnt 
on the sports pitches of school and college, made the gentleman a duti-
ful defender of the underdog (or peasant African) but also imparted the 
moral courage required to ensure unflinching resolve in his duty to uphold 
British prestige.37 Of course, this ideal rarely translated into reality, but 
that should not detract from its influence on Furse’s vision for the type of 
man he believed should stand as the bedrock of the British empire.38 Even 
among those who had not attended a public school, of whom there were 
more after 1945, this remained the proclaimed archetype towards which 
to aspire.39 Furse’s vision found affirmation in print, and subsequently 
on screen, where the DO was typically conjured as bronzed, taciturn and 
morally steadfast. Clad in pristine white, khaki safari suit and pith hel-
met, to audiences across Britain these figures became the embodiment of 
British colonial power.40
Sabine Clarke has rightly observed that this stereotype’s enduring 
traction has too often blinded historians to the growing diversity of the 
Colonial Service after 1945.41 In probing beneath the Colonial Service’s 
much- proclaimed esprit de corps, Christopher Prior reveals a richer array 
of opinions and characters than the uniformity so celebrated in hindsight 
suggests.42 Rapid expansion after 1945 led to a greater mix of backgrounds 
among recruits. This was particularly true in the technical services, but 
also affected the profile of the Colonial Administrative Service (CAS). In 
contrast to the 1930s, when 77 per cent of recruits came from schools 
belonging to the Headmasters’ Conference, between 1947 and 1956 this 
proportion dropped to 57 per cent. Among agricultural scholars, the 
split was almost equal. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
also important to stress the impact of the huge increase in the number of 
women appointed after 1945, an area that requires further attention.43
Change was slow, however. For much of the 1950s those in senior 
positions were members of the CAS appointed by Furse, who often found 
it difficult to reconcile their own experience in the colonies with the new 
expectations being articulated in London after the Second World War. 
This created a tension that went to the heart of the Colonial Service’s 
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identity: it could embrace the new technocratic agenda but, in so doing, 
diminish the role of the CAS; or it could resist London’s modernizing 
proclamations, to reassert the traditional authority of the DO, who knew 
best his district and what his Africans most needed.44 The result was an 
unhappy compromise that satisfied few.
Resistant modernizers: Colonial Service  
recruitment during the 1950s
As the 1950s progressed, the Colonial Office took care to present a 
modernizing and progressive empire, not as a crutch to fading British power 
but of service to humanity at large. Yet it still stressed a sense of duty and 
sacrifice, embedded in upper middle- class identity.45 In preparation for a 
recruitment lecture at Cambridge in 1952 entitled ‘The Colonial Service: my 
job’, the organizer suggested:  ‘The general theme might well be: a life of 
difficulties, frequent disappointment and uphill work amidst environments 
which are often unfavourable, but offering a challenge which we, as a 
Nation, are called upon to meet, and a job which is infinitely worthwhile.’46 
Even more forthrightly, a 1955 recruitment poster pronounced it ‘a 
worthwhile career for a man who is not entirely self- seeking’.47 A declared 
commitment to the (exceedingly) steady progress towards a multiracial 
Commonwealth ensured that such pronouncements carried a distinctive 
inflection compared to those made a generation earlier.
Recruitment publicity echoed this point. Bradley was not alone in 
adopting typically Whiggish tones to remind potential applicants that 
they were just as beholden to ensure the successful transformation of 
empire into a multiracial Commonwealth as their predecessors had been 
to ‘build’ it in the first place. A 1956 report outlining how serving officers 
should approach recruitment lectures at schools stressed:
The vital point is that men are still wanted and there is a job to be 
done which is worth doing. There may be risks attached to it, and 
there are few jobs worth having which are entirely without risks, 
but there are opportunities also and above all the opportunity of 
assisting, not as some would have it, in the closing down of the colo-
nies but in the development of the Commonwealth.48
The Colonial Office’s message was clear: while the basic role of a colonial 
officer might be changing, this did not mean that the transition to self- 
government should endanger long- term career prospects.
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Pre- deployment training was remodelled so as better to prepare 
officers for the challenges of managing a ‘modern empire’. Lectures in 
economics, anthropology and history stressed that colonial peoples were 
not ‘primitive’ or ‘backward’ but ‘underdeveloped’ and that recruits’ pri-
mary role would be to assist in the development of colonial societies.49 
All officers, regardless of which branch they served in, were expected 
to bring expertise that would further this process and should expect to 
work alongside educated Africans in preparation for self- government. 
Contemporary and retrospective accounts testify that this message 
started to resonate among recruits. Although this was often conditioned 
on the assumption that self- government remained some years off  – a 
sense always corroborated by senior officers – a growing number stressed 
their desire to undertake ‘worthwhile service’ in helping indigenous peo-
ple to ‘run their own affairs’ or assist in the development of ‘emergent 
nations’.50
Recruiters envisaged this spirit of friendship and progress forming 
the basis of relations between colonial officers and local people. After 
1945 the Colonial Office showed itself well aware of the need to tackle 
the instinctive racism underpinning many of the axioms of trusteeship 
and indirect rule.51 Although this did nothing to curtail the racialized vio-
lence that often characterized the run- up to independence, nor challenge 
entrenched views among senior officers or white settler communities 
in Africa, it did lead to greater scrutiny of applicants’ attitudes to race. 
Recruiters and training supervisors were quick to praise those recruits 
with ‘progressive’ attitudes. Many training reports recorded with satisfac-
tion efforts by cadets to surmount racial divisions by cultivating friend-
ships with African students or locally recruited cadets also on the course. 
These attitudes, recruiters believed, were vital to securing the bonds of 
intimacy required to bind the Commonwealth together in perpetuity.
Yet, even as public proclamations suggested a changing dynamic, 
entrenched attitudes among serving officers undermined efforts to con-
nect with a younger generation. For all the talk of a new technocratic era, 
the Colonial Service never fully embraced the post- war agenda. Senior 
officers, almost all of whom had risen through the ranks of the district 
administration, remained loath to surrender the DO’s pre- eminence in 
favour of a new technocratic elite, believing that technical expertise or 
knowledge of Africa still mattered less than character and conditioning. 
Recruiters consistently reaffirmed their enduring faith in the solid over 
the spectacular, championing the ‘dependable’, ‘hard- working’, ‘well- 
mannered’ and ‘healthy’ all- rounder. While many recruits gained praise 
for their willingness to engage with the abstract problems of colonial 
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administration, this was always deemed a bonus rather than essential. 
‘Secretariat type’ remained loaded with sneering inference, just as ‘ideal 
bush officer’ carried high praise.
Appearance, as a mark of underlying character, had always carried 
great weight in assessing applicants, and this continued into the 1960s. 
Officers were expected to be outgoing and sporty and to exert an air of 
effortless authority. Those who cultivated a less fastidious appearance 
or lacked the confidence and poise of the public school prefect or ‘officer 
type’ found it far harder to win the affirmation of recruiters. One under-
graduate who enquired as to the possibility of applying was cryptically 
dismissed as ‘might be arty and “international” ’, another as ‘[p] olitically 
minded  – doubtful’.52 This often went hand in hand with assumptions 
about class background and political inclination. One bearded grammar 
school recruit, who had also attended a redbrick university, was assessed 
by his interviewer:
I doubt…if he has been suitably realistic in considering whether the 
actual life and work is what would suit him; my feeling is that he 
may be rather given to facile enthusiasms rather than analysis and 
reflection… He is also a member of the United Nations Students 
Association and is very interested in work of this kind… I  would 
like to have seen him without his beard but nevertheless he appears 
quite civilised.53
Interviewers often assumed that applicants from ‘working- class 
backgrounds’ would have a ‘chip on their shoulder’, or worried that 
they might be angry young men with subversive views on empire. If 
they were appointed, it was stressed that they should be sent to a strict 
district commissioner to be ‘toughened up’.
Concerns over appearance acted as a proxy for deeper fears about 
whether those recruits who lacked the traditional conditioning would be 
able to cope with the realities of daily life as a DO or adapt to the social 
atmosphere of the colonies. In contrast, the ‘right kind of background’ 
frequently compensated for other deficiencies. Most sought after were 
those with family connections to overseas service. In recommending two 
candidates in 1950, the supervisor on the Cambridge training course, a 
former DO, observed: ‘X has all the background of family service and the 
sincerity of thought that we could desire… What I liked especially about 
these two was the absence of materialism in their idea of the Service 
as a career.’54 More importantly for many recruiters, these candidates 
were seen to bring a ‘grounded and realistic’ outlook to their job. These 
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apprehensions linked inextricably to the growing political uncertainty 
surrounding the colonial project. Many senior officers continued to see 
the maintenance of law and order as taking priority over unduly hasten-
ing the process towards self- government through citizenship or mass 
education schemes, and that required tough, level- headed young men, 
not ‘starry- eyed do- gooders’.55
Schoolmasters and college tutors remained well aware of these 
priorities. Echoing their interwar counterparts, referees highlighted out-
door interests, sports or an ‘adventurous spirit’, but moral leadership and 
honesty still counted for most.56 Indicative of the general tone is one col-
lege tutor’s reference for a public- school- and Cambridge- educated appli-
cant in 1960:
[H] e is not by any means brilliant academically. But on the other 
hand, he is a very charming man, full of the social graces and with 
a great mass of common sense. He is possibly the sort of man who 
can be described as ‘the salt of the earth’… I  think that he is the 
sort of man who, while not brilliant, would make a very steady and 
reliable administrator. He is scrupulously honest, kind and humble, 
and I take pleasure in recommending him for an appointment.57
While direct reference to an applicant’s ‘gentlemanly credentials’ gradually 
faded away, thinly veiled class inferences bubbled between the lines. ‘Salt 
of the earth’ evoked a modern gentleman of the meritocratic age, able 
to operate among all types of people but still defined by incontrovertible 
virtues of honesty, common sense and self- restraint.58
By tracing the efforts to attract new recruits during the post- war 
period we can begin to map the gap between the Colonial Service’s rhe-
torical positioning and what this meant in practice. Attempts to explain 
the Service’s role at the end of empire to a domestic audience exposed 
contradictions that went to the heart of the late colonial state. While a 
new inflection emphasized Commonwealth over empire, this endorse-
ment was never unconditional. Misgivings over the pace of change 
reflected senior officers’ resentment at having ‘their service’ overhauled 
by London bureaucrats. In this respect, the idea of ‘duty’ at the end of 
empire still accentuated patriotic and institutional obligations over the 
broader humanitarian emphasis that was starting to be heard more regu-
larly across wider British culture. Recruits had to understand that their 
role was to maintain order and implement the decisions of their senior 
officers, not to set off on a reforming crusade.59 As had always been the 
case, the call to ‘service’ remained demarcated by carefully bounded 
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limits. Many recruits chafed against these restrictions, but in the increas-
ingly turbulent atmosphere of late empire senior officers would not com-
promise hard- headed realism for idealistic sentiment.
Still a job to be done? Service, duty and  
British culture during decolonization
If the recourse to a ‘gentlemanly code’ had been intended to assuage 
fears among a traditional audience, it largely failed. Nor did it resonate 
loudly enough with the new meritocratic elite reaching adulthood 
in the era of universal secondary education and the welfare state. 
Frustratingly, records of rejected applicants no longer survive. Nor is 
it possible to establish with any clarity why an individual chose not 
to apply. Nonetheless, from the extant records, it seems clear that the 
Colonial Service’s institutional ethos not only determined the type of 
individual appointed but, just as significantly, heavily influenced who 
applied in the first place. As in many other areas of British culture after 
1945, ideas of service, duty and character took on a more democratic 
inflection, becoming less associated with noblesse oblige and more 
with service to humanity at large.60 For those considering their career 
options in the late 1950s, empire could still represent an exciting, exotic 
and idealistic outlet for ambitions that could not be realized in the 
restrictive climate of home.61 Even as the Colonial Office persisted with 
long- established recruitment strategies, appealing to their traditional 
audience, many individuals sought a colonial career for reasons far 
more nuanced than a straightforward commitment to Britain’s ongoing 
colonial status. When imagining the future career possibilities available 
in empire, many accepted that fundamental change was coming but 
also that the chance to play a part in that process, whatever it might 
involve, was a risk worth taking.
Colonial Office efforts were stepped up to reassure an increasingly 
sceptical audience of undergraduates, parents, school and university 
authorities alike that long- term, attractive career opportunities remained 
on offer.62 H. H. McCleery, supervisor on the Cambridge Colonial Service 
training course, noted that fears over job security held heavy sway over 
potential undergraduate applicants:  ‘My experience has been that they 
are chiefly afraid of the political uncertainty. A  man may have a keen 
sense of mission, and yet shrink from committing himself to a job which 
may turn bad on him while he is still in the early 30s…’63 Even at the 
very end of the decade, interviewers promised at least ten to fifteen 
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years’ service. While several recruits remember these assurances sound-
ing unrealistically optimistic at the time, they remained in line with gov-
ernment timetables for withdrawal from East Africa by the mid- 1970s.64 
Revealingly, the word ‘career’ was not removed from publicity posters 
until 1959, only three years before recruitment stopped, and even then 
the move sparked an angry response from senior officers fearful of the 
effect on applicants.65
Nevertheless, despite these efforts, recruitment rates continued to 
decline. The Colonial Service’s dependence upon networks rooted in a 
narrow social clique meant that peer and personal affirmation was fre-
quently crucial in directing individuals towards an application. Once 
parents, teachers and college tutors sensed a decline in career opportuni-
ties, or serving officers fed back negative criticism, the entire recruitment 
structure began to crumble. Similar problems had paralysed Indian Civil 
Service recruitment in the 1920s.66 By the mid- 1950s morale among 
serving officers was in sharp decline, leading to growing numbers of 
resignations and frustrated letters to British newspapers. Perhaps most 
damagingly, serving officers increasingly warned potential applicants, 
including their own children, not to apply.67 Recruitment talks at uni-
versities drew ever smaller audiences, and even then a significant pro-
portion attended in order to heckle over oppressive policies in Africa.68 
The university appointments boards confirmed mounting undergraduate 
reluctance to apply, and by the end of the decade declared themselves no 
longer prepared to promote the Colonial Service.69
Elite career patterns did undergo a noteworthy shift during the 
1950s. Full employment, and the gradual phasing out of national ser-
vice after 1957, allowed for a more relaxed attitude towards finding a 
career.70 Traditional service careers became less popular, with fewer 
entering the armed forces, clergy or civil services, while the number 
joining business or engineering firms grew significantly.71 Opportunities 
to fulfil such roles overseas proliferated, often promising better terms 
of service than those offered by the Colonial Service.72 Contract terms 
gave individuals welcome flexibility while allowing them to accrue expe-
rience that would only increase future employability. In contrast, many 
young colonial officers who joined the Service in the early 1950s with 
the expectation of a full career increasingly feared that their experience 
in empire would leave them poorly placed to find new employment in 
Britain only a decade later.73
In the post- war climate, professional competence and techno-
cratic expertise became the maxims of the new meritocracy; ability 
rather than conditioning would determine individual opportunity.74 
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Following the expansion of the grammar schools under the 1944 
Education Act, by the mid- 1950s a growing number from outside the 
upper middle class proceeded to higher education.75 Often labelled 
‘angry young men’ by those such as Colonial Service interviewers, 
this group built a mounting critique of the gentlemanly ruling elite 
in the early 1950s, which erupted into visceral hostility following the 
Suez Crisis. Voices from across the political spectrum lambasted and 
lampooned the gentlemanly creed as antediluvian and anachronis-
tic, without relevance to modern British life.76 The empire caste drew 
particular ire in these attacks, further fuelled by the series of ‘colo-
nial scandals’ that broke in the late 1950s.77 Certainly, some grammar 
school recruits found the Service’s institutional ethos infuriating. For 
Elwyn Thomas, agricultural officer turned novelist, the whole service 
could be scathingly dismissed as ‘middle class from top to bottom, an 
outlet for the minor public schoolman, with his home in the suburbs – 
the parson’s son, the axed army officer’s, using it as a ladder to improve 
himself socially, with its artificial air of gracious living and its milk- 
round of orders and decorations. And how they love it!’78 Nonetheless, 
it is important not to exaggerate a sense of rupture.79 As the changing 
profile of Colonial Service recruits after 1945 highlights, a significant 
number of grammar- school- educated and redbrick graduates gained 
appointments and went on to build successful careers across all colo-
nial territories. Problematically, however, they never applied in suffi-
cient numbers to satisfy demand, while at the same time public school 
applicants also started to dwindle.80
Far from being unresponsive to the destabilizing climate of decolo-
nization, the public schools’ ethos during the 1950s and 1960s reflected a 
carefully crafted compromise. Contrary to the picture of moribund inertia 
that characterizes many depictions after 1945, they successfully met the 
dual challenges posed by the breakdown of empire and rising social mobil-
ity. By the late 1950s the most forward- thinking (and financially secure) 
institutions acknowledged that, to retain significance in the changing edu-
cational landscape, they had to reappraise core elements of their ethos.81 
As they became less preoccupied with their role as nurseries of empire, so 
they placed less emphasis on a gentlemanly code of character, sport and 
manners.82 The focus fell instead on the need to retool elite young men 
to withstand emerging challenges at home, while seizing new overseas 
opportunities beyond the limits of empire. This did not entail the aban-
donment of their traditional values but, rather, their evolution to ensure 
relevance for a generation that did not take imperial status for granted and 
appeared intent on questioning the orthodoxies of their parents.83
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Imperial achievements remained enshrined within the fabric of 
school buildings and traditions while leadership and character were 
preserved as core qualities, and it remained expected that ambition 
should lead public school boys to positions of power and influence. Yet 
little overt mention of colonial affairs appeared in the day- to- day culture 
of the schools, while an ambivalent shrug rather than any great outcry 
greeted decolonization. Time- honoured summons to imperial duty were 
dismissed with growing irreverence; The Monmouthian reported face-
tiously, in 1954, that one Colonial Service recruit was currently undergo-
ing training ‘to be a better bearer of the white man’s burden’.84 Debates 
on imperial controversies barely surfaced but, when they did, tended to 
endorse moves towards a Commonwealth of nations.85 School magazines 
reported virtually nothing on colonial crises, while reports from old boys 
living overseas became an increasing rarity. Although the Colonial Office 
remained committed to sending the occasional speaker to talk on Colonial 
Service careers, so did many other organizations looking to attract public 
school recruits. School culture never lost its tone of reactionary, nostalgic 
conservatism, but when pupils became animated their focus was invari-
ably domestic. Censorship, university access, sexual morals, the position 
of the public schools in the education system or class more generally all 
received and provoked far greater interest than the end of empire.86
Headmasters sought to prepare young men for a post- imperial 
future with greater competition from across society. Boys were still 
wholeheartedly encouraged to retain broad horizons and to view the 
world as an open field of opportunity; the end of empire did not mean 
that Britain’s global role was over, and certainly should not, as one head-
master warned, predicate a retreat into a parochial ‘tending of his own 
back garden’.87 Yet the fact that these would not be within the nexus of 
empire was not something to be lamented.88 Luminaries at speech days 
acknowledged that the empire project was changing but saw this as 
something to celebrate. This did not mean a cleavage with older tradi-
tions but, rather, their natural evolution into future triumphs. Returning 
to his old school, Haileybury, in 1957, Clement Attlee, Labour prime min-
ister from 1945 to 1951, was careful to make this point:
The old imperialism which flourished when I was here has changed 
its character and now we have a great Commonwealth of Nations – 
and I believe that the old Haileyburians of the East India College 
would have seen that as the fruition and not the frustration of its 
work. But it certainly does not mean that there is no need now for 
people to go out to the ends of the earth. There is that need. It is 
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just as great as ever, although sometimes the work to be done is 
on rather a different plane – not so much ordering people about as 
co- operating – and I believe we shall still find Old- Haileyburians all 
over the world.89
The message was clear. For a new generation of elite schoolboys, 
just as eager as their predecessors had been to experience and exploit 
opportunities across the globe, the end of empire did not have to neces-
sitate the abandonment of personal ambition. Rather, it merely required 
an adjustment of attitude and new emphasis on humanity rather than 
empire.90
VSO: from ageing service to young man’s challenge
The Colonial Office never wavered in its promise of a career offering enter-
prising young people variety, a sense of service and adventure. These 
attractions did not evaporate upon the climax of empire, nor did schools 
cease to produce the type of character who had formed the mainstay of 
recruits throughout the twentieth century. So, what openings emerged 
to replace the void left by the disappearance of a career in empire? The 
late 1950s saw a blossoming of a student volunteer movement, which 
included growing numbers volunteering overseas.91 While this reflected 
a wider global trend, the origins of Britain’s largest overseas volunteer 
organization, VSO, demonstrated especially close links to the late 
colonial state.92 This is not to suggest that volunteer schemes were based 
upon a desire to perpetuate colonialism, though some levelled these 
criticisms at the time. Nonetheless, as Jordanna Bailkin’s recent portrait 
of VSO deftly sketches, its founding ideology drew upon long- established 
themes within the Colonial Service’s recruitment message but sought 
to reconfigure these in order to energize a new generation of Britons 
to undertake service overseas.93 It is within this process of evolution 
and realignment – of which VSO offers one glimpse – that we can start 
to explore the entanglements that shaped the cultural landscape of 
decolonization.94
Voluntary Service Overseas was founded in 1958. The creation of 
former Colonial Service official Alec Dickson, it was intended to provide 
elite school leavers with the opportunity to undertake a year’s voluntary 
work overseas before they started university. He feared that the vacuum 
left by the end of national service and the growth of the welfare state 
would inhibit young people’s development into responsible citizens by 
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closing off opportunities to undertake service for others or to mix with 
those from different backgrounds.95 But he also believed that the end of 
empire would deprive young people of a valuable outlet for these ideals, 
a concern held by other colonial officials at the time. When writing in The 
Times, Dickson quoted one serving officer:
Twenty years ago they would have been an obvious choice for an 
Assistant District Officer. Now of course he is more likely to become 
a History master at a school in Britain… I only hope the contracting 
of bounds of empire do not cut off such young men and the people 
of other races from mutual co- operation.96
Family connections to overseas service shaped Dickson’s own 
background. His father had been a civil engineer working across the 
globe, while his older brother joined the Colonial Education Service 
in North Borneo. Having started a career in journalism in the 1930s, 
Dickson served in East Africa during the Second World War, where he 
launched a mobile propaganda unit aimed at buttressing British sup-
port among the local population.97 After returning to Europe to par-
ticipate in more resettlement work, he joined the Colonial Service in 
1948, and was posted to West Africa as a social development officer, 
where he remained until 1954.98 In this role, he participated in a num-
ber of mass education and community development training schemes, 
intended to inculcate leadership and teamwork values, which the 
Colonial Office identified as essential to shaping responsible citizens in 
preparation for self- government.99
The philosophy Dickson developed during this time informed much 
of his subsequent trajectory.100 He believed vehemently that the opti-
mism, energy and innocence of youth represented the surest means of 
breaking down racial and cultural barriers in a decolonizing world.101 In 
so doing, individuals gained through selfless service to others.102 Dickson 
was convinced that the era of ‘development’ could not be successful if 
it relied only upon ‘expatriate expertise’ or impersonal aid packages. It 
required instead a process of reciprocal teaching and friendship between 
European and local elites; development had to rely upon human interac-
tion to tackle the mundane problems of daily life.103 At the heart of his 
philosophy stood an amateur ideal, which ran against prevailing tech-
nocratic trends but emphasized the same ethos of worthwhile service 
to others proclaimed in Colonial Service publicity and which reflected 
Dickson’s own educational background at public school and Oxford dur-
ing the interwar years.104
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Dickson first approached the Colonial Office in 1956, hopeful that 
his vision would chime with their focus upon community development 
and ideas of Commonwealth. Although he was not rejected outright, 
he met with considerable circumspection.105 Wary of sending a young, 
untrained cadre of volunteers into increasingly politically unstable socie-
ties, many in the Colonial Office preferred to rely upon trained experts 
rather than well- meaning amateurs.106 Dickson’s personal reputation 
within the Service was equally problematic.107 Failing to find the affir-
mation or financial support required, he turned instead to missionary 
groups already engaged in development work overseas, and in early 
1958 persuaded the Bishop of Portsmouth to pledge his support in an 
open letter to The Sunday Times.108
VSO conspicuously and deliberately eschewed any mention of, or 
allusion to, colonialism; Portsmouth couched his appeal in the same 
language that had come to dominate Colonial Service recruitment lit-
erature, however. These opportunities would be of ‘inestimable benefit 
to the development of the Commonwealth’ and provide the foundations 
for mutual respect between the peoples of newly self- governing nations 
and Britain. At the root of the proposal lay an acclamation of the value 
of humanitarian service:  ‘Equally urgent is the need for the best of our 
young people – in their difficult period of transition before university or 
career – to have the opportunity of doing something worthwhile, where 
it is most genuinely needed, and seeing a bit of the world into the bar-
gain.’109 In articulating a new vision of British engagement with the wider 
world, VSO clearly distinguished itself from the colonial state; volun-
teers would not be taught to govern arrogantly but to better themselves 
through immersion in a new culture and working alongside peoples who 
were their equals.110
Nonetheless, in a variety of ways, Dickson’s Colonial Service con-
nections were essential to establishing VSO.111 When identifying pro-
jects, he found ready support among more progressive officers, who 
helped arrange placements across five territories for the first batch of 
volunteers. Following initial success, VSO quickly grew in popularity and 
ambition, and by the early 1960s it was receiving over 1,000 applications 
per year.112 Two more former colonial officers were appointed to expand 
Dickson’s one- man show and assist with day- to- day administration.113 
Edward Chadwick became deputy director, having previously been piv-
otal in pioneering community development programmes in Nigeria, 
where he had also been Dickson’s superior.114 Another ex- Nigeria DO, 
Gilbert Stephenson, was charged with developing the public affairs 
and fundraising operation.115 Its governing council exhibited a similar 
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profusion of colonial connections. Although VSO began  without any for-
mal government support, the Colonial Office quickly offered its implicit 
endorsement. The Secretary of State for the colonies, Alan Lennox- Boyd, 
received the first volunteers at the Colonial Office before their departure 
and remained an active and enthusiastic supporter.116 Following the suc-
cess of the first year, however, the British government offered more sig-
nificant patronage. In 1959 the Colonial Office provided a £9,000 grant 
and helped expand the scope of placements across the Commonwealth.117
It quickly became clear that VSO targeted the same social elite that 
had formed the bulwark of Colonial Service recruits. Dickson and his 
colleagues relied on ready access to public school networks to generate 
interest, with the first eighteen volunteers coming from public schools. 
Although the background of recruits expanded in the second year, with 
a roughly equal split between public and grammar school pupils, VSO 
remained an elite concept and organization.118 The Daily Express did not 
miss this point, noting in 1959 that it was ‘an organization for public 
school and grammar school boys’.119 Volunteers were selected according 
to criteria that bore remarkable resemblance to Colonial Service recruit-
ment procedure, and, indeed, during the early years included a retired 
Colonial Service resident on its interview panel.120 Personal references 
lauded precisely the same qualities considered so important among colo-
nial administrators.121 Reviewing the second year of service in 1959, 
The Times included examples of several testimonials, written by head-
masters, that most certainly would have won the approval of a Colonial 
Service selection board: ‘Head of school, captain of rugger; cricket and 
boxing colours; leader of school orchestra, chairman of art society; 
under- officer, Combined Cadet Force. A boy of strong character, moral 
and physical courage, integrity and vision; is shrewd, mature, versatile 
and energetic.’122 Promoting its initial success, a VSO publicity release 
celebrated the ‘very high standard of volunteer’ and reminded readers 
that ‘[h] alf of those volunteering for the first projects had been head boys 
who had already won open scholarships’.123
Despite fundamental differences between an application to the 
Colonial Service and a year or two spent on VSO, volunteers’ experiences 
had much in common with what an earlier generation eagerly anticipated 
upon an application to the Colonial Service.124 All recruits wrote letters 
back to Dickson, which became publicity to attract more young adventur-
ous volunteers, promising experiences that Stephenson likened to the lot 
of a DO.125 But relying so heavily on former colonial officers to implement 
a radical new philosophy quickly exposed tensions between paternalis-
tic ideas of service among an older generation and the new emphasis on 
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friendship. In 1961 the British Council complained over Stephenson’s 
monthly newsletter, reporting that volunteers in Ghana had been 
angered by his ‘smug and self- congratulatory’ tone, which ‘tended to sug-
gest that people overseas were comic and extraordinary’. Stephenson’s 
background as an interwar DO came to the fore as he commented on 
‘darkest Ethiopia’ and Thomas Gray’s Ode on a distant prospect of Eton 
College and endorsed a quotation from a volunteer in Bechuanaland: ‘The 
minds of the people are those of children who need help desperately if 
they are to take on the responsibilities of what are to them at the moment 
merely romantic dreams, not even political ideals.’126
British Council entreaties stressed that, for VSO to be a success in 
newly independent nation states, it was ‘absolutely fundamental’ that 
volunteers and organizers alike accepted those among whom they vol-
unteered as ‘dignified human being[s] , and the equal of the white man 
in every respect’. Any trace of ‘patronage or condescension or ridicule’ 
would undermine the entire basis of overseas voluntary service, as ‘[t]
he African is no longer prepared to be done good to by people who do 
not in every way show that they accept him as an equal’.127 Moving slowly 
beyond the established parameters of colonial rule to construct new rela-
tionships between young Britons and indigenous people took time and 
adaptation. For all the innovation that Dickson’s vision promised, it also 
suggested the possibility for a continuation of more traditional perspec-
tives. Despite some initial grumbling among colonial governors that 
VSO recruits were ill- suited to the challenges of colonial territories, the 
general impression is that many officers responded well to the injection 
of youth.128 Nonetheless, just as former Colonial Service officers had to 
adapt to new and uncertain terrain, so young Britons were also able to 
start to explore the new dynamics and relationships made possible in a 
postcolonial world.
The presence of independent- minded teenagers prepared to chal-
lenge (or ignore) entrenched social and racial protocols exposed deeper 
tensions between the volunteers and an older generation of expatriate 
Britons living across colonial and newly independent territories.129 One 
volunteer outraged the governor’s wife in Sarawak by arriving for dinner 
at the residency dressed in a sarong, but the dispatch of the first female 
volunteers in 1961 sparked new points of concern, particularly surround-
ing their interactions with local men.130 In Malaya, the local Anglican 
archbishop complained to Dickson at one female volunteer’s behaviour, 
while another sent in 1962 was reported to the high commissioner for 
having an ‘affair’ with a local Sikh man. Despite being interviewed about 
her behaviour she remained resolute that she had nothing to be ashamed 
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about, and, when asked what her parents would think, responded that 
‘they do know and raised no objection’. In spite of the accusations, the 
volunteer made an overall favourable impression, with the high commis-
sioner observing traits for which many a male colonial officer had won 
praise: ‘[S] he is the least volatile of the girls, calm, intelligent and seri-
ous… She is obviously the only girl in the party likely to have taken “A” 
level in pure and applied maths.’131
Indeed, many volunteers appeared determined to challenge local 
preconceptions by conspicuously disassociating themselves from the 
pomp of the colonial period. In a newspaper interview with the Malay 
Mail, the aforementioned volunteer made it clear that she wanted to 
challenge Malays’ ‘two dimensional view of Britain – all pomp and pag-
eantry and straw cottages’ which had been so rigorously maintained by 
the colonial elite: ‘I had to assure them there is a seamy side to Britain 
too. It really meant tearing down some pretty solidly built illusions.’132 
Records testifying to volunteers’ motivation or their post- university 
careers are not readily available.133 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning 
that at least two 1959 VSO volunteers joined the Colonial Service, with 
McCleery praising one’s idealism, progressive racial attitude and the 
galvanizing effect of his year in Sarawak.134 A third VSO volunteer, also 
appointed to Northern Rhodesia in 1961, withdrew because he did not 
think Africa somewhere to take his fiancée; all his referees drew attention 
to the ‘sense of vocation’ he had gained through his volunteering, how-
ever.135 Even so, a somewhat cynical response from his Colonial Service 
interviewers wondered whether his ‘idealism’ and ‘sincerity’ masked 
a ‘naivety’ and lack of ‘toughness’ that would prove problematic in the 
field.136
Conclusions
In 1962 Sir Ralph Furse published his memoirs. For a title, he chose the 
name of a mythical Greek bird snarer, Aucuparius, and in elegiac tones 
acclaimed the system he had created and the Colonial Service as he 
wanted it remembered. At the book’s heart ran a paean to the gentlemanly 
code of service and duty that defined Furse’s essential sense of empire.137 
Like the title, however, his central theme sat uncomfortably in the context 
of early 1960s Britain, its nostalgia for a vanishing empire in stark contrast 
to Anthony Sampson’s contemporaneous dissection of a calcifying nation. 
Furse received positive reviews in the conservative press, particularly from 
former colonial governors,138 but others were already more circumspect. 
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Writing a year later, a former Kenya DO, John Nottingham, eloquently 
exposed the flaws at the heart of Furse’s ‘apologia’:
It is arguable that had our colonial civil servants been less snob-
bish and paternal, had they been selected for their brains rather 
than their ‘character’, such disasters as the emergencies in Kenya 
and Nyasaland would have been avoided. Sir Ralph and the Oxford 
clique have much to answer for. Their manifest good intentions may 
not be a sufficient plea in mitigation.139
The tensions and contradictions that stood at the heart of the Colonial 
Service’s ethos after 1945 produced competing visions for what shape 
the future should take. Ultimately, recruiters’ staunch attachment to 
long- established tropes of character and conditioning sat uncomfort-
ably within the changing domestic climate, making it impossible for the 
Colonial Service to adapt successfully to the waning of imperial power.
The same year also saw the end of Dickson’s association with 
VSO following a series of clashes with Whitehall over future ambi-
tions. Even as a further 243 volunteers were dispatched to forty- nine 
territories across the globe, the arrival of President Kennedy’s newly 
formed Peace Corps made many in Westminster worry that Dickson’s 
amateur ideal was simply not adequate for the United Nations’ Decade 
of Development. Throughout the 1960s VSO’s reliance on government 
funding grew, and with the increased funding came increased pres-
sure to refocus on graduate volunteers and technocratic expertise.140 
Even so, the promise of service to others, adventure and unique experi-
ences overseas continued to hold as much appeal to young audiences 
as careers in empire had for a previous generation. Interestingly, the 
funding of VSO schemes in the twenty- first century was proposed by 
the Overseas Service Pensioners Association as one strategy to rehabili-
tate the colonial record ‘[i] n view of the fact that the ideals and motives 
of people who wanted to serve overseas were very much the same’.141
VSO, as embodied in Dickon’s philosophy, gave voice to a particu-
lar vision of the future that some Colonial Service officers imagined 
possible, though could not accommodate. The links between the two 
organizations, both conceptually and tangibly, emphasize the ways in 
which this was a future imagined on the basis of a changing empire, 
and one that sought to underline the constant of duty amidst a tur-
bulent climate. These physical and mental entanglements ensured 
that the end of empire was not the final point of decolonization, and, 
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instead, demonstrate one way in which vast interconnected  networks 
of power, spanning Britain, her former colonies and the many 
 individual lives shaped through this association, would endure in new 
ways. Continuing today, VSO has so far sent over 50,000 volunteers to 
 undertake ‘worthwhile service’ overseas. 
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Protecting empire from without: 
francophone African migrant workers, 
British West Africa and French efforts to 
maintain power in Africa, 1945– 1960
Joanna Warson
The study of France and Africa in the late colonial period has frequently 
centred on francophone Africa. This francophone bias, in turn, is closely 
intertwined with the growing importance of Africa to France as a means 
of great power status from the post- war period onwards. The humilia-
tions suffered during the Second World War, alongside the vital role that 
France’s African colonies played in the defence of Free France, enhanced 
the significance of maintaining an empire, particularly in Africa.1 A clear 
declaration of this sentiment was made at the Brazzaville Conference in 
early 1944, organized by the French Committee of National Liberation, 
to signal France’s commitment to reform and development in Africa.2 Yet, 
despite recommending significant reforms to the French colonial system, 
‘any possibility of evolution outside the French imperial block’ and ‘the 
eventual creation, even in the distant future, of self- government in the 
colonies’ was explicitly ruled out.3 Thus, in spite of the growing tide of 
anti- colonial nationalism in the post- war era, the French maintained the 
belief that ‘the only independence they [the Africans] will want will be 
the independence of France’.4
With a few notable exceptions,5 France’s dogged commitment to 
maintaining its colonial sphere has contributed to a scholarly neglect of 
French involvement in areas of the African continent outside their tra-
ditional sphere of influence. Similarly overlooked are the connections 
between francophone and non- francophone territories. In the post- war 
period, however, African interconnectivity was greater than ever before, 
with the Second World War bringing ‘to light the strategic and economic 
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importance of the continent as a whole’. Henceforth, according to one 
official from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, francophone and 
anglophone Africa were ‘closely intertwined with each other’.6 Thus, at 
a time when the momentum for freedom from European rule was start-
ing to grow in Africa, connections across colonial boundaries increased. 
These connections highlight the extent to which the decolonization 
process was not bound to the inevitable creation of new nation states. 
Within these connections was a contingent vision of transnational 
engagement, which prioritized migration, communities and diaspora 
over the borders of the nation state. Although there has been a rise of 
comparative histories of decolonization in recent years,7 there remains 
only limited work on the connections between the ends of empire in the 
twentieth century.8
It is the aim of this chapter to challenge the francophone bias of the 
existing literature concerning Franco- African relations in the post- war 
period, while simultaneously bringing to the fore previously unknown 
connections between the ends of European colonial rule on the African 
continent. It will achieve this aim through an exploration of French 
responses to the mass migration of francophone Africans to neighbour-
ing British West African colonies in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. The first part of this chapter unpicks French views of francophone 
African migrant workers living in neighbouring British colonies, focus-
ing particularly on French concerns about the negative consequences of 
this migration for francophone Africa, notably in terms of labour short-
ages. These fearful colonial futures steered the hand of French adminis-
trators, worried about their subjects being attracted by British colonial 
policy or anglophone African nationalism. In the second part, this chap-
ter addresses French efforts to respond to this threat, both within its 
colonies and beyond the borders of francophone Africa. This case study 
exemplifies the entanglements of the late colonial and decolonization 
eras, and offers a new insight into the ways in which France sought to 
preserve its African empire in the post- war period. In so doing, it offers 
new perspectives on the end of European colonial rule in francophone 
Africa specifically and the decolonization processes of the twentieth 
century more widely. The artificiality of colonial territorial boundaries 
created both concern and opportunity for colonial powers and peoples. 
The exchanges between anglophone and francophone Africa speak of 
the porousness of colonial boundaries but also of the ability of local 
people to traverse the identity groups that colonial authorities sought 
to place them in and, in the period of decolonization, that nationalist 
groups sought to impose. The fluidity and exchange were key to the 
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social relationships across the region, but they also presented a problem 
for postcolonial national governments trying to control newly cemented 
national borders.
Expatriate francophone Africans – or the external 
threat to the French empire that came from within
The migration of francophone Africans seeking employment to neigh-
bouring British territories began in the interwar period. Enticed by 
the availability of lucrative jobs in gold mines and cocoa plantations, 
Africans from Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Togo, Soudan (Mali), 
Niger, Dahomey (Benin) and the Ivory Coast flooded across the borders 
into anglophone Africa. The Gold Coast (Ghana), in particular, was 
viewed as an ‘El Dorado, a Mecca for men who want to get rich quick’.9 
For those migrating to anglophone Africa, particularly from poor 
French- ruled territories such as Niger and Soudan, the Gold Coast was 
‘a real earthly paradise, where it was possible to make money quickly, 
especially as affluent goods are not expensive’.10 It was not merely the 
opportunity for enrichment that encouraged francophone Africans to 
seek employment in neighbouring British territories. Workers were also 
enticed by the prospect of lower taxes, greater freedoms and, above all 
else, the opportunity to escape the constraints of forced labour and other 
labour obligations in French- ruled territories.11 Therefore, according to 
Romain Tiquet, migration can be understood as a protest against colonial 
constraint.12 How did they respond to the labour regimes in British 
colonies? Did their mobility allow them to circumvent colonial control 
in both contexts?
The porous and artificial nature of colonial borders further facili-
tated migration between francophone and anglophone Africa. The move-
ment of people around West Africa was not something new in the colonial 
era but, rather, built on long- standing patterns of migration established 
prior to the arrival of Europeans on the continent. This meant that, in 
spite of the establishment of colonial borders in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, many African social groups lived divided between French- ruled and 
British- ruled territories. This was an entanglement that both pre- dated 
and outlasted European imperialism. Those from the south- east of the 
Ivory Coast, for example, had relatives living in the Ashanti region of 
the Gold Coast, while the frontier between British Togo and French Togo 
‘divided many tribes in two’.13 Similarly, the Songhay and Zerma people 
from areas that became part of Niger and Soudan had long traditions 
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of migrating southwards to the Gold Coast.14 Therefore, many arriving 
in British West Africa from francophone Africa would find themselves 
living alongside members of the same tribe, or perhaps even the same 
village.15 Moreover, in the view of two French ethnographers sent out 
to study these migratory movements in November and December 1950, 
European expansion in West Africa in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century reinvigorated this north– south migration, as the ‘pacification’ 
of the region by the British and the French enabled people living in the 
north to resume contact with members of their family or social group.16 
Thus, migration was ‘a habit’ for the Zerma, the Songhay, the Mossi, the 
Dagomba, the Bambara and the Fula, to name but a few.17 By 1946 an 
estimated one million francophone African migrant workers were living 
in Britain’s West African colonies.18
For the French colonial administration, preoccupied with sustain-
ing influence in francophone Africa after the defeats and disappoint-
ments of the Second World War, the presence of a substantial number of 
French subjects in British West Africa was a grave cause for concern. In 
the first instance, the voluntary ‘exodus’ of workers to the Gold Coast con-
tributed to long- standing manpower shortages in French West Africa.19 
In the words of Frederick Cooper: ‘Not only was death reaping the har-
vest of African labour [in French- ruled territories], so too was Great 
Britain.’20 French officials were conscious of this problem and, from the 
1930s onwards, discussed measures to reverse the outflow of the African 
workforce. Under the Popular Front government (1936– 1938), officials 
contemplated providing workers with incentives that mirrored methods 
employed in British West Africa, such as paying workers a share of the 
harvest, a common practice in the Gold Coast.21 Wages also increased 
during the Popular Front period.22 Nevertheless, a persistent belief that 
Africans had to be compelled to work, and the resulting commitment to 
forced labour, limited the extent to which French labour reform could be 
implemented in the colonies in the interwar period. Thus, large numbers 
of francophone Africans continued to flow across the borders into British 
West Africa in pursuit of work.23
The abolition of forced labour by the French in Africa following 
the promulgation of the Houphouët- Boigny law on 11 April 1946 con-
tributed to a shift in patterns of migration from francophone to anglo-
phone Africa, with temporary seasonal migration replacing permanent 
relocation in Britain’s West African colonies.24 The reduction in labour 
obligations in the French colonies did not stem the flow of workers 
entirely, however, as had been hoped by the French colonial adminis-
tration.25 Moreover, while the Second World War stimulated economic 
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growth in the Gold Coast, it had negative consequences in francophone 
Africa, prompting a new rush to the Gold Coast as soon as the borders 
reopened.26 By 1949 an estimated 800,000 francophone Africans lived 
in Accra alone. According to the Africa- Levant Department at the Quai 
d’Orsay, the French Foreign Ministry, this meant that the capital of the 
Gold Coast was home to ‘the largest group of French [nationals] resident 
overseas’.27 The persistence of this movement into the 1950s is evidenced 
in a 1955 letter from the French consul in Accra to the Governor General 
of Overseas France, which described how ‘for many years the indigenous 
populations of our territories have come willingly and in great number 
to the Gold Coast in search of work’.28 This voluntary expatriation took 
on a new significance in the paradoxical post- war era, in which, in spite 
of a renewed commitment by the French to maintaining their African 
colonies, France’s hold over its empire was increasingly fragile.29 In 
August 1944 the commissioner for the colonies contacted those respon-
sible for colonial affairs at the Free French Mission in Accra, outlining 
the French Committee of National Liberation’s serious preoccupation 
with the continued problem of workers ‘abandoning their country for 
the Gold Coast’.30
Across the globe in the post- war period, European colonial powers, 
and in particular Britain and France, moved towards an intervention-
ist ‘developmental’ colonial state, in the hope that it would make their 
empires both ‘richer and more politically legitimate’.31 This shift towards 
development and reform, in turn, formed part of what Martin Shipway 
has described as the ‘late colonial shift’: a fundamental reassessment of 
the colonial project by colonizer and colonized alike.32 This was a con-
tingent moment in the charting of France’s colonial future. Although 
they were not unique to France, these concerns were particularly acute 
in the French case, given the importance attributed to empire in Africa 
both in literal and abstract terms. For France, having an African empire 
was a necessary prerequisite for the restoration of its great power status. 
Thus, the need to halt the outflow of migrant labour to anglophone Africa 
struck at the heart of efforts to restore French grandeur after the defeats 
and disappointments of the Second World War.
France’s efforts to reassert its position on the African continent 
through development and reform were epitomized by the recommen-
dations set out at the Brazzaville Conference of 1944, which included 
increased African political representation and investment in develop-
ment projects.33 When it came to the francophone Africans resident in 
British West Africa, there were concerns that this population might be 
insufficiently aware of the post- war advances in French colonial policy 
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as a result of their physical location outside the French empire. In a 
report following a visit to Lagos in July 1948, the French vice consul to 
the Gold Coast highlighted the limited attachment to the newly named 
French Union among francophone African migrant workers living in 
Nigeria. More worrying still were the sentiments of the most advanced 
and influential members of Nigeria’s francophone African commu-
nity. According to the French diplomat, évolués living in Lagos saw the 
French colonial administration as ‘excessively meddlesome and not 
very democratic’.34 Moreover, their loyalties were not with Dakar or the 
French Union but with their territory of origin (in this case Dahomey), 
and any attachment to France was attributed to familial ties in French 
territories and the desire to benefit from French protection while living 
in a British- ruled territory. Worse still, in spite of the new constitution, 
the francophone African community in Nigeria allegedly closed their 
eyes to advances in French colonial policy and continued to affirm 
their hopes for a complete transformation of French administrative 
methods.35
The fast- paced political evolution of Britain’s African colonies in 
the post- war period did little to ease French concerns. The changed inter-
nal and international context in the aftermath of the Second World War 
was acknowledged by the British Colonial Office and contributed to the 
formulation of a new British approach to African policy, based on notions 
of ‘political advancement’ for the continent.36 In Nigeria the Macpherson 
constitution of 1951 led to the replacement of indirect rule with semi- 
responsible government, while in the Gold Coast a parliamentary system 
of government was introduced in the wake of the Accra Riots of 1948. 
The first elections were held in 1951, with the Ghanaian nationalist who 
went on to become the first president of an independent Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah, and his Convention People’s Party (CPP) emerging victorious. 
While Ronald Hyam has challenged the extent to which these British pol-
icies constituted a strategy of decolonization, it is nevertheless clear that 
the majority within the UK government accepted the fact that Britain’s 
African colonies would eventually achieve their independence.37 The 
position was expressed openly as early as 1938, when the Secretary of 
State for the colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, asserted that ‘the ultimate, 
if distant, aim of British colonial policy was the evolution towards self- 
government’,38 though this did not necessarily mean independence 
within a national framework.
By contrast, and as has already been noted above, France remained 
steadfastly committed to maintaining its African empire. For the French, 
as Cooper notes,
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the one point which was an absolute, from de Gaulle on down, was 
that the empire would remain French. The war had proven the value 
of the empire to France, and the post- war recovery would require 
both an efficient empire and one whose legitimacy was secure.39
This, in turn, contributed to French fears about the spread of anglophone 
African nationalism among its colonial subjects, evidenced by the 
concerns raised on several occasions during the 1950s about the potential 
impact of visits to francophone African territories from Ghanaian nation-
alists.40 Unsurprisingly, there were also fears about the susceptibility of 
francophone Africans living in anglophone Africa itself, especially those 
resident in the Gold Coast, sometimes described as les Gold Coastiers. As 
Jean Rouch, researcher at the Musée de l’Homme, acknowledged in his 
1954 report on migration in the Gold Coast, this British- ruled territory 
was ‘the most evolved country in West Africa’ in political terms.41 This 
was something attributed to Britain’s view of the Gold Coast as the ‘pilot 
African colony’, where the policy of self- government could be tested out 
and refined.42
More worrying for the French colonial administration, however, 
was a growing interest among French colonial subjects residing in the 
Gold Coast in the Ghanaian nationalist leader, Kwame Nkrumah. The 
Zerma people, in particular, were active supporters of Nkrumah and 
the CPP, evidenced by reports of members of this group attending CPP 
meetings, wearing symbols and shouting slogans that glorified the party 
and singing songs in praise of Nkrumah.43 In 1954, in spite of legisla-
tion passed by the British colonial authorities preventing French subjects 
from voting in legislative elections in 1954 (previously it had not been 
necessary to be a British subject in order to vote in the elections for local 
councils), the Zerma demonstrated their support for Nkrumah at the 
polls, evading legislation by registering themselves as Hausa (natives of 
Nigeria who, like the Zerma, frequently migrated to Accra). According 
to investigations carried out by Rouch, some 1,600 out of 2,000 Zerma 
questioned in Accra voted in the 1954 elections, in spite of the risk of a 
£50 fine or three months in prison.44
To the French colonial administration, therefore, the presence of 
francophone Africans in British West Africa created a potential threat 
to the French empire that came from within but was enhanced by the 
situation without. This, in turn, demonstrates the way in which concerns 
about maintaining France’s African colonies were not solely concen-
trated on the francophone world. Rather, the presence of a large number 
of France’s colonial subjects outside its traditional sphere of influence led 
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certain individuals and groups to look beyond the borders of the empire 
in order to shore up power within it. This, in turn, reveals the existence 
of a much wider French vision of the African continent than has previ-
ously been explored by scholars, bringing to light often overlooked con-
nections across colonial borders.
Implementing French colonial policies in anglophone 
Africa – or protecting the empire from the outside
France’s response to the ‘exodus’ from its colonies was, like the threat 
itself, twofold, looking both inwards to the situation in the colonies and 
outwards to the British West African setting. With regard to the former, 
there were calls for reforms of French colonial policy, particularly when 
it came to labour, in an attempt to entice Africans back to French- ruled 
territories. As in the interwar years, these calls for reform frequently 
centred on the need to reproduce British approaches towards labour in 
the francophone African setting. For example, in 1944 the administra-
tor charged with the colonies at the Free French mission in Accra called 
for the benefits and conditions available to workers in the Gold Coast to 
be introduced in French West Africa, notably higher salaries, improved 
working conditions and a diminished administrative burden, in line with 
the situation in British West Africa. In summary, he argued that ‘we must 
as far as possible create the conditions at home [in French West Africa] 
that attract workers to the English’.45
In the post- war period it is possible to identify several instances 
of the French colonial administrators seeking to achieve this aim, with 
increased wages and improved workplace conditions and benefits. The 
most striking example, however, was the decision to abolish forced labour 
under the Houphouët- Boigny law of 1946. The 1944 report discussed 
above made an explicit recommendation concerning the prestation (a 
policy whereby taxes were paid in the form of forced labour), arguing 
that the system ‘profoundly fatigued’ the native populations of franco-
phone Africa.46 Moreover, the group of African deputies who, in February 
1946, submitted to the National Assembly a proposed law abolishing 
forced labour in all overseas territories made reference to the problems 
concerning labour migration to British West Africa, arguing that forced 
labour provoked ‘total dissatisfaction of natives in regard to France and 
an increasingly massive exodus’.47 The French National Assembly subse-
quently approved this African proposal, and forced labour was abolished 
in the colonies.
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It is apparent, therefore, that, although the French largely failed 
in their objective to reverse the outflow of labour to British West Africa, 
there was an important link between the presence of a substantial fran-
cophone African population in Britain’s African colonies and the evolu-
tion of French colonial policy in the post- war period. While there were 
certainly other factors that informed French colonial policy during 
this era,48 it is nevertheless important to acknowledge the influence of 
French and francophone African experiences in, and knowledge about, 
British West Africa, particularly when it came to questions of migration 
from francophone to anglophone Africa. French efforts to adopt British 
colonial labour initiatives after 1945 also stand in contrast to the posi-
tion set forth by Alexander Keese that, despite being ‘interested and 
aware of what happened in British Africa’, French colonial administra-
tors ‘strongly disagreed with developments’ in anglophone Africa and 
gathered information ‘not to learn from British reforms, but to under-
stand if developments on the British side of the border could lead to 
unrest amongst populations in French Black Africa’.49 While the latter 
statement is certainly true, it is apparent from the above discussion that, 
in certain instances, British colonial policy was an important reference 
point for the French.
The second element of the French response to the perceived threat 
posed by the presence of a substantial francophone African population 
in anglophone Africa concentrated on British West Africa itself. Up until 
1946 the official French presence on the ground in British- ruled African 
territories was minimal. A liaison office in Accra, linked to the British resi-
dent minister in the Gold Coast, had responsibility for the whole of British 
West Africa.50 The only other official French mission in the region was a 
military and administrative transit post in Lagos.51 Many of the employ-
ees at these offices were French military personnel, a legacy of their for-
mer status as Free French missions.52 Both offices were also staffed by 
employees of the French colonial companies that had operated in British 
West Africa since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
including the Compagnie française de l’Afrique occidentale (CFAO), the 
Société commerciale de l’ouest africain (SCOA) and Chargeurs Réunis, 
as well as other individuals active in West African commerce.53 The Lagos 
post is a striking example of the role played by private actors in the offi-
cial French presence in anglophone Africa, with an agent of Chargeurs 
Réunis serving as the head of the post, and two former retailers who had 
been active in West Africa serving as subordinates.54 The participation 
of private individuals in French diplomatic posts in British West Africa, 
in turn, can be traced back to Paris’ decision in the interwar period to 
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station consular agents in Accra and Lagos under the supervision of the 
French consulate general in London, thus according these offices a large 
degree of independence and leading to a blurring of the lines between 
official and non- official French action in anglophone Africa.55
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, certain indi-
viduals at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Colonies 
(from 1946 the Ministry of Overseas France), as well as a number of ‘men 
on the spot’ in London, Lagos and Accra, sought to take control of the 
situation and formalize the French presence in British West Africa. They 
sought to make an asset for the future from this imperial entanglement. In 
early 1945, for example, Henri Laurentie, the director of political affairs 
in the Ministry of the Colonies, asserted in correspondence with the liai-
son mission in Accra that it was ‘essential that France be well represented 
in the British colonies on the West Coast of Africa’.56 Although there was 
some delay in responding to this perceived imperative,57 a French consu-
late opened in Accra on 1 October 1946.58 Two days later, on 3 October, 
a chancellerie détachée opened in Lagos, which was responsible to the 
French post in Africa and had similar functions to a vice consulate (and 
was frequently referred to as such).59
Various factors underpinned the formalization and expansion of 
France’s diplomatic presence in anglophone West Africa. British activi-
ties across the region were an important point of reference from the 
outset. The UK government’s plan to replace the resident minister in the 
Gold Coast with an under- secretary dependent on the Colonial Office, for 
example, led to calls from the director of political affairs at the French 
Ministry of the Colonies for the liaison mission in Accra to be replaced 
by a consulate. The former, it was argued, had been created specially to 
collaborate with the resident minister and, therefore, was no longer fit 
for purpose. Instead, a more formal diplomatic presence was required 
in order to ensure productive Anglo- French collaboration in the future.60 
In this respect, the French were responding directly to British demands, 
notably those from the resident minister in West Africa, Harold Balfour. 
During a meeting with the administrator responsible for the colonies at 
the French liaison mission in Accra in January 1945, Balfour criticized 
the limited functions of the existing French office, calling for a greater 
administrative or consular presence that would enable ‘closer collabo-
ration between the British and French colonies in West Africa’.61 It is 
noteworthy that the British consulate general in Dakar, Senegal, was 
cited as a potential example in this respect, providing further evidence 
of the importance of the British model in Africa in shaping French policy 
towards the continent.62
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Alongside the significance of British activity and Anglo- French coop-
eration, concern for French colonial subjects was paramount in inform-
ing the systemization and expansion of France’s diplomatic presence in 
Britain’s African colonies. A  report prepared by Guy Monod, following 
a mission to Africa in early 1946 on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, stressed the importance of establishing consulates in Accra and 
Lagos so that indigenous migration from francophone to anglophone 
Africa could be studied in situ.63 France’s new consulates in British West 
Africa were not solely responsible for observing francophone African 
residents, however. They were also tasked with ‘discrete action’ towards 
this colonial population.64 Much of this activity focused on improving 
French colonial subjects’ knowledge and understanding of France and its 
empire, because, as has been noted above, it was believed that the French 
effort in Africa was ‘unknown’ among these populations.65 Thus, during 
a visit to Lagos in 1948, the French vice consul to the Gold Coast went to 
great lengths to stress the benefits of French rule to francophone Africans 
living in Nigeria, highlighting ‘the social, economic and political achieve-
ments’ of France as well as ‘the dedication and work’ of French doctors, 
teachers, missionaries and administrators.66 In addition, the French dip-
lomat made requests to Paris for photographic propaganda that could be 
disseminated among France’s expatriate colonial population, including 
documents depicting the work carried out by the Office of Niger, the port 
of Dakar and the Pasteur Institute. Images of sporting activities, sessions 
of the general councils, art exhibitions, 14 July celebrations and open-
ing ceremonies for new buildings, it was hoped, ‘would give the image 
presented a more lively appearance’.67 In a similar vein, in October 1949 
three advisers to the Assembly of the French Union (Mitterrand, Plagny 
and Moullec) visited Lagos with the principal objective of making contact 
with French African subjects resident in Nigeria. Although no large- scale 
propaganda efforts formed part of this visit, the three Frenchmen did 
participate in a meeting organized by the Association for French Africans 
and attended by the French vice consul in Lagos, where they spoke of ‘the 
role and the action of the Assembly of the French Union and the links that 
unite the metropole and its overseas territories’.68 These initiatives, in 
turn, aimed to ensure the loyalty of France’s colonial subjects and, thus, 
help sustain the French empire.
Alongside these direct attempts to secure the allegiance of expatri-
ate colonial subjects, there were also more indirect strategies to foster 
a sense of French identity among the francophone African community. 
One striking example of these efforts was the French social centre, which 
opened in Lagos in 1949 on the initiative of the vice consul in Nigeria, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167FrAnCophonE MigrAnt WorkErS in brit iSh WESt AFriCA
167
Georges Tourot.69 According to an interview with Tourot published in the 
Daily Times, the centre aimed
to eclipse any known scheme of social welfare service ever promul-
gated in Lagos Colony. The idea behind this modest beginning is to 
develop the centre into a Club, where French Africans will meet in 
one cohesive organisation instead of, as at present, frittering away 
their energy and financial resources in different institutions, thus 
engendering feelings of rivalry between the leading personalities 
in the French African community.70
In a dispatch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tourot himself described 
the aim of the social centre, and the consulate in general, as being
to put into practice the principles of the French Union. We not only 
initiate the gathering together and protection of our African nation-
als, we also justify and prove in a way that is in our interest that we 
support their social development as part of the duties arising from 
our presence in Africa.71
Services offered by the centre included free financial and legal 
advice, French and English language classes, sports and youth organiza-
tions and social events.72 The centre also organized monthly visits from 
a doctor employed by the Health Service in Dahomey.73 The success of 
the social centre in achieving its aims was highlighted in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ praise of Tourot’s work upon his departure from Lagos 
in 1951. In particular, the report emphasized Tourot’s role in ‘bringing 
together the French community in Nigeria’, a task that was believed to be 
‘important and difficult’.74 Similarly, in the Gold Coast, French diplomats 
offered support and services for francophone Africans, including social 
events. On 14 July 1948, for example, chiefs and other representatives of 
different indigenous communities were invited to a reception to mark the 
occasion in the garden of the consular residence in Accra. In the evening 
a number of these Africans who were deemed to be évolués were invited 
to join the European French population for a dinner party.75 According to 
The African Morning Post, there ‘was dancing to the tunes of a radiogram’, 
with the party continuing until ‘about 1 am the next day’.76
French consulates in British West Africa played an important role 
in the lives of francophone Africans resident in the region. It is unsur-
prising, therefore, that, to many francophone Africans, the French consul 
was akin to a ‘commandant de cercle’, the French equivalent of a British 
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district commissioner. As such, French colonial subjects resident in Accra 
or Lagos called upon these diplomats to resolve the multiple difficulties 
in their lives. According to the French consul in Accra, Charles Renner, 
‘[N] o business is too large or small for one [a francophone African] to 
come to him [the consul] for advice.’ Entanglement at state level was 
reflected in the contact sites between communities, with the fulfilment 
of everyday social functions helping to steer policy higher up the chain. 
As such, the consul might be called upon to admit complicated rights of 
inheritance, arbitrate a dispute, search for a woman who had left her hus-
band, obtain reimbursement for a debt or facilitate entry into a school or 
a money transfer.77 The extent of this workload led those on the ground to 
request additional support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notably 
additional personnel to deal with colonial administration.78 The signifi-
cance of French diplomats in the lives of francophone Africans resident in 
British West Africa is further evidenced by the participation of a number 
of ‘distinguished natives of French territories’ in the reception to mark 
the departure of Tourot from his post in Lagos in April 1950.79 The consul 
was, therefore, pivotal in the lives of many francophone Africans resident 
in anglophone Africa, taking on a role that far exceeded that of a normal 
consular agency.
Thus, despite being overseas representations, French diplomatic 
posts in West Africa also fulfilled the functions of the colonial adminis-
tration. They sought to act on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Overseas France simultaneously and took on the 
roles of colonial administrators despite the fact that they were physically 
located outside the borders of the French Union. This is a situation that 
was explicitly set out in the report on Monod’s visit to Africa on behalf of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1946. According to this document, the 
principal objective of the new posts in British West Africa was to execute 
colonial policy.80 In a similar vein, the French consul in Accra described in 
a 1950 dispatch ‘the particular character’ of the French post in Accra, as 
it was ‘situated in a colony surrounded by French territories, with several 
hundreds of thousands of people from these territories with French citi-
zenship’.81 The fact that many of those who served at the French consular 
posts in British West Africa had experience of work in the colonies under-
lines this blurring of the lines between the colonial and diplomatic func-
tions of the posts in Accra and Lagos. Prior to his posting in Lagos, Tourot, 
for example, had worked for sixteen years within the French colonial 
administration.82 Similarly, a 1945 note from the French post in the Gold 
Coast to the British colonial secretary described how the French consul in 
Accra ‘will be assisted by one or two officers having experience in colonial 
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affairs’.83 The colonial function of France’s diplomatic offices in British 
West Africa is further evidenced by the importance that the Ministry of 
the Colonies ascribed to these missions.84 By establishing a formal dip-
lomatic presence in anglophone Africa, the French were, therefore, con-
ducting colonial policy outside their colonies with the aim of protecting 
the empire from the outside. This, in turn, reveals the existence of a much 
wider French vision of Africa in the post- war period, which extended 
beyond the colonial context to include the continent as a whole.
Conclusions
French fears about the susceptibility of francophone Africans to 
anglophone African nationalism  – with the exception of those from the 
French mandate of Togo – proved to be largely unfounded. A report from 
the French consul in Accra, from 1955, for example, claimed that ‘the 
French African emigrant, even one who has lived [in the Gold Coast] for a 
number of years, does not consider it home’.85 This claim was supported by 
some discreet investigations carried out by the French consul into whether 
there was any demand for a French language school for the children of 
francophone African workers resident in the Gold Coast. The response was 
resoundingly negative, with nearly everyone surveyed recorded as saying 
that they wanted their children to be raised ‘in their country of origin, 
that is to say, in a French territory, because they would like to maintain 
their links there’. The growing number of Africans applying to the French 
consulate in Accra for a French passport further enhanced the French 
conviction in the loyalty of francophone Africans to the French Union.86
This type of evidence also contributed to the belief that francophone 
Africans had little interest in British West African politics. Any political 
engagement – such as the support given to Nkrumah by the Zerma, dis-
cussed above – was soon reduced to competition between different native 
groups. Characterizing these migrants by the boundaries they crossed, 
therefore, can obscure the significance of their links to the communities 
of their birth. These migratory populations did not draw on their mobil-
ity as a strong point of identity; rather, it was the memory of their lin-
gering social and cultural entanglements that marked the nature of their 
migration. Francophone Africans living in Accra, for example, attempted 
to demonstrate that they had the same rights as other foreigners resident 
in the Gold Coast, namely those from British- ruled Nigeria.87 There was 
also the growing perception that the experience in British West Africa 
actually increased francophone African loyalty to the French Union. 
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The report from the French consulate in Accra in 1955 discussed above 
asserted that the francophone Africans of the Gold Coast were troubled 
by the political evolution in this British territory and feared the prospect 
of living under a government that was entirely composed of Africans.88 
Their vision of the colonial future had, in turn, been developed in ref-
erence to their long- standing entanglement with francophone Africa. In 
a similar vein, Rouch concluded in his report on migration to the Gold 
Coast that it would be absurd for colonial administrators to consider 
these emigrants ‘as agitators ready to preach a crusade for the independ-
ence of French Africa’ as a result of their preference for the French system 
over the British.89 In particular, Rouch argued that francophone Africans 
failed to understand the British approach and thought that the British 
wanted to leave the Gold Coast because ‘they don’t like Africans’.90 For 
both the migrants and the colonial administrators who governed them, 
the contingent possibilities of their future in anglophone Africa were 
defined by their francophone entanglement.
Although French fears about the threat posed by francophone 
Africans resident in British West Africa proved to be unfounded, this 
case study is significant for our understanding of France’s approach to 
the African continent during the age of decolonization. It demonstrates 
how the interconnectivity and interdependence of the African system in 
the post- war period forced France to look beyond its colonial borders 
with a view to maintaining its sphere of influence in Africa. Of particu-
lar concern were French colonial subjects who, by living and working in 
anglophone Africa, posed a potential challenge to French colonial rule 
that was simultaneously internal and external. French attempts to deal 
with this perceived double- sided threat, in turn, influenced France’s 
approach not only to its colonies but also to the African continent as a 
whole. With regard to the former, French efforts to prevent the migra-
tion of its colonial subjects to anglophone Africa influenced some of the 
reforms implemented in the post- war period in an attempt to ensure that 
francophone Africa remained French. In the case of the latter, initia-
tives aimed at providing for colonial subjects living in anglophone Africa 
prompted the systematic expansion of France’s formal presence in Africa 
outside its colonial empire. This, in turn, set the stage for a much wider 
French engagement with the African continent in the post- independence 
period.91
Thus, in contrast to much of the current literature, which has empha-
sized the particularity of France’s relations with francophone Africa, the 
responses of the French to their expatriate colonial subjects demonstrate 
the existence of a much wider French approach to the African continent 
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from the post- war period. Colonial problems were not confined solely to 
the francophone African setting, and colonial policy was not informed 
purely by experiences within the French empire. Rather, during the age 
of decolonization, challenges to French colonial rule, along with efforts 
to resolve these potential threats, were entangled with events in anglo-
phone Africa. Unpicking this web of entanglements is vital to fully under-
standing the end of French rule in Africa and its aftermath, as well as 
wider processes of decolonization in the twentieth century. 
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Conclusion: the conditional as  
a category
Chris Jeppesen and Andrew W. M. Smith
The ways in which the future is forecast, when we speak in the 
conditional, are intimately bound up with our assessment of the present. 
After the Second World War, when this volume has stressed the notion 
of a late colonial shift, there was a period of profound change, creating 
a mass of swirling possibilities in Europe and in Africa. In 1950 Keïta 
Fodéba described an ‘African dawn’, as the ruptures of wartime and 
imperial conflict interrupted the rhythms of village life.1 There was a 
sense, for some, that natural forces were undermining empire, but also 
that they could spark its renewal. For European powers, this late colonial 
shift offered the chance to reconstruct empire as a modernizing force 
committed to development and an essential, stabilizing structure within 
the new constellations of Cold War rivalry. For those living under colonial 
rule, new claims could be made for economic and political equality, while 
white settler communities saw the chance to assert a colonial future that 
might entrench white control in Africa. All the while, for anti- colonial 
political and intellectual elites, it seemed that a global discourse of rights 
should secure colonial emancipation.
The conditional assessment of empire was not simply the task of 
states. Ordinary people, activists, businesses and even historians all imag-
ined their own futures. As demonstrated by Michael Collins in Chapter 1, 
these visions were not limited by, or within, bounded spaces or official 
channels. Instead, they ranged across local, national, imperial and global 
forums to try and make real the ambitions hoped possible. Removing the 
definite ending from our imperfect view of the past does not necessitate a 
counter- factual discussion of flags and federations, but can open a smaller 
window on a social history of ideas inflected by the context in which they 
emerged. This volume has sought to stress the uncertainties of the end of 
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British and French empire in Africa as a means of interrogating the con-
tingent nature of the decolonization process. Competing visions of what 
this change might entail vied throughout the 1950s, and, in turn, cre-
ated new openings that promised alternative futures, regardless of their 
realization. In emphasizing three central themes of development, con-
tingency and entanglement, the essays in this collection have sought to 
tease out how some of those futures were imagined, why some succeeded 
and why others fell away. As Frederick Cooper notes:  ‘Imaginative pro-
jects have material consequences.’2
Colonial development was central to this reimagining. The reshap-
ing of colonial societies never unfolded as European planners hoped, 
however; Africa would not be Europe’s blank slate. Far from revealing the 
hegemonic, modernizing power of empire, development schemes often 
exposed the limits of colonial authority and the necessity for negotiation. 
Development became a field in which competing claims on the future 
could be made, and, simultaneously, the battleground upon which those 
visions were resisted. In charting the distance between metropolitan 
ambitions and local realities, the chapters in this volume suggest fresh 
insight into how development initiatives contributed to the contingent 
ends of empire. In Chapter 2, Charlotte Riley traced debates about aid and 
development within the Labour Party from the post- war moment, when 
policy- makers still imagined a bright colonial future, to the postcolonial 
world, when development remained central to policy- makers’ vision of 
progressive engagement with African states. Continuity in personnel and 
ideas ensured that the transfer of power did not precipitate a fundamen-
tal rupture in development policy but that new initiatives often built upon 
enduring colonial entanglements. In Chapter 3, Marta Musso looked at 
how Algerian oil became a contingent factor at the turbulent end of French 
empire in North Africa. Throughout the War of Independence a range of 
actors on both sides, at and below the level of the state, sought to exploit 
the developmental promise of hydrocarbons to cultivate allies, dominate 
debates and make deals in pursuit of a vital resource. In both chapters, 
we see how the promise of future developmental engagement was wholly 
contingent on ideas of sovereignty defined in the conditional. European 
powers emphasized developmental entanglements to ensure continued 
access to markets and resources, while newly independent governments 
often forfeited sovereign control over territorial resources to preserve 
economic ties to Europe. Understanding the conditional sense of decolo-
nization helps to explain the performative aspect of continued European 
involvement in Africa. Between aid parcels branded with the Union Jack 
and ephemeral Saharan oil contracts drawn up by the embattled French 
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state lies an insight into how the politics of development were contested 
during the ongoing process of decolonization.
Each aspect of these contests was refracted through the many indi-
vidual perspectives that made up the imperial nation state. By looking 
at the ways in which individual decisions formed amidst the rapidly 
changing climate of the 1950s, we can begin to cut across those perspec-
tives to consider how those living through the ends of empire responded 
to the wider changes unfolding around them. In Chapter  4, Andrew 
Smith argued that, by understanding the way these visions of the future 
were shaped by specific moments in the late colonial state, we can bet-
ter untangle the ongoing process of decolonization. By placing specific 
documents within their ideational context, it is possible to look more 
closely at the ways in which discourse was shaped by the broader entan-
glements that surrounded it, both personal and political. In Chapter 5, 
Robert Skinner considered how the concept of human rights took on a 
new inflection as the process of decolonization accelerated. Skinner 
showed that the history of human rights, and its strong association with 
sovereignty, was contingent on the entangled history of decolonization. 
From Sharpeville to the United Nations, on to West Yorkshire and back 
to southern Africa, networks of transnational activists emerged from the 
particularities of local violence. Amidst the breakdown of empire, these 
networks became essential conduits in mobilizing global opinion against 
the enduring iniquities of white rule in Africa. In both these chapters, we 
can see how a dense, interconnected and diverse range of debates shaped 
and were shaped by the end of European empires and the ongoing pro-
cess of decolonization. By tracing the discourse, or studying the moment 
in which these ideas were framed, we get a sense of how placing decolo-
nization in the conditional tense opens new opportunities for analysis.
Focusing on these moments and on these discussions means 
looking at the messy ways in which formal empires split apart. From 
this, we gain a pronounced sense of the complex mental and mate-
rial entanglements that survived flag independence. In Chapter  6, 
Chris Jeppesen looked at changing ideas of service and duty in the 
late colonial state. The Colonial Service’s recruitment crisis in the 
1950s exposed the irreconcilable tensions between its traditional 
institutional ethos and the new priorities of the revised colonial mis-
sion. As careers in empire lost their popular appeal, new organiza-
tions, such as VSO, offered alternative opportunities for service and 
adventure overseas. The links between the two organizations empha-
sized the ways in which this was a future imagined on the basis of a 
changing relationship between Britain and colonial territories, but 
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one that sought to emphasize the constant of duty amidst a turbulent 
climate. The porosity of colonial borders ensured that entanglements 
existed not only between ‘metropole’ and ‘colony’ but between empires 
themselves, despite the best efforts of cartographers to demarcate 
European empires as discrete territorial units. In Chapter  7, Joanna 
Warson charted the dense networks of labour, kinship and trade that 
crossed colonial borders and imperilled imperial sovereignty. Labour 
migrancy between anglophone and francophone West Africa exposed 
the insecurities of flagging empires and highlighted the limited ability 
of the late colonial state to impose control on the actions of indigenous 
people. Looking at how colonial administrators sought to untangle 
these links shows how they themselves imagined the future of African 
development and projected French influence forwards. Both these 
chapters captured the late colonial state as a contested space in which 
the ‘official mind’ sought to impose control on the turbulent currents 
starting to erode colonial authority. Exploring these often futile efforts 
reveals the internal contradictions that stood at the heart of Britain 
and France’s revised colonial missions. The desire to impose a vision of 
a consensual and ongoing colonial future through often frenzied plan-
ning belied the limits of colonial control in the everyday lives of many 
indigenous people. Yet this planning also made possible unexpected, 
though enduring, entanglements between newly independent states 
and postcolonial powers.
The contradictions of decolonization need not hinder its discus-
sion, nor limit our frames of analysis. In looking at the three key themes 
of this volume  – development, contingency and entanglement  – it is 
clear that they overlap and intersect as analytical categories. This is a 
productive tension for understanding the ways in which imperial lega-
cies lingered and systemic inequality persisted, even as new languages 
of liberation found an ever greater audience. The force of the future 
imperfect lies in its conditionality, and, in trying to rescue that sense 
of the conditional, the entanglements of the late colonial state gain 
traction. In this space delimited by time instead of place, we can gain 
an insight into the importance of the post- war moment as a period in 
which processes of change were accelerated, and perceptions of the 
future recast. Exploring visions of the future can open up a sense of 
the late colonial shift as it occurred, privileging an anti- teleological 
reading of these transformative decades. By seeking to untangle the 
asymmetric interactions of individual actors, larger global networks 
and specific governments, the link between imagining and acting the 
end of empire becomes clearer. Using the conditional as a category, 
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we can begin to unpick the developmental, contingent and entangled 
threads of the imperial nation state as it planned imaginative projects 
in Europe and Africa.
By 1965 Keïta Fodéba envisaged a ‘new dawn of African freedom’; 
winds had seemingly calmed and tides ebbed, leaving behind only the 
crumbled remnants of Britain and France’s African empires. As this 
volume has sought to explore, however, decolonization was never an 
irresistible force of nature but a contested, uncertain and contingent to- 
and- fro, which unfolded in the conditional and left entangled pasts to 
shape future possibilities. Bright though Fodéba’s new dawn seemed in 
the mid- 1960s, it should not blind us to the blurred alternatives glimpsed 
in the twilight of empire.
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Afterword: Achilles and the tortoise: 
the tortoise’s view of late colonialism 
and decolonization
Martin Shipway
As the battle of Borodino draws to its wearied and bloody end, in volume 
three of War and peace, Leo Tolstoy reflects on a day that, while militarily 
inconclusive, ultimately led to the defeat of Napoleonic France, ‘a country 
on which, at Borodino, for the very first time, the hand of an opponent 
stronger in spirit had been laid’. Turning the page, Tolstoy then turns his 
attention away from his narrative, to the problem of historical time and 
causation, drawing a parallel with Zeno of Elea’s best- known paradox, 
‘whereby a tortoise that has a head start on Achilles will never be caught 
up by him, even though Achilles is walking ten times faster than the 
tortoise’.1 In the time it takes Achilles to reach the tortoise’s starting 
point, the tortoise will have gained on him, and so on ad infinitum; the 
mathematical resolution of the paradox need not detain us, though 
Tolstoy dismisses it perhaps too readily as a ‘fallacy’. But the way in 
which Tolstoy expounds his analogy with the ‘search for the laws of 
historical movement’ offers some cautionary lessons for us as historians 
of decolonization.
Writing in the 1860s, at a distance from the events of 1812 similar 
to our own from the climactic ‘year of Africa’, 1960, Tolstoy’s perspec-
tive on the entire Napoleonic period offers the loftiest of ‘aerial views’ (to 
borrow from Michael Collins):  ‘[A] n extraordinary spectacle – millions 
of men in movement. Men drop their normal occupations and rush from 
one end of Europe to the other, plundering, slaughtering one another, 
experiencing triumph and despair, and the whole business of life is dis-
rupted for years to come…’2 Tolstoy, of course, had his own agenda: not 
only the condemnation of war and all its works, but also an assault on the 
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myth of Bonaparte’s genius, and more generally on the agency of ‘great 
men’. If his alter ego is Count Pierre Bezukhov, wandering the battlefield 
at Borodino, excited but uncomprehending, the exemplar of his view of 
history is Marshal Kutuzov, who alone understands that history will take 
its course however he intervenes, and who finally recognizes that there is 
nothing left to do but die. ‘And die he did.’3
Just as Achilles does, of course, outpace the tortoise with ease (‘as 
any fule kno’, Nigel Molesworth might interject, looking over Count 
Lev Nikolayevich’s shoulder), so it sometimes seems that our object of 
study, the end of the European colonial empires, may all too readily, as 
Tolstoy puts it, be ‘blown away like dust, leaving no trace behind, sim-
ply by selecting a greater or smaller discrete unit for analysis’.4 Especially 
greater. On the one hand, the ‘twenty- year crisis’ of post- 1945 decolo-
nization was played out, as I have argued elsewhere, at the hectic pace 
and accelerating timescales of l’histoire événementielle.5 This necessarily 
left room for contingency, or, as one might put it more plainly – recall-
ing Harold Macmillan’s possibly apocryphal quip that it was ‘events, dear 
boy, events’ that he most feared – for things to go wrong. From this per-
spective, decolonization and its aftermath were so ragged and unpredict-
able, so much a matter of hurried negotiations and hastily improvised, if 
grandly executed, ‘transfers of power’, followed by more or less orderly 
imperial retreats, and by greater or lesser degrees of post-colonial chaos, 
that actors at the time necessarily found themselves reaching for larger 
explanations: trysts with destiny, national liberation, ‘freedom in poverty 
rather than riches in slavery’, winds of change, tides of history or even, 
quite simply if tautologically, a newly invented ‘decolonization’. On the 
other hand, returning to Frederick Cooper’s dictum, already quoted by 
the editors at the outset, given that ‘we know the end of the story’, not 
only do we all reach for some larger explanation as to why decolonization 
happened – and I do not need to renavigate the terrain so comprehen-
sively mapped out by Michael Collins in this volume – but we also most 
likely subscribe to the view that it was somehow ‘inevitable’. And yet, 
though we as historians of decolonization might concur that the dying 
colonial empires, like Napoleon, were defeated at the ‘hand of an oppo-
nent stronger in spirit’, we might nonetheless resist either or both of the 
two broad theses expounded by generalist historians on an ideological 
continuum extending from Niall Ferguson to Eric Hobsbawm, by public 
commentators and by our own undergraduate students: either that the 
inevitability of the end of colonial empire was so irrefutable as to require 
no further explanation, other than perhaps a misplaced nod of congratu-
lation to the British on how ‘well’ they managed their imperial retreat; or, 
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conversely, that it was so trivial or so cynically stage- managed an event 
that the underlying forces of (Western) imperialism, racial domination 
or globalization continued largely unchecked, or indeed were reinvigor-
ated by the process.
The historian of decolonization, blinking in the late afternoon sun-
light of Kew or Aix- en- Provence after another day in the archives, may 
tend rather to the tortoise’s perspective. Here, the tortoise looks appre-
hensively over his shoulder (and, if he was a colonial official, he was 
almost certainly male) as Achilles bears down inexorably, perhaps urged 
on by Walter Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’, as deployed so evocatively by 
Benedict Anderson.6 And yet, that same official continues writing, plan-
ning, reforming, accumulating document after document, box after box. 
Although no more distant from us than Pierre or his more courtly friend 
Prince Andrey from their creator, reconstructing the point of view of this 
late colonial ‘official mind’ offers something of a puzzle: what did these 
individuals think they were doing? Setting the agenda for a transna-
tional approach to decolonization and globalization, Martin Thomas and 
Andrew Thompson have proposed a beguiling psychological explanation:
Many acknowledged that the old ways of colonial dominance were 
becoming untenable. Yet few applied the logic of this insight to 
their particular colonial difficulties. Supporters of empire instead 
argued time and again that, despite the countervailing evidence in 
other places, either resisting rebellion or imposing limited reforms 
in others might yet achieve success. This was neither blind reac-
tion nor unreconstructed imperialism. Rather, it was something 
more: a problem of cognitive dissonance, a failure to recognise that 
the internationalisation of colonial problems and the transnational 
networks of anti- colonial opposition made the local containment of 
colonial problems impossible to achieve.7
Rooting around in a second- hand bookshop recently, I was reminded 
that ‘cognitive dissonance’ has been used before to explain ‘ideologi-
cal polarization’, for example during the Cultural Revolution in China.8 
Persuasive as the idea may be of British or French (and, one might think, 
even more Belgian or Portuguese) officials grappling to bridge the ‘dis-
connect’ between their belief systems (‘If I just keep moving, Achilles will 
never catch me’) and what they saw happening around them, the concept 
turns out, on closer inspection (and as Paul Hiniker’s title suggests), to be 
a variant on the conventional juxtaposition of ‘ideology’ and ‘reality’. As 
Gary Wilder has argued, this conceptual pairing of opposites has given 
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rise to an enduring ‘analytic of failure’ in French colonial historiography, 
according to which ‘ “failure” is treated as the condition and horizon of 
knowledge about colonial history’, presupposing a ‘narrative of progress 
against which reformers’ failure and success may be easily evaluated’.9 It 
may simply be that Wilder’s ‘analytic of failure’ applied to interwar colo-
nial humanism is at risk of transmuting into a post- 1945 ‘analytic of futile 
intransigence’.10
In any case, I find myself unwilling to break faith entirely with the 
subjects I have encountered in the archive. As a doctoral student coming 
fresh to historical research, but mindful of the self- deceiving protago-
nists of French and German literature I  had encountered as an under-
graduate, I  once asked my supervisor, John Darwin, what I  should do 
if I simply could not believe what the documents were telling me (I do 
not recall exactly about what, probably French official reformist inten-
tions in Indochina). Darwin’s bemused advice – and he was perhaps most 
concerned that I should not lose the momentum of writing – was along 
the lines of ‘Just tell it as you find it’.11 It was good advice, though the 
historiographical moment for ‘Whiggish’ belief in a ‘planned’ decoloniza-
tion had already passed,12 and, in the case of my own research, the ‘myth’ 
of Brazzaville et seq. did not bear close scrutiny. As Wilder also urges us, 
rather than ‘enacting’ the rights and wrongs of colonial history, or our 
disagreement with the values of its (imperial) subjects, we need to ‘work 
through’ the debates and discourses as we find them.13 Andrew Smith’s 
notion of ‘expired contingency’, expounded in this volume, seems to me 
to be more congenial than the sustained suspension of disbelief suggested 
by a diagnosis of ‘cognitive dissonance’. It allows us, at least in the first 
instance, to take at face value the arguments for alternative ‘imagined 
futures’ or for the ‘future imperfect’, as set out by the editors – and not, 
counter- factually, because of what ‘might have happened’ but because 
they may, with patience, lead us to a fuller explanation of what did.
All historians no doubt have epiphanies in the archives of the kind 
recounted by Smith, but I hope I may be allowed the indulgence of telling 
one of my own, as it advances my argument. Somewhere in the ‘Affaires 
politiques’ files at Aix I found a scrap of squared notecard on which was 
written, in the unmistakable handwriting of Governor Henri Laurentie, 
director of political affairs, something like ‘Hô  – sam[edi], 20h  – rue 
Jasmin’.14 It appeared to be the record of a dinner invitation; the address 
in the sixteenth arrondissement of Paris, was, I guessed, Laurentie’s ser-
vice apartment. With no more precise information to go on, I tucked the 
memory away, and did not mention it in my doctoral thesis or in the book 
that followed.15 When, much later, I met Laurentie’s sons, the memory 
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resurfaced, and I put the question to the younger son, Jean: yes, the din-
ner took place (‘How did you know that?’), sometime in August 1946; 
Jean was present, and ‘Oncle Hô’ dedicated a children’s book to him.16 
What transpired at the dinner we will never know, nor what they ate, 
drank or smoked. And, though it is not likely that Laurentie was offer-
ing Hô the job of Governor General of the proposed new Federation of 
Indochina, the occasion also hardly seems like the encounter of men 
contemplating – on either side – the impending irretrievable breakdown 
in relations between the French Republic and Hô’s fledgling Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam. At this point, certainly, the tortoise is well out 
in front…
Although he was its principal author, Laurentie, for one, had been 
arguing against the Indochinese federal project within French official 
circles, at least since the Japanese overthrow of the Vichyste adminis-
tration of Indochina on 9 March 1945, on the grounds that France had 
been, in the words of Pierre Messmer, ‘physically and intellectually 
wiped from the face of Vietnam’, and that therefore an accommodation 
needed to be reached with Vietnamese nationalism.17 Even earlier, late 
in 1944, Captain Paul Mus claims to have advised Laurentie to use the 
term ‘French Union’, rather than the then preferred ‘Communauté’, as 
it would more readily accommodate a sovereign Vietnam.18 Returning 
for a moment to Andrew Smith’s objet trouvé, the publicity slip on Mus’ 
1954 publication Le destin de l’Union française, though the meaning of 
the inscription ‘INDOCHINE X AFRIQUE?’ was clear enough in 1954, in 
the wake of Dien Bien Phu, the message might also be taken as acknowl-
edging a much earlier foreclosing of certain possibilities, though, by the 
same token, the opening out of others.
Thinking again about Laurentie leads me back to the late colonial 
state, which is central to an understanding of all three conceptual strands 
at the heart of the present volume: development, contingency, entan-
glement. The late colonial state is a curiously elusive entity that did not 
actually exist at the time, any more than ‘decolonization’ existed as a gen-
eralized concept much before the late 1950s. One of the few historians to 
write about it at any length is John Darwin, in an incisive article published 
in 1999.19 And yet, in his magisterial The empire project, Darwin prefers to 
write about colonial governments, for example in the context of an (also 
fictional) ‘fourth British Empire’, of which the ‘most self- confident face’ was 
the so- called ‘second colonial occupation’ (that is, the late colonial devel-
opment regime evoked by Charlotte Riley and Chris Jeppesen).20 Looking 
back at Decolonization and its impact, I realize that I used the colonial state, 
late or otherwise, largely instrumentally, as the optic through which my 
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comparative approach was most effective; a way of bringing the otherwise 
disproportionate weight of British imperialism into scale with French and 
other colonial states that I wanted to consider. The onset of the colonial 
state’s ‘lateness’, which I characterized as a ‘late colonial shift’ (an idea that 
appears to have gained some purchase in the literature), seemed to me 
to be crucial to understanding the ways in which the post- 1945 crisis of 
colonial empire eventually resolved itself into decolonization. And, though 
others have written about a French ‘empire- state’ or ‘imperial nation- state’, 
in particular Frederick Cooper and Gary Wilder, both of whose work has 
been immensely influential on my own thinking, it sometimes seems that 
only my Portuguese colleagues persist with the idea of a late colonial state 
as such.21 Indeed, when Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo invited me in 2012 to 
present the idea of the British and French late colonial state to a seminar at 
Brown University, Cooper suggested that it was not that late (as Portuguese 
late colonialism came later), was not really colonial any more and was cer-
tainly not a state – so all I was really left with was ‘the’. He was, I think, 
teasing. Finally, and here I accept mea culpa, though I followed through 
the late colonial shift to the endgame of decolonization, time, space and 
flagging momentum ensured that, like late colonialism itself, my work 
petered out at the moment of ‘flag independence’; although reviewers have 
forborne to mention it, the reference to ‘impact’ in my title, the vestige of 
earlier ambition, was no longer fully justified.
Reading the essays collected in this volume has been a pleasurable 
and intellectually profitable experience, and I was both flattered and 
slightly unnerved by the invitation to contribute this afterword, by vir-
tue of my status as an ‘established scholar’ (where ‘established’ might be 
taken to mean either superannuated or comprehensively outflanked). I 
hope I can rise to the challenge with three brief concluding comments to 
suggest how the essays reflect where we find ourselves in our understand-
ing of the contingencies and entanglements of late colonialism, the late 
colonial state in particular and the transition to the post-colonial state. 
First, and starting with a statement of the obvious, all these chapters 
(apart from Michael Collins’ formidable historiographical survey) are 
written from the perspective of imperial or (soon- to- be) post- imperial 
actors, and thus reflect, for the period of decolonization, what Cooper has 
termed ‘thinking like an empire’.22 In his recent Freedom time, Wilder too 
takes an approach ‘that begins with empire as an optic emphasiz[ing] the 
real, if problematic ways that colonized peoples were members of impe-
rial political formations’, and ‘proceeds from the fact that European states 
did not simply surrender colonies but abandoned their overseas popu-
lations’.23 As these essays show, this same optic may also embrace the 
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‘real, if problematic ways’ in which those at the imperial centre thought 
about empire, and how a late imperial perspective conditioned, focused 
or indeed compromised their thought and action. Imperial, perhaps, 
but not necessarily imperialist, the voices that emerge from these pages 
include: officials of a more or less reformist persuasion; recruiters to the 
Colonial Service seeking to rebrand the career they were offering, as well 
as their increasingly sceptical recruitees; British Labour Party members 
and policy- makers wriggling on the hook of their own predilection for late 
colonial interventionism; oil executives, including those of rival European 
nations (early- adopting neo- colonialists, perhaps, seeking to profit from 
impending decolonization); and human rights activists in the English 
shires, reconciling their concern for individual human rights with the 
overriding priority of a collective right of self- determination.
Secondly, the essays confirm a view that, if the late colonial state 
was not perhaps very state- like, it was – or, in the editors’ preferred future 
imperfect tense, would be – becoming more so. (It may be worth record-
ing here that, in French, the conditional is used also for reported speech; 
as Le Monde might have reported in November 1954: ‘Selon M. Mitterrand, 
l’Algérie, ce serait la France…’ In other words, the conditional embraces 
both point of view and intention.) Just as John Darwin’s title draws on 
Adam Smith’s contention that the British empire in 1776 was ‘not an 
empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine but the project of a 
gold mine’,24 so too we might suggest that the late colonial state was ‘the 
project of a state’, but one that never fully got off the ground before decol-
onization intervened. The postcolonial landscape was strewn with the 
wreckage of late colonial state projects that failed to make it off the run-
way – in particular the various federal projects that Collins has studied25 –  
as if decolonization were some geopolitical prequel to Ken Annakin’s 1965 
film Those magnificent men in their flying machines. What all these projects 
had in common, including those that remained mere blueprints for flying 
machines, like the plans for a Federation of Indochina, was that, more 
than the project of a gold/ copper/ tin/ uranium mine, oil well or rubber/ 
coffee/ sisal plantation, they embodied the ambition of what we might 
call, following Michel Foucault, late colonial rationality or ‘governmental-
ity’, understood as
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.26
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In seeking to open up analytical space for the idea of an imagined 
Franco- African federalism, as championed by Léopold Senghor and Aimé 
Césaire, Wilder urges us to go beyond what he calls ‘methodological 
nationalism’ – that is, to see decolonization as something other than ‘a 
series of dyadic encounters between imperial states…figured as power-
ful nations and [colonized peoples] as not yet independent nations ruled 
by foreign colonizers’.27 This is, at the very least, an interesting mind 
game, identifying the ways in which our thinking is predicated on ‘meth-
odological nationalism’, such as my own characterization of the late 
colonial state, in 2008, as ‘in some sense the prize over which colonial 
governments and nationalist political forces were fighting’,28 or indeed 
David Low and John Lonsdale’s highly influential concept of the ‘second 
colonial occupation’.29 As my fellow contributors seem to demonstrate, 
Wilder’s suggested alternative approach is the logical corollary of tracing 
the trajectory of the late (and soon to be defunct) colonial state, whether 
this comes from the perspective of French proconsuls fretting over the 
impact of inter- imperial migration or the evolution of the British left’s 
development policy. Even the stratagems of the French official mind to 
secure a French future for Saharan hydrocarbons, it might be argued, 
were held in tension with late colonial rationality, whether in the form of 
de Gaulle’s 1958 Constantine Plan for Algerian development, which was 
to be funded by the Algerian bonanza; or of the Common Organisation of 
the Saharan Regions (OCRS), which, though one of the least ‘state- like’ 
of late colonial projects, was not without appeal to local Tuareg popula-
tions who otherwise found themselves at the margins of the future states 
of Mali and Niger – or indeed to Mali and Niger themselves, which briefly, 
before Algerian sovereignty dictated otherwise from 1962, glimpsed the 
possibility of a share of oil revenues.30
Thirdly, and most importantly, what emerges from the essays in this 
collection taken as a whole is a fuller, more complex understanding, but 
in many ways a more straightforward one than our conventional ‘meth-
odological nationalism’ allows, of what happened to the late colonial 
state as it passed through the turbulence of the decolonizing endgame. 
Reading through Foucault’s Security, territory, population lectures (and 
even while recognizing that Foucault himself would soon take his concept 
in radically different directions),31 I was struck by the parallels between 
his subject and ours, in his historical account of the evolution in statecraft 
from the Renaissance to the modern period, from an overriding preoccu-
pation with the maintenance of sovereignty over a given territory, which 
was associated with Machiavelli’s advice to the prince, to a concern with 
‘people and things’, and hence to ‘governmentality’. The key relationship, 
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it seemed to me, for example in his depiction of the ‘Westphalian’ state 
system (from 1648), was the relationship between sovereignty and gov-
ernmentality (or ‘reason of state’). Turning to the late colonial empires, 
it is this relationship, between an ongoing if challenged imperial sover-
eignty and the forms of an interventionist, welfarist late colonial state 
(also a ‘security state’), that we address.32 The question then arises, 
which is not considered by Foucault (or indeed by those authors who led 
me to Foucault, Wilder and Véronique Dimier),33 as to what happens (as, 
Paul Mus argued, had already happened in Vietnam in 1945) when impe-
rial sovereignty is withdrawn. Only a preliminary answer is suggested 
here, lest this afterword outrun its allotted space, but, on the evidence 
presented in this volume, it would seem to be the case that the processes 
of late colonial governmentality simply continued, albeit in a transfig-
ured or transmuted form. Achilles outruns, and possibly even laps, the 
tortoise, and yet the progress of the tortoise continues.
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